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Abstract
What is the psychology of privacy? How do we perceive privacy? Why do
we disclose personal information about ourselves on the Internet, and what
does this reveal about our own personalities? In six chapters, this dissertation
discusses potential answers to these questions. Chapter 1 provides a general
introduction to the overarching research question, Chapters 2-5 include the
four main studies that either have already been published (Study 1, 2, and 3)
or have been submitted for publication (Study 4), and Chapter 6 summarizes
the dissertation and offers a concluding privacy synthesis.
In Study 1, I propose a new privacy theory, the so-called Privacy Pro-
cess Model (PPM). The PPM states that privacy consists of three major el-
ements: the privacy context, the privacy perception, and the privacy behav-
ior. In order to balance the three elements people constantly engage in a
privacy regulation process, which can be either explicit / conscious or im-
plicit / subconscious. Through concrete examples of new digital media, sev-
eral implications of the PPM are demonstrated.
In Study 2 and 3, I analyze aspects of privacy that pertain to the Internet
in particular. Both studies explain and predict concrete online privacy behav-
iors on social network sites (SNSs). An observation known as privacy paradox
states that privacy behaviors cannot be predicted sufficiently by means of
psychological antecedents such as privacy concerns. In Study 2 (Is the Pri-
vacy Paradox a Relic of the Past?), which is co-authored by Prof. Dr. Sabine
Trepte, we analyze this observation through the results of an online question-
naire with 579 respondents from Germany. By adopting a theory of planned
behavior-based approach, the results showed that self-disclosure could be ex-
plained by privacy intentions, privacy attitudes, and privacy concerns. These
findings could be generalized for three different privacy dimensions: infor-
mational, social, and psychological privacy behaviors. Altogether, Study 2
therefore suggests that the privacy paradox does not exist.
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Study 3 (An Extended Privacy Calculus Model for SNSs), co-authored by Prof.
Dr. Miriam J. Metzger, builds upon the results of Study 2 and investigates
whether psychological antecedents can explain not only online self-disclosure
but also online self-withdrawal, all within one single theoretical and empiri-
cal framework. Using a privacy calculus-based approach, the study analyzes
data from a U.S.-representative online sample with 1,156 respondents. The re-
sults showed that self-disclosure could be explained both by privacy concerns
and expected benefits. In addition, self-withdrawal could also be predicted
by both privacy concerns and privacy self-efficacy. In conclusion, Study 3
demonstrates that perceived benefits, privacy self-efficacy, and privacy con-
cerns together predict both online self-disclosure and online self-withdrawal.
Study 4 (Predicting the Desire for Privacy), also co-authored by Miriam J.
Metzger, then again broadens the perspective and analyzes the relationship
between the desire for privacy and different facets of personality, with a
focus on aspects of personal integrity. Building on Altman’s privacy regu-
lation theory, we tested our hypotheses with a 2-study approach: First, we
conducted an online questionnaire with 296 respondents and second, we
ran a laboratory experiment with 87 participants. The results of the ques-
tionnaire showed several significant relationships: For example, respondents
who reported lacking integrity and being more shy, less anxious, and more
risk averse were all more likely to desire privacy. The experiment, for ex-
ample, showed a statistical trend that participants who had written an essay
about past negative behaviors were more likely to express an increased desire
for privacy from other people. In addition, an implicit association test (IAT)
showed that participants whose IAT results implied higher lack of integrity
also desired more privacy from government surveillance. In conclusion, the
results evidence that the desire for privacy relates with several aspects of
personality and, notably, also with personal integrity.
In the overarching discussion, I combine the aforementioned results in
order to draw a novel and updated picture of privacy. This picture suggests
that online self-disclosure is not paradoxical but explainable. Being able to
understand online privacy behaviors is important; however, this is not only
because the Internet has paramount importance in social and professional
contexts, but also because our desire for privacy can even reveal central as-
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pects of personality, such as our own personal integrity. Finally, I integrate the
results with the aim to contribute to a new privacy synthesis. This privacy
synthesis argues that modern societies should try to design new cultural
artifacts about privacy, update old and obsolete social privacy cybernetics,
foster a better understanding of the conceptual nature of privacy, work to-
ward new and more protective privacy laws, and, above all, aim to leverage
overall privacy literacy.
11
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1 Introduction
1.1 A brave new privacy?
In his novel Brave New World, Aldous Huxley (1932) describes a fictitious
society of the future, one that is full of technological and societal revolutions.
In this new world, people can learn while they are sleeping, have promiscu-
ous relationships, benefit from optimized genes, reproduce artificially, and
enjoy perennial instant gratification (through a drug called “soma”). On
the one hand, this enabled some significant societal improvements, such
as stability, peace, and freedom (according to the totalitarian government);
on the other hand, however, these changes also curtailed several important
socio-psychological aspects, such as eudemonic growth or individual self-
realization (according to the main protagonist Bernard Marx). In the end, the
negative consequences prevailed — this brave new world was not positive
but negative, Huxley designed a dystopia and not a utopia.
Since Huxley’s novel in 1932, the real world has changed substantially as
well, and several sweeping technological and societal revolutions took place.
Interestingly, some of these changes are similar to those described by Huxley:
People nowadays google in order to attain all the information they need,
find their romantic partners online through apps such as tinder, optimize
their physique by counting and tracking every single step they make, talk
with their friends and family at any time and at any place, and overall just
never seem to be bored. But what do these technological and societal changes
imply, are they positive or negative?
Notably, almost all of the aforementioned changes have one thing in com-
mon: They affect peoples’ privacy. When, what, and how much do we want to
disclose about ourselves? Information systems now record, store, and make
accessible a large part of things that had not been documented before, had
been forgotten, or had not been accessible. What once was private can now
13
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become public. There is no doubt that the recent technological and societal
changes have both changed and challenged the foundations of privacy —
with no end in sight.1 Hence, even though it remains somewhat controversial
and polemic to say, there seems to be some truth to the claim that with the
end of the 20th century, society changed so significantly that indeed a brave
new world was born, a world with eminent effects on everyone’s privacy.
1.2 Thesis: Our privacy has decreased
In order to discuss how the socio-technological changes affected privacy ex-
actly, it is useful to have a look at the general mechanisms of change. To
this end, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel offered a most prominent and help-
ful template, the so-called “Hegel’s dialectic” (Hegel, 1807/2011). According
to Hegel, societal change often takes place as follows: A status quo (thesis)
causes an extreme reaction (antithesis), which eventually leads to a more
moderate solution (synthesis). Change is a social process and always messy
and cumbersome: A difficult situation will provoke an extreme reaction,
which will entail both important improvements but also grave new errors
(Hegel, 1807/2011). Only gradually, and after much to and fro, a more mod-
erate solution can manifest.
As illustration, consider the following prominent example from history,
the French Revolution (The Philosophers Mail, 2015): The regal decadency
during times of absolutism in France in the 18th century was a strong provo-
cation for the impoverished French people (thesis). Eventually, this provo-
cation paved the way for the French revolution, with the aim to empower
the people (antithesis). The code civil, a cornerstone of personal freedom
and civil rights, was passed; but, at the same time, Robespierre’s reign of
terror also started to devastate society. Only gradually and several decades
later, modern democracies were able to manifest (synthesis). Hegel’s tripar-
1Interestingly, the rate of technological progress seems to increase steadily: According to the
law of accelerating returns, technological progress does increase not only linearly but even
exponentially (Kurzweil, 2005). According to Moore’s law, components per computer chip
double each year, a hypothesis that is by now well supported by empirical data (Mack,
2011). Hence, the future will very likely provide even more technological devices that
collect personal data.
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tite observation of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis thus offers a promising
framework to analyze current phenomena of privacy, which is why I will
adopt it in this introduction and also later in the overarching discussion.
Thesis: In the course of the past years, our privacy has decreased sig-
nificantly. It has decreased because the status quo, from an intrapersonal
perspective, encompasses an unprecedented intrusion into personality. Others
can attain very sensible information about us, sometimes even information
that we do not know ourselves — for example, our shopping habits, our color
preferences, or our social network structure. Others can acquire pieces of in-
formation about us that accurately describe our personality, our inner selves.
Second, the status quo epitomizes a loss of control. Companies have the ca-
pabilities to precisely predict our personality, and users have no chances to
prevent them from doing so (Matzner, 2014). Moreover, even if we deliber-
ately allow Facebook to access our information, we cannot prevent Facebook
from passing on that information to others.2 Latent profiles are construed
with information drawn from several sources, a process that is beyond our
control (Matzner, 2014). Third, the status quo undermines the human abil-
ity to forget. The characteristic of humans brains to forget information is
oftentimes considered a blessing (e.g., Smithstein, 2010-07-25): Forgetting
eventually helps to forgive, one might consider it the brain’s inherent ca-
pacity to “wipe the slate clean”. As instant messengers today record and
store the content of verbal communication, this capacity is undercut. Fourth,
the status quo is a challenge for cross-contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2010).
Whereas before it was possible to represent different personas in different
contexts, this possibility gets lost due to a so-called context collapse (boyd,
2008). Context collapse describes the characteristic of SNSs to combine sev-
eral distinct social groups into one meta group. Hence, one’s partner, family,
friends, colleagues, and acquaintances are suddenly merged into one single
audience. And this can pose a significant threat, as it increases the need to
communicate very coherently. The Internet is full of anecdotes in which com-
munication went awry, entire websites are dedicated to privacy mistakes.3
2for example, all pieces of information that fall under Facebook’s IP-License; see section
6.4.4, p. 179
3e.g., www.en.webfail.com/
15
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One could argue that before, it was easier to get away with not telling the
entire truth. Today, the need for integrity increases and, thus, interferes with
aspects of self-disclosure and privacy.
Privacy also decreases from a societal perspective. First, because corporate
companies such as Facebook, Google, or Amazon have exhibited a substan-
tial increase in private power. By now, they have become entities that provide a
worldwide infrastructure. Apple, for example, determines for billions of peo-
ple how to communicate, how to buy, and what information to attain. Never
before had organizations existed with such knowledge and such power. The
individual loses some of his or her autonomy, as social conventions and
processes compel individuals to use very specific proprietary services. And
second, because the lack of privacy is continuously increasing (especially
due to big data), this can curtail political deliberation and become a threat
for democracy. In the book Privacy, Publicity, and Democratic Decision-Making
in Times of Big Data, edited by Philipp Richter, eight scholars coming from
eight different research disciplines warn of this risk. Several notions are pre-
sented suggesting that democratic deliberation is currently thwarted — for
example, because of the fact that statistical algorithms derived from big data
analyses are capable of precisely predicting users’ voting behavior (Nebel,
2015). Eventually, this might undermine the anonymity of the voting process,
a prerequisite for democracies.
This novel intrusion into personality by means of computer generated
predictive algorithms, the loss of control, the challenge of cross-contextual
integrity, the increase in corporate power, and the new threat to democracy
hence converge to the following thesis: In the course of the past years, our
privacy has decreased significantly.
1.3 Antitheses: Post privacy or total privacy?
What is the reaction, what is the antithesis? So far, two major antitheses
emerged: First, the post privacy antithesis. The post privacy antithesis is most
vividly represented by Gordon Bell, a researcher emeritus at Microsoft Re-
search (e.g., Wilkinson, 28.05.2007). Gordon Bell is one of the founding fathers
of lifelogging, which stands for the continual capturing of each and every
16
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personal and interpersonal action (Bell & Gemmell, 2009). Later, others fol-
lowed his lead — for example Jeff Jarvis (Jarvis, 2011) and Christian Heller
(Heller, 2011) — and proclaimed that the time of privacy is finally over. The
antithesis of the post privacy movement is: Privacy might have decreased,
but privacy was never important in the first place, which is why we should
abandon the concept altogether.
The second and very diametrical reaction is the total privacy antithesis. This
antithesis is most prominently spearheaded by Edward Snowden, who is a
former NSA contractor and who revealed the mass surveillance activities
by the NSA (Greenwald, 2013.06.06). Other prominent advocates of the total
privacy movement include Jacob Appelbaum (Brooke, 2011.10.11) or Max
Schrems (Gibbs, 2015.12.03). The total privacy antithesis proclaims that by
using privacy enhancing technology (for example, sending PGP encrypted
e-mail, surfing in the deep web, or using air-gapped computers) everyone
should protect any communication from third parties. The antithesis of the
total privacy reaction is: If privacy continues to decrease, our freedom, social
life, and democracy will eventually cease to exist, which is why we have to
safeguard our privacy under all circumstances.
I argue that both antitheses will not be the solution to the thesis that
privacy has decreased significantly: Post privacy as a solution can only be
feasible for a fraction of the population, as it would ridicule in the long
run the convention to wear clothes, to shut bathroom doors, or to close the
curtains when having sexual intercourse — conventions that only few would
be willing to abandon. Similarly, total privacy cannot be the solution as well:
First, total privacy is also only feasible for a fraction of the population, as
a very high technical expertise is needed to employ all means necessary to
use anonymous and encrypted technology. Second, legal authorities need
to have at least some capability of limiting privacy in order to enforce the
law: For example, identification is necessary for imposing traffic penalties,
stopping tax evasion, or prosecuting criminal activities. Hence, total privacy
or complete anonymity for everyone and at all times does not seem to be an
adequate solution either.
17
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1.4 Toward a privacy synthesis
Ultimately, this dissertation aims to offer some helpful thoughts regarding
a potential synthesis of privacy. I aim to achieve this primarily by trying to
contribute to our general understanding of privacy. To this end, this disserta-
tion features four separate studies, including a theoretical analysis of privacy
as a psychological concept (Chapter 2), two empirical studies on specific on-
line privacy behaviors (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), and an empirical study
on which aspects of personality make people desire more or less privacy
(Chapter 5).
What is the exact nature of privacy? Even among experts, the notion is
widespread that “privacy is a messy and complex subject” (Nissenbaum,
2010, p. 67). For example, what is the difference between privacy, freedom,
autonomy, control, or self-disclosure? Interestingly, especially for the context
of SNSs is has been argued that because users have a lot of control over their
in- and outputs they have the illusion of privacy, feel free, and experience a
“shelter for ... authentic living” (Trepte & Reinecke, 2011, p. 61). Ultimately,
this shows that aspects of control, privacy, and even authenticity are closely
related to one another. At the same time, one could argue that if privacy was
only about being in control of one’s accessibility (a position that is, for ex-
ample, supported by Burgoon, 1982) than a prisoner who is currently sitting
in his cell, not being able to decide when to leave his or her compartment,
accordingly would have no privacy at all. But can that be true? Does he really
have no privacy, given that he is remote, alone, and just by himself? Overall,
it is apparent that the theoretical configuration of privacy is still challenging,
which is why I argue that first of all we have to advance our conceptual un-
derstanding of privacy, and especially our understanding of privacy in online
contexts. To this end, I hold that it is not so much important to develop a
decidedly new model of privacy. Instead, given the large number of already
existing theories on privacy (e.g., Altman, 1975; Burgoon, 1982; Gavison, 1980;
Petronio, 2002; Warren & Brandeis, 1890; Westin, 1967), which all comprise
numerous valuable insights, I propose that it will be more profitable to inte-
grate the aforementioned theories into one encompassing theory of privacy.
18
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With this aim, I have developed the privacy process model (PPM), which I
present in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Throughout the entire dissertation,
the PPM provides the theoretical framework for the empirical studies.
Next to improving our general comprehension of privacy theory, I argue
that it is equally important to leverage our specific understanding of privacy
behaviors. Especially on the Internet, several controversial privacy behaviors
can be found. Consider the following example: In general, people are most
willing to self-disclose in situations when they feel private, withdrawn, and
in control of their environment (e.g., Westin, 1967). On the Internet, however,
there are several contexts in which there is almost no privacy whatsoever,
given that Google is analyzing its users’ personal mail, that Facebook is
scanning its members’ social conversations, and that the NSA is generally
intercepting as much computer traffic as possible (e.g., The Guardian, 2014).
And still, people are self-disclosing vividly on these sites. How can that be?
With the aim of answering these questions, I subsequently present two empir-
ical studies that analyze concrete privacy behaviors and their corresponding
psychological correlates for SNSs. Besides the example mentioned above, a
number of other studies have also suggested that online privacy behaviors
are somewhat paradoxical — most of all, because people with more privacy
concerns had not been found to disclose less personal information on SNSs
(e.g., Taddicken, 2014; Tan, Qin, Kim, & Hsu, 2012; Tufekci, 2008). As a result,
in Chapter 3, I first analyze the privacy paradox by using a specific behavior
explanation paradigm, the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985), aim-
ing to find significant relations between psychological concepts of privacy
and online self-disclosure. Second, in Chapter 4, I refer to a different strand
of privacy research, the so-called privacy calculus (e.g., Krasnova, Veltri, &
Günther, 2012), in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of online
privacy behaviors. Whereas the theory of planned behavior-based approach
addresses privacy concerns as predictors of privacy behaviors, the privacy cal-
culus states that next to privacy concerns also expected benefits can explain
privacy behaviors. In addition, literature on the privacy calculus so far ana-
lyzed only self-disclosure as behavioral criterion, which is somewhat incom-
plete given that privacy behaviors also include acts of self-withdrawal (i.e.,
the deliberate deletion, obfuscation, or withholding of information; e.g., De-
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batin, 2011). As a result, I developed the extended privacy calculus model for
SNSs, which extends the scope of prior research by including self-withdrawal
behaviors as additional dependent variable.
Whereas the first three studies focus on a better understanding and ex-
planation of privacy, the last empirical study targets the relevance and the
implications of privacy. In Chapter 5, I hence explore the relation between
privacy and specific facets of personality, focusing on the question of whether
people who lack integrity might desire more privacy. So far, this question has
not been analyzed in an empirical study, although there are several plausible
theoretical reasons why this relationship might exist. For example, according
to Altman (1976) people reinforce their social boundaries in situations of
imminent risk, and subsequently withdraw from social interactions (thereby
increasing their privacy). People who have done something dishonorable or
even illegal indeed face a higher risk, because others would disapprove of
their behavior, which is why they have a good reason to conceal that infor-
mation. Or in more technical terms, it seems plausible that people who lack
integrity have an increased desire for privacy. On the other hand, it seems
equally possible that people desire privacy because they are generally more
withdrawn, shy, or risk-averse. Pedersen (1982), for example, found that peo-
ple who described themselves as “introverted thinkers” were more likely
to prefer social isolation. Hence, it could be that several different facets of
personality affect peoples’ desire for privacy, including aspects that can be
considered negative, neutral, or positive. Analyzing this relationship seems
relevant given that there are very distinct and conflicting positions regarding
the inherent value of privacy. Some say that it is important to limit privacy in
order to prevent crime (e.g., the mayor of Chicago, Rahm Emanuel; Dellimore,
2013), others hold that everyone should generally have the basic right to be
let alone (Warren & Brandeis, 1890); some argue that privacy hinders social
participation (e.g., the CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg; Kirkpatrick, 2010),
others claim that privacy fosters personal growth (Westin, 1967). Hence, what
does it reveal about someone’s personality if he or she desires more privacy?
Might he or she indeed lack integrity or, by contrast, is that person simply
more shy? And what are the potential societal implications?
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In Chapter 6, I combine the results of the aforementioned studies in one
overarching general discussion. First of all, I evaluate the studies’ results
in light of the extant literature, highlighting some novel aspects that this
dissertation affords and addressing some problematic positions that future
research might want to resolve. Eventually, I discuss the societal and prac-
tical implications of this dissertation. What does it mean that our privacy
is decreasing, how does it affect the world we are living in? Is this “brave
new privacy” good or bad, do the positive or do the negative aspects prevail?
How do we have to react to the changes introduced by new information tech-
nologies, and, overall, what is a potential privacy synthesis? These questions
are of a very general nature, broad, and maybe even philosophical. Can one
dissertation answer these questions? No, of course not. However, it becomes
increasingly apparent that psychology and communication research play a
major role in answering these questions, given that they offer convenient
theoretical and methodological frameworks to analyzing these questions. In
his 2015 article Communication and the good life, former president of the In-
ternational Communication Association (ICA) Peter Vorderer discussed the
challenges of the digital revolution and ended with the following conclu-
sion: “What a mess, what a wonderful challenge for a discipline like ours,
because it is this field that ’literally studies ways in which the world is made’
(Calhoun, 2011, p. 1495)” (p. 8). Therefore, in the final chapter, I also aim to
provide some practical and societal implications that can be drawn based on
the results of this dissertation.
Privacy is a broad meta concept that reverberates in various areas of social
life. At the same time, privacy is a very specific process that unfolds in con-
crete behavioral manifestations. Privacy is not neutral, it is often considered
a value, it is deemed important for democracies, and it might be related to
personality, maybe even to integrity. That is the point where this dissertation
starts. The aim is to develop a better understanding of the psychology of pri-
vacy and, eventually, to contribute to a new privacy synthesis. The research
question of this dissertation, in short, might thus be described best as follows:
What happens in each one of us when we provide information about our-
selves, for example on SNSs, and what could this process reveal about our
personality? Overall, what is the psychology of privacy?
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Preamble
Abstract
The following article develops a new model of privacy referred to as the
privacy process model (PPM). Drawing on extant literature on privacy, the
PPM analyzes the distinct conditions, mechanisms, and regulations of privacy.
First, it identifies an objective privacy context, which is subdivided into infor-
mational, social, psychological, and physical dimensions. Second, it examines
subjective privacy perceptions, which are divided into the same dimensions.
Third, it observes privacy behavior, which is the amount of self-disclosure
people show. If either privacy perception or privacy behavior differ from
a desired status, people will engage in a privacy regulation, meaning that
they will try to alter their privacy context or their privacy behavior. Able to
account for online as well as offline contexts, the PPM offers a novel and
universal approach to understanding privacy.
Keywords: privacy process model, context, perception, regulation, social
network site, SNS, Facebook
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2.1 Introduction
In recent years, privacy has become one of the most prevalent topics in public
discourse. Individuals, political parties, and private companies alike all pon-
der questions relating to the phenomenon privacy. The more people analyze
privacy, the more approaches to privacy there are. These approaches can vary
substantially — for example, some concentrate on technical issues such as the
security of data online, others to psycho-social aspects such as the seemingly
preposterous acts of self-disclosure on Social Network Sites (SNSs).
Because privacy is often talked about, the impression arises that the mean-
ing of the term is established. But this is not the case — even in scientific
contexts, people display very distinct understandings of privacy. Numerous
definitions of privacy have been developed (see, e.g., Altman, 1975; Burgoon,
1982; Gavison, 1980; Petronio, 2002; Warren & Brandeis, 1890; Westin, 1967).
Yet, as Helen Nissenbaum (2010) argues, none seems to be capable of grasp-
ing the entire truth. In the following, I address this problem by developing a
new model of privacy, the privacy process model (PPM). The PPM is concep-
tualized on the basis of a theoretical analysis of extant literature on privacy
and privacy models, and on recent empirical studies. The PPM is designed
to arrange existing definitions, mechanisms, and effects in a single model. It
thereby aims to integrate privacy’s most important aspects, but also takes into
account that all variables are interdependent. I start by giving an overview
of already existing models and definitions of privacy; afterwards, I outline
the PPM. I then present a possible application of the PPM in the field of new
media in order to illustrate the use of the PPM and conclude by discussing
the strengths and limitations of the PPM.
2.2 Theories of privacy
The fact that so many publications explicitly deal with privacy shows at
least one thing: The definition of privacy is not self-evident. Extant defini-
tions lead to a heterogeneous and sometimes inconsistent scientific depiction
of privacy (Margulis, 2011). Nissenbaum describes the situation with the
following words: “One point on which there seems to be near-unanimous
agreement is that privacy is a messy and complex subject” (Nissenbaum,
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2010, p. 67). I will therefore start with addressing the literal meaning of the
term privacy. Subsequently, I will present the core elements of three essen-
tial works on privacy. These are Alan Westin’s Privacy and Freedom (1967),
which argues that privacy must be treated as a particular condition or status;
Irwin Altman’s The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space,
Territory, Crowding (1975), which highlights the importance of the regulatory
aspects of privacy; and Judee Burgoon’s Privacy and Communication (1982),
which elaborates different dimensions of privacy.
When dealing with privacy and the different depictions of it, it is helpful to
look at its original meaning. The word “private” derives from the Latin word
privatus, which literally means “deprived”, and more extensively “robbed,
free, personal”. A private thing thus reflects something that is separate, not
attainable for everybody and belonging to a particular person. The term
privacy accordingly measures the extent to which somebody or something
is detached from the influence of others. Though this might seem trivial, it
is important to note — in some definitions, privacy is defined as the control
over the degree of detachment (see, e.g., Burgoon, 1982). If this was the case,
however, a lonely wanderer would be as private as a person on the dance floor
of a nightclub: Both are in equal control of all possible aspects of their privacy.
Hence, in order to be able to account for this apparent difference, privacy
should always be a measure of the degree of a certain type of detachment.
According to Westin, privacy can be defined as “the voluntary and tem-
porary withdrawal of a person from the general society through physical or
psychological means” (Westin, 1967, p. 7). Four different conditions arise as a
result: solitude (freedom from presence and surveillance of others); intimacy
(freedom to be able to hold relationships); anonymity (freedom from identi-
fication); and reserve (limitation of self-disclosure). Westin thus follows an
approach that classifies different states of privacy. Altogether, it is important
to note that privacy is understood as a proportionate withdrawal from social
interactions.
Altman’s definition mirrors Westin’s to a great extent, but adds an im-
portant notion: Taking a socio-psychological approach, Altman places more
emphasis on the constant dialectic and dynamic regulation of privacy. He
therefore stresses that there is no paramount condition of privacy that one
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should generally try to attain. On the contrary, desired levels of privacy
fluctuate depending on the specific situation and the interaction that takes
place. In order to achieve a desired level of privacy, people constantly ad-
just interpersonal boundaries. Privacy thus resembles a thermostat: First, the
current level of privacy is perceived. If the perceived level differs from the
desired level, the current status is appraised negatively. This negative ap-
praisal results in an attempt to regulate the current status. If people perceive
themselves as having too little or too much privacy, they will try to change
their behavior. Altman’s assumptions have been tested in various studies.
Vinsel, Brown, Altman, and Foss (1980) were able to show that students who
engaged in various forms of privacy boundary adjustments — for example,
closing doors when they need to study or consciously seeking company in
the dorm when appropriate — showed an increased likelihood to successfully
pass the first year and to advance to the next.e
The next important progress in the definition of privacy was made by
Judee Burgoon in 1982. In an analysis of the literature available at the time,
Burgoon proposed that privacy and all associated regulations take place in
four different dimensions: informational privacy, social privacy, psycholog-
ical privacy, and physical privacy. Informational privacy measures how far
people can decide what information is collected about themselves. Is behav-
ior recorded on a video-tape? Can the person be clearly identified? How
much information about biography and personality is accessible? Social pri-
vacy reflects the extent to which people can decide whom they interact with,
whom they share personal information with and who has access to them.
Psychological privacy captures the degree to which people can control men-
tal in- and outputs, what kind of information they are confronted with and
what kind of information they are free to voice. Physical privacy defines the
adjustment of factual physical boarders: How close people are to one another
or how thoroughly people are separated, for example by windows, fences or
walls. According to Burgoon, privacy is very much about the controllability of
these dimensions. Again, no general desirable condition of privacy is stated.
Burgoon argues that when people are capable of adjusting the dimensions,
privacy is high; when people are not in the position to do so, privacy is low.
Burgoon’s approach is empirically supported by the fact that people display
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different kinds of behaviors in each dimension. A longitudinal study has in-
vestigated whether people changed their privacy behavior on Facebook after
experiencing negative interactions after somebody left a hostile post on their
Facebook wall (Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2014b). It was found that after
such negative experiences, people did increase their informational privacy —
for example by disguising their authentic names. Nevertheless, respondents
did not change their social or psychological privacy behavior.
In their attempt to define privacy, the aforementioned theories more or less
claim to be comprehensive. Yet, each takes a different but at the same time vi-
able viewpoint on privacy, leading to a somewhat diffuse and unsatisfactory
theoretical definition. With the PPM, outlined below, I aim to conceptualize
a model that integrates the presented definitions and adds important new
aspects.
2.3 The privacy process model
If one regards the literal meaning of privacy together with the aforemen-
tioned theories, a broader picture of privacy can be seen. Privacy emerges
as the degree of separation from others (the literal definition); as a separa-
tion that can be characterized by different conditions (Westin, 1967); as being
about a continuous adjustment of individual boundaries (Altman, 1975); and
as taking place in four different dimensions, namely the informational, the
social, the psychological and the physical (Burgoon, 1982).
2.3.1 Privacy context
The literal translation of the word privacy and the work by Westin (1967)
suggest that privacy is first and foremost an objective condition people find
themselves in: People are either alone or in company. The degree of privacy
should thus be objectively measurable. This notion comprises the first factor
of the PPM and shall be called the privacy context. It seems reasonable to
further adhere to Burgoon (1982), who argues that there are four dimensions
of privacy. Unlike Burgoon, I do not consider the dimensions as a degree of
control over privacy, but — bearing in mind the literal translation of privacy —
as a degree of individual detachment. The informational privacy context
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thus measures the amount of information collection taking place in a given
situation. Are cameras in use? Is another person taking notes? Is there an
active voice recorder? The social privacy context refers to the number and
the kind of people present. The fewer people there are in one room and
the more one is acquainted with them, the higher the social privacy context
becomes. For the PPM, I propose measuring the dimension of psychological
privacy somewhat differently to Burgoon (1982). Burgoon defines psycholog-
ical privacy as the freedom of thought, a condition that in most cases can be
regarded as warranted and as a whole somewhat difficult to operationalize.
I thus propose that psychological privacy be taken as a measure of the extent
to which people present in a situation engage in intimate and personal, or
trivial and impersonal conversations. The more that people disclose intimate
information, the higher the psychological privacy context. If people elaborate
on mundane topics like the weather, psychological privacy is regarded as low.
Defining psychological privacy this way offers one benefit: It accounts for all
the situations in which people are able to think as they please, but not speak
as they like. Finally, the physical privacy context concerns the extent of the
proximity of others. How close are other people? Can or are they touching
me? Can they see me?
All four dimensions of the privacy context are independent and can differ
from each other. For example, on the Christmas party of a large company, in-
formational privacy is high (no observation and collection of personal data);
social privacy is low (presence of several personally distant colleagues); psy-
chological privacy might be high (a lot of personal, non-business related talk);
and physical privacy moderate (for example, when being seated together at
a table in a restaurant). Furthermore, the privacy context can be defined for
different kinds of situations, ranging from offline contexts such as business
meetings, cocktail parties, or even confessions in a church to online contexts
such as Facebook groups / wallposts, YouTube channels, or public Internet
platforms.
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2.3.2 Privacy perception
The privacy context is the given situation that can be assessed and described
objectively. That being said, it can be argued that the privacy context also
needs to be perceived — research shows that people differ greatly in their
perception of particular situations (see, e.g., Haber, Cohen, Lucas, & Baltes,
2007). Especially in the case of online media use, people often perceive greater
privacy than there actually is (Trepte & Reinecke, 2011b). Barnes (2006) raises
the point that users of SNSs are often not aware of the fact that a substantial
part of their conversations are not private but accessible for other users. In
order to account for this difference, the factor privacy perception is included
in the PPM. Again, the privacy perception is defined in the four dimensions
regarding Burgoon (1982).
The following examples of the four dimensions of privacy perception show
the importance of these distinctions. In terms of informational privacy, people
tend to feel anonymous and unobserved in public spaces. Yet this assumption
is not true: In Britain, on a busy day in an urban environment, a person will
have their image captured by approximately 300 cameras on thirty different
CCTV systems (Norris & Armstrong, 1999). In the entire country, more than
50,000 cameras monitor public places in 500 cities (Hempel & Töpfer, 2004).
Because of the discrepancy of context and perception, it is mandatory to
install signs with notifications when CCTV is in use (see, e.g., Hempel &
Töpfer, 2004). Facebook, on the other hand, serves as a perfect example of
false social privacy perception. It can be shown that people are not fully
aware of their entire audience when posting messages on their timeline (boyd,
2008a). This phenomenon has been termed the context collapse — meaning
that users address several distinct groups of persons at once, without being
able to find the appropriate level of self-disclosure (boyd, 2008a). Hence, it
can be stated that the people’s perception of their social privacy exceeds the
factual social privacy context.
The same discrepancy can be assumed for psychological privacy percep-
tion: Again, some Facebook users perceive a very pronounced psychological
privacy and assume that a lot of private information is being shared online
and that it is generally appropriate to behave similarly (Trepte & Reinecke,
2011b). All the same, studies show that a substantial part of SNS users do not
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disclose information online and remain so-called lurkers (Metzger, Wilson,
Pure, & Zhao, 2012). People generally seem to overestimate the amount and
the intimacy of information being shared online. The discrepancy between
physical privacy perception and context is probably the least pronounced.
Only in few situations are people incapable of assessing who shares their
presence and who is how close. This being said, people differ in their estimate
of physical privacy: For some people, being touched by somebody during a
conversation might be very usual and not be considered to reduce physical
privacy. People in other cultures, however, would consider this as an intrusion
and as a significant reduction of their physical privacy (see, e.g., Hall, 1990).
Again, all four dimensions are distinct and hence judged independently. At
this point in the discussion, the most important aspects of privacy have been
covered. Yet, arguably the most intriguing question regarding privacy has
been omitted: How does privacy influence human behavior?
2.3.3 Privacy behavior
Depending on contexts and privacy perceptions, people will engage in dif-
ferent kind of privacy behaviors (see, e.g., Margulis, 2003). If people feel
they are in a private situation, they are willing to talk about different things
compared to less private contexts (Westin, 1967; Trepte, 2012). I therefore in-
clude the factor privacy behavior as the third major element of the PPM. One
question remains: What exactly is privacy behavior? In the PPM, I define it
as any behavior that involves acts of self-disclosure. According to Wheeless
(1976, p. 338), a self-disclosure is “any message about the self that a person
communicates to another. Consequently, any messages or message unit may
potentially vary in the degree of self-disclosure present depending upon the
perception of the message by those involved”. In line with Wheeless and
Grotz, numerous behaviors can be regarded as privacy-related: postings on
Facebook, conversations among friends, talks in front of audiences, etc. For
privacy behaviors, the four dimensions of Burgoon (1982) are not applicable.
Instead, I will implement the approach by Taddicken (2011), which differ-
entiates self-disclosure into the dimensions of facts, thoughts, feelings and
experiences. Depending on how people perceive their privacy, they are more
or less willing to engage in acts of self-disclosure. If people feel that they are
34
2 The privacy process model
in a private situation, they are more willing to expose personal information
and to share intimate beliefs; they can be authentic, creative, or imaginative
(Margulis, 2003; Trepte, 2012). Derlega and Chaikin (1977) have pointed out
that self-disclosure is a function of privacy. Thus, it can be concluded that
people are best able to self-disclose in situations of high perceived privacy.
2.3.4 The privacy regulation process and controllability
Altman (1975) makes the important point that people are constantly regulat-
ing their privacy. This finding appears to be a pivotal aspect of privacy, which
is also implemented in the PPM. I propose that people cannot regulate their
privacy perception. Nevertheless, people can obviously change their contexts
as well as their behavior. As a result, the current status of privacy perception
and privacy behavior are constantly compared to a corresponding desired
state of privacy perception and a desired state of privacy behavior. If the
current and the desired state do not correspond with each other, people will
feel dissatisfied and want to alter this imbalance — in order to do so, they
will engage in a privacy regulation. Privacy regulation can be established
by two means: either by changing the context or by changing the behavior.
Which route people will chose depends on the controllability: If it is more
convenient to change the context, people will do this — and vice versa.
In order to illustrate the process of privacy regulation, let us consider the
following example: A man comes home from work and sits down to have
dinner with his family. Since his oldest son is away, a seat next to his younger
son is free. Due to the distance, the current status of the physical privacy
perception is increased. Because he wants to be close to his family at this
moment, his desired physical privacy perception is low. He might change the
privacy context: He decides to leave his usual seat in order to sit next to his
son. He thereby engages in a privacy regulation by deliberately reducing his
own physical privacy context. Additionally, people also always monitor their
privacy behavior, that is the intimacy of their self-disclosure. Going back to
our example, the man is now alone with his wife at the table. His desired
level of self-disclosure is high, because he wants to talk about his bad feelings
resulting from the difficult day at work. All the same, he realizes that they
are still just talking about trivial things. Consequently, he shifts the topic and
35
2 The privacy process model
starts talking about his day and explains why he was not able to cope with
the situation. He alters his privacy behavior by augmenting the amount of
self-disclosure.
In order to be able to regulate, people need to be actually capable of doing
so. The more people are in control of their privacy context and privacy behav-
ior, the more they are able to adjust. This notion is not new; Burgoon (1982)
was one of the first who stressed the importance of control for understanding
privacy. Thus, in order for privacy regulation to take place, controllability
needs to be granted. A prisoner, for example, is unable to determine whether
he is being videotaped, whom to meet, or when to leave his cell. The mere
presence of privacy is not the problem for him but the fact that he is un-
able to adjust it. A prisoner does not have controllability over his privacy.
Controllability must therefore be the last factor in the PPM.
2.3.5 Integration of the privacy process model
The aforementioned elements of the privacy context, the privacy perception
and the privacy behavior constitute the main frame of the PPM. Furthermore,
the mechanism of privacy regulation and the factor of controllability comple-
ment the PPM. The entire model can be seen in Figure 2.1. The PPM is called
a process model because it incorporates several sequential steps: People have
a privacy perception, because they find themselves in a privacy context. Peo-
ple disclose certain pieces of information, because they feel private. First
comes the situation, second its perception, and third the behavior. The fact
that people constantly regulate their privacy context and privacy behavior
further exemplifies the dynamic features of privacy, which are considered in
the PPM.
The PPM builds on another important premise: All the different states of
privacy context, privacy perception, and privacy behavior need to be regarded
in a descriptive, that is in a neutral and value-free way. As Ruth Gavison
(1980) writes:
First, we must have a neutral concept of privacy that will enable us
to identify when a loss of privacy has occurred so that discussions
of privacy and claims of privacy can be intelligible. Second, pri-
vacy must have coherence as a value, for claims of legal protection
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PRIVACY BEHAVIOR
(Self-Disclosure)
PRIVACY CONTEXT
(Informational, Social, Psychological, Physical)
PRIVACY PERCEPTION
(Informational, Social, Psychological, Physical)
PRIVACY-REGULATION
(Takes place if Current Status differs from Desired Status)
Desired StatusCurrent Status
CONTROLLABILITYCONTROLLABILITY
Evaluation RegulationInfluence
Figure 2.1: The privacy process model
of privacy are compelling only if losses of privacy are sometimes
undesirable and if those losses are undesirable for similar reasons.
(p. 423)
Two viewpoints — for example, on the desired status of the privacy con-
text — are therefore possible. The descriptive viewpoint would be: “On Face-
book, privacy decreases.” The normative one would be: “On Facebook, pri-
vacy is endangered!” In the prevailing media coverage a normative viewpoint
is often adopted (Lindner, 2013). Generally, more privacy is deemed to equal
better privacy. Margulis (2003) makes a strong point in saying that it is im-
portant to have privacy in order to reflect upon oneself, to promote creativity,
and to foster relationships. However, this does not imply that a constant state
of privacy is desirable. On the contrary, studies show that people in constant
need of privacy are less satisfied with their lifes and show more negative af-
fect (Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2013). Furthermore, in the media, demands
are often made for restrained and moderate behavior online. Nevertheless,
increased amounts of self-disclosure on SNSs can be shown to be associated
with higher degrees of life satisfaction and positive affect. Also, in a 2-year
longitudinal study with 327 respondents it was found that people get more
informational support online than offline (Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2014a).
In order to take advantage of that support, people necessarily need to open
their privacy context to a certain extent.
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Taken together, this shows that privacy first needs to be regarded descrip-
tively. Only afterwards, with support by scientific research, should normative
assumptions be made. Since research on these aspects is still sparse, more
work on how to find absolute criteria of advisable behaviors needs to be con-
ducted. First studies show that the results might contradict public opinion.
To summarize the core implications of the PPM in seven axioms:
1. Any given situation (privacy context) leads to a particular sense of
intimacy and confidentiality (privacy perception).
2. The higher the level of privacy perception, the more people will engage
in a subsequent act of self-disclosure (privacy behavior).
3. For the privacy context as well as for the privacy perception, the dimen-
sions of informational, social, psychological, and physical privacy can
be differentiated.
4. For the privacy perception as well as for the privacy behavior, people
perceive a current status of privacy, which they compare with a desired
status of privacy.
5. If there is a discrepancy between current status and desired status,
people engage automatically in a privacy regulation process. In the
privacy regulation process, people aim to change either the privacy
context or the privacy behavior.
6. In order for a privacy regulation to be able to take place, the controllabil-
ity of either privacy context or privacy behavior needs to be warranted.
7. All elements shall be assessed not in a normative but in a descriptive
heuristic.
2.4 The privacy process model in the context of the media
Numerous social interactions — like the purchase of goods, the handling of
financial transactions, or the fostering of social relationships — have been
shifted into the Internet. Therefore, these interactions now take place in a
different context with different characteristics. These new characteristics are
defined by (boyd, 2008b) as follows: The Internet is persistent, searchable,
replicable, and scalable. This means that information will last longer, can
be found more easily, can be recontextualized, and can be distributed and
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assessed on a large scale. All these points influence our own privacy: On
account of the digital representation of ourselves, the form and the extent
of access we grant to ourselves have been changed substantially. Because
of this change, privacy in online contexts has become such an important
topic. Even so, it is important to note that mechanisms pertaining to privacy
establishment and regulation have not changed. Arguably, there is no such
thing as online privacy that entails a new and different kind of privacy. On
the contrary, the same mechanisms of privacy unfold, only in a substantially
different context. Therefore, it is preferable instead to talk of privacy in online
contexts (cf. Trepte et al., 2014a). The PPM considers this notion — that is, the
privacy context can be defined for all possible situations. In the following, I
advance a detailed, fictional example of how the PPM can be applied to a
very common Internet process: communication on Facebook.
Stefan Mayer, 26 years old, is just about to finish his degree in medicine at a
German university. If we regard the four different dimensions of his privacy
context in Facebook, the following conditions can be found: (1) On Facebook,
Stefan does not use his full name. Instead of naming his account Stefan Mayer,
he calls himself Ste Fan. For his profile picture, Stefan uses a photo that clearly
shows himself. He indicates his birthday, but not his postal address. Stefan
does not have a public profile. For people who do not know Stefan, just a few
pieces of information can be found. Nevertheless, friends of Stefan can access
a lot of personal information about him online. Because Stefan also uses
Facebook on his smartphone, Facebook can regularly retrieve his location.
As a result, Stefan’s informational privacy on Facebook might be considered
low to medium. Evidently, this evaluation is volitional from his standpoint.
In order to be able to assess the absolute magnitude of privacy contexts,
such evaluations would need to be compared with averages of representative
samples. (2) Stefan has 350 friends and uses no friend lists. Among Stefan’s
friends are his family, fellow students, current and old friends, people he used
to go to school with, teammates of his football club, colleagues of his part-
time job, and a few acquaintances. He is not befriended with any professors
or lecturers from university, nor with his boss. As a result, Stefan’s social
privacy context can be regarded as being low. (3) Stefan’s Facebook friends
most of the time post things like links to videos and music on the Internet,
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share photos, or ask for ideas on what to do in the evening. The psychological
privacy can be considered medium: His friends talk about interesting and
relevant things, but not on Facebook. (4) Using Facebook does not affect his
physical privacy, which is therefore high.
Let us now look at Stefan’s own privacy perception. (1) Stefan knows that
Facebook collects various kind of data. He is aware of the fact that without
any precautions, unacquainted people would be able to find a lot of personal
information. He therefore decides to use a nickname and set the status of his
profile to private. He now thinks that his informational privacy is somewhat
guaranteed, therefore probably medium. (2) Stefan knows that many people
with whom he does not interact on a regular basis can read his messages. He
tried to regulate the audience of his posts by not befriending any supervisors.
People whom Stefan does not know cannot access his profile. All in all,
he knows that he is not completely private, but thinks that his audience is
familiar enough for him to be able to share some information with them
without having to worry about being compromised. Hence, he estimates his
social privacy as medium. (3) Stefan has the impression that on Facebook
people sometimes post very intimate things, things he does not want to know.
Nonetheless, he knows that for more sensitive issues, friends tend to send
him a personal message. So he thinks that overall there is generally a medium
to high level of psychological privacy on Facebook.
Moving on to different kind of privacy behaviors Stefan displays during
the completion of his degree in medicine: (1) After he gets his exam results —
he passes successfully — he leaves a happy status post saying that he is now
officially a doctor and that it is the best feeling he has ever had. This post
can be considered of medium intimacy: He informs people of an important
event in his life, which is nothing trivial, yet does not include anything very
intimate or self-revealing. (2) The day after he went to the graduation party,
Stefan sends his best friend a picture of a girl he got to know, tells him about
their evening, and that he likes her very much. This behavior can be regarded
as being of high self-disclosure: He reveals to his friend very personal and
intimate information, and asks for his opinion.
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It is often argued that people perceive SNSs as more private than they actu-
ally are (Trepte & Reinecke, 2011b), and that not the factual but the perceived
privacy context determines one’s subsequent behavior. How, then, does the
privacy context differ from the privacy perception in this fictional example?
Whereas the informational context can be considered low to medium, Stefan
perceives it to be medium. Whereas his social privacy can be estimated as
low, Stefan regards it as medium. Again, the psychological privacy context
was medium, whereas Stefan perceives it to be medium or even high. In
our example, the privacy behavior was first a status update and second a
personal message. The status update mirrors Stefan’s perceived privacy: He
estimates his audience as sufficiently familiar to be willing to inform them
that he obtained his university degree. One day later, he wants to share an-
other piece of information: That he got to know an interesting woman. This
self-disclosure embodies much more intimacy, which he is not willing to
share in the context of a public wall post. This shows that the current level
of perceived privacy does not amount to his desired level of privacy. As a
result, he engages in a privacy regulation by changing the privacy context:
This information he shares privately with his best friend, thereby altering his
social and psychological privacy context.
All different communication mechanisms available on Facebook enable pri-
vacy regulations: By choosing specific channels for particular self-disclosures,
people regularly change their privacy context. Again, this shows that it is
very important for people to be able to regulate contexts — some information
is simply not meant for everybody. If this changing of contexts is not possible,
people will need to change their privacy behavior, meaning that they will
disclose less personal information than desired. Since self-disclosure is an
important socio-psychological factor for people (Trepte & Reinecke, 2013),
environments that provide a secure background for privacy behaviors are all
the more important.
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2.5 Discussion of the privacy process model
2.5.1 Implications
In this article, I have developed a new privacy model, the privacy process
model. Several positive aspects are brought forward by the PPM. One of its
major benefits is that the PPM includes the most important aspects of privacy
in a single model. If one looks at existing definitions alone, the phenomenon
of privacy cannot be fully understood. Privacy is not just a condition (Westin,
1967), it is not just the readjustment of interpersonal boundaries (Altman,
1975) and it is not just about being in control of these boundaries (Burgoon,
1982) — it contains all these aspects and more. For example, until now, no
model for capturing privacy has distinguished between factual privacy con-
texts and subjective privacy perceptions. Since this distinction is relevant for
both offline and online contexts, its incorporation in a privacy model seems
viable. Moreover, the notion of self-disclosure has not been conceptualized in
existing privacy related models. In the PPM, people are considered to engage
in self-disclosure depending on the level of privacy they perceive. Addition-
ally, the PPM sets the aforementioned variables in a contingent order: People
first encounter a privacy context, out of this context a privacy perception
arises, which then determines the extent of people’s self-disclosure. Also, in
everyday contexts, people constantly regulate aspects of privacy (Altman,
1975). The PPM is the first model that takes this notion into account: When
the desired privacy differs from the desired privacy, people change either
their privacy context or their level of self-disclosure.
The model’s distinction between the four dimensions of privacy (Burgoon,
1982) is also useful. It is often claimed that privacy is over in the era of the In-
ternet (Heller, 2011; Jarvis, 2011). With the more specified model of the PPM,
however, it becomes apparent that even though the informational privacy is
reduced online (Trepte & Reinecke, 2011b), this does not transfer to aspects
of social, psychological, and physical privacy. Here, users can decide with
whom they want to share information and how intimate this information is.
Besides, in Trepte’s and Reinecke’s book Privacy Online, none of the thirty-
one researchers claim that the time of privacy is over (Trepte & Reinecke,
2011a). Finally, the PPM is not limited to online contexts. Every context can
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be assessed by the PPM in terms of the four dimensions of informational, so-
cial, psychological, and physical privacy. Thus, privacy behaviors relating to
situations such as business meetings can be regarded as well as mechanisms
taking place when users leave a post on their Facebook wall. Consequently,
there is no need to refer to different models when trying to understand,
replicate, or predict privacy related behaviors.
2.5.2 Limitations
The PPM results from analyzes of extant literature and new empirical find-
ings — at this point, the model has not been validated empirically. Hence,
the PPM is still a hypothesized model that needs to be examined in fur-
ther empirical studies. The PPM builds upon a selection of theories and
definitions of privacy. Other elaborate definitions — for example the commu-
nication privacy management theory by Petronio (2002) or the privacy in
context approach by Nissenbaum (2010) — are not addressed explicitly here
and encompass potential additional insights. Moreover, the four privacy di-
mensions need to be validated. Based on a theoretical analysis by Burgoon in
1982, their empirical foundation seems moderate. The first study trying to re-
produce the four factor structure was unable to perfectly reproduce the four
dimensions (Ruddigkeit, Penzel, & Schneider, 2013). Other variables such
as cross-contextual consistency, familiarity of context members, or context
replicability might be worth integrating. Regarding the privacy perception,
it seems possible that people assess their own privacy according to a much
more basic and simple heuristic. Thus, further empirical research needs to
be conducted in order to establish what dimensions have to be included.
Finally, the aim of the PPM is not to explain self-disclosure behaviors
as comprehensively as possible. If it was, variables such as the need to be-
long, impression managament, anticipated self-disclosure gratifications, or
extraversion would have to be included (see, e.g., Christofides, Muise, & Des-
marais, 2009; Krasnova, Spiekermann, Koroleva, & Hildebrand, 2010).
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2.5.3 Conclusion
The phenomenon of privacy cannot be regarded in a simplistic, uni-dimen-
sional way. Because of the thorough changes induced by the rise of the Inter-
net, it becomes all the more important to understand the dynamics inherent
to privacy. The privacy process model has been designed to capture the core
variables and mechanisms of privacy in a model applicable to both offline
and online contexts. With its reference to established definitions of privacy
and the inclusion of current empirical studies, the PPM offers a comprehen-
sive overview of the most pivotal aspects pertaining to privacy.
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3 Is the privacy paradox a relic of the
past? An in-depth analysis of privacy
attitudes and privacy behaviors
Preamble
Abstract
The privacy paradox states that online privacy concerns do not sufficiently ex-
plain online privacy behaviors on Social Network Sites (SNSs). In this study, it
was first asked whether the privacy paradox would still exist when analyzed
as in prior research. Second, it was hypothesized that the privacy paradox
would disappear when analyzed in a new approach. The new approach
featured a multidimensional operationalization of privacy by differentiating
between informational, social, and psychological privacy. Next to privacy
concerns, also privacy attitudes and privacy intentions were analyzed. With
the aim to improve methodological aspects, all items were designed based
on the theory of planned behavior (TPB). In an online questionnaire with
N = 595 respondents, it was found that online privacy concerns were not
significantly related to specific privacy behaviors, such as the frequency or
content of disclosures on SNSs (e.g., name, cell-phone number, or religious
views). This demonstrated that the privacy paradox still exists when it is
operationalized as in prior research. With regard to the new approach, all
hypotheses were confirmed: Results showed both a direct and an indirect
relation between privacy attitudes and privacy behaviors, the latter mediated
by privacy intentions. In addition, also an indirect relation between privacy
concerns and privacy behaviors was found, mediated by privacy attitudes
and privacy intentions. Therefore, privacy behaviors can be explained suffi-
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ciently when using both privacy attitudes and privacy concerns within the
TPB. The behaviors of users on SNSs are not as paradoxical as was once
believed.
Keywords: privacy paradox, privacy, theory of planned behavior, social net-
work site, SNS, Facebook, privacy concerns, attitudes, intentions, behaviors,
structural equation modeling
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3.1 Introduction
Many social network site (SNS) users have pronounced privacy concerns and
are afraid that their privacy might be violated online (European Commission,
2011; Hoy & Milne, 2010; Yao, Rice, & Wallis, 2007). However, these concerns
and fears rarely impact actual SNS use (Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Nosko, Wood,
& Molema, 2010). In prior research, this phenomenon of contradicting privacy
attitudes and behaviors was referred to as the privacy paradox (Barnes, 2006).
Now, several years after its detection in 2006, it seems fruitful to ask: Does
the privacy paradox still exist?
This study has three aims: First, to replicate prior research — to see if
the privacy paradox still occurs. Second, to develop a new and optimized
approach that reflects the widely shared understanding of privacy as a multi-
dimensional construct. Third, to find a way to connect both privacy attitudes
and privacy behaviors with privacy concerns — to determine if privacy con-
cerns are relevant or not.
3.2 Theory
3.2.1 The privacy paradox
The privacy paradox was first mentioned in an essay by Barnes (2006):
“Herein lies the privacy paradox. Adults are concerned about invasion of
privacy, while teens freely give up personal information. This occurs because
often teens are not aware of the public nature of the Internet” (para. 15).
More specifically, Barnes observed four controversial phenomena of SNS use:
(a) the large quantity of information disclosed online, (b) the illusion of pri-
vacy on SNSs, (c) the discrepancy between context and behavior (indicating
that even when people realize that SNSs are a public realm they still behave
as if it was a private place), and (d) the users’ poor understanding of data
processing actions by online enterprises (Barnes, 2006). The privacy paradox
was debated in many disciplines (Trepte & Reinecke, 2011a) and has been
investigated in a number of studies (Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2014; Utz &
Kramer, 2009). It can be defined as follows: People’s concerns toward privacy
are unrelated to the privacy behaviors. Even when users have substantial
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concerns with regard to their online privacy (European Commission, 2011)
they engage in self-disclosing behaviors that do not adequately reflect their
concerns.
Since that time, several studies have investigated the privacy paradox also
empirically. A considerable number of studies have found support for the
privacy paradox (e.g., Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Ellison, Lampe, & Vitak, 2011;
Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Nosko et al., 2012; Stutzman & Kramer-Duffield,
2010; Taddei & Contena, 2013; Tufekci, 2008). For example, Tufekci (2008)
demonstrated that “Findings show little to no relationship between online
privacy concerns and information disclosure on online social network sites”
(p. 20). Tufekci reported that privacy concerns did not relate to the disclosure
of the users’ authentic names, their political / religious views, and addresses.
Similarly, Acquisti and Gross (2006) showed that there was no relation be-
tween privacy concerns and posting of cell-phone number on SNSs. Also,
Taddei and Contena (2013) found that privacy concerns did not correspond
to the posting behavior on Facebook.
However, results on the privacy paradox are manifold and some studies
did not support the privacy paradox (Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009;
Joinson, Reips, Buchanan, & Schofield, 2010; Krasnova, Spiekermann, Korol-
eva, & Hildebrand, 2010; Mohamed & Ahmad, 2012; Stutzman, Vitak, Ellison,
Gray, & Lampe, 2012). Krasnova et al. (2010) found that the perceived privacy
risk — a construct that closely resembles privacy concerns — was associated
significantly with the respondents’ amount of self-disclosure on SNSs. Mo-
hamed and Ahmad (2012) came to the conclusion that “Information privacy
concerns explain privacy measure use in social networking sites” (p. 2366).
The study of Trepte et al. (2014) on negative online experiences found that
even when users were insulted online they changed only their informational
but not their social or psychological privacy behavior. The empirical findings
of the privacy paradox thus can be considered inconsistent in nature. As a
consequence, it seems important to first replicate previous research.
53
3 Is the privacy paradox a relic of the past?
Research question: Will privacy concerns be related to specific on-
line privacy behaviors such as the indication of (a) the authentic
first name, (b) the authentic last name, (c) the personal address,
(d) the cell-phone number, (e) political or religious views, and (f)
the frequency of posts on SNSs?
3.2.2 The privacy paradox explicated
In the following, we explicate the privacy paradox in more detail. First, we
start with the definitions of privacy behaviors and privacy concerns. After-
ward, we aim to unveil the privacy paradox by elaborating on the relation
between privacy concerns and privacy behaviors. As a final point, we suggest
a new approach to analyze the privacy paradox.
Privacy behaviors and privacy concerns
Behaviors are usually referred to as any observable actions that are taken
by individuals. Privacy behaviors are generally referred to as any behaviors
that are intended to optimize the relationship with others by either limiting
self-disclosure or by withdrawing from interactions with others (e.g., Alt-
man, 1975; Burgoon, 1982; Dienlin, 2014; Petronio, 2002; Warren & Brandeis,
1890; Westin, 1967). Burgoon (1982), for example, defines privacy based on
the following four dimensions: Informational privacy, which captures the
individual control over the processing and transferring of personal infor-
mation. Social privacy, which captures the dialectic process of regulating
proximity and distance toward others (Burgoon, 1982). Psychological privacy,
which captures the perceived control over emotional and cognitive inputs
and outputs. Physical privacy, which captures the personal freedom from
surveillance and unwanted intrusions upon one’s territorial space.
Privacy concerns have been described as “the desire to keep personal in-
formation out of the hands of others” (Buchanan, Paine, Joinson, & Reips,
2007, p. 158). Privacy concerns capture the negatively valenced emotional
attitude that people feel when personal rights, information, or behaviors are
being regressed by others. Privacy concerns can be related to the concept of
attitudes. An attitude is “an evaluative integration of cognitions and affects
experienced in relation to an object” (Crano & Prislin, 2006, p. 347). Attitudes
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are studied on two dimensions: instrumental (cognitive) attitudes and experi-
ential (affective) attitudes (Courneya & Bobick, 2000). Generally, attitudes can
be both positive and negative. Privacy attitudes and privacy concerns have
two major differences with regard to polarity and scope: Concerning polarity,
privacy concerns are unipolar, whereas privacy attitudes are bipolar. Privacy
concerns measure, for example, if people are afraid that their bank account
would be compromised — which can be only a negative feeling. Privacy atti-
tudes measure if, for example, people think that it is either advantageous or
disadvantageous to use online banking — which can either be a positive or a
negative feeling. Concerning scope, the potential application area of privacy
attitudes is larger. Privacy attitudes can be specified for every single online
privacy action, such as having a Facebook account, indicating one’s authen-
tic name, or posting family pictures. Privacy concerns, by contrast, refer to
online phenomena that are considered only negative: For example, online
identity theft, misuse of personal data, or willful deception in communication
processes.
Unveiling the privacy paradox
To answer the question of why users engage in paradoxical behavior we
suggest three approaches that are interconnected with each other. First, we
reconsider the definitions of privacy concerns and privacy behaviors. Second,
we refer to socio-psychological research and to the general finding of the
attitude-behavior gap (Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1994; LaPiere, 1934). Third,
we critically ask how well previous methodological operationalizations are
able to reflect the influence of users’ privacy attitudes on behaviors.
With regard to the definition of privacy behaviors, we suggest the follow-
ing: Burgoon’s approach toward privacy was largely acknowledged in the
field of online privacy research (Peter & Valkenburg, 2011; Trepte & Rei-
necke, 2011a). However, so far only Ruddigkeit, Penzel, and Schneider (2013)
used Burgoon’s approach in an empirical work. In the majority of studies,
a multitude of singular behaviors were used that did not consider the mul-
tidimensional nature of privacy (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Ellison et al., 2011;
Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Nosko et al., 2012; Stutzman & Kramer-Duffield, 2010;
Taddei & Contena, 2013; Tufekci, 2008). We suggest that a multidimensional
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approach toward privacy by referring to Burgoon’s (1982) definition seems
worthwhile. With regard to the definition of privacy concerns, we suggest that
it is important to also empirically distinguish between privacy concerns on
the one hand and privacy attitudes on the other hand. From a methodological
viewpoint, the aforementioned considerations imply a limitation of variance
when looking at privacy concerns only. Generally, a limitation of variance
decreases the likelihood to detect significant relations (Schmidt, Hunter, &
Urry, 1976). This might partly explain why, so far, it has not been possible to
find significant correlations between privacy behaviors and privacy concerns.
Integrating privacy attitudes might account for more variance and thus statis-
tical power. We therefore suggest that it is important to consider both privacy
concerns and privacy attitudes when analyzing the privacy paradox.
A second answer to the question of why users engage in paradoxical behav-
ior might be found in socio-psychological research, which has identified the
attitude-behavior gap (Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1994; LaPiere, 1934). The
attitude-behavior gap indicates that attitudes and behaviors are oftentimes
unrelated (Kaiser, Byrka, & Hartig, 2010). A number of boundary conditions
have been proposed with regard to why and when this gap occurs (Trepte
et al., 2014). The first condition addresses the situations in which respon-
dents are asked to express their attitudes (Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1994).
It has been shown that subjective norms, peer pressure, and situational con-
straints can have a substantial influence on respondent answering behavior.
Respondents might withhold their true opinions or even provide false an-
swers if they perceive strong situational constraints and norms forcing them
to do so. Especially with regard to online privacy, users might be aware
of contemporary reports in the mass media that often focus on prevailing
privacy risks (Teutsch & Niemann, 26.05.2014). As a consequence, respon-
dents’ answers might largely reflect the public’s opinion rather than their
own. Another boundary condition states that the strength of the association
between attitudes and behaviors largely depends on the strength of the at-
titude. When attitudes are pronounced or extreme, they are more likely to
determine behavior (Kaiser et al., 2010; Petty & Krosnick, 1995). The last con-
dition addresses personal experiences, which determine whether attitudes
allow for adequately predicting behaviors. The societal threat posed by on-
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line privacy intrusions remains rather obscure, because only a few users
have actually experienced privacy violations (European Commission, 2012;
Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2013). Thus, it seems that privacy attitudes are
largely built on heuristics and secondhand experiences. However, firsthand
personal experiences are important when it comes to building sustainable
attitudes (Tormala, Petty, & Brinol, 2002). A lack of personal experiences with
online privacy issues might have the effect that respondents are authentic
when indicating that they are afraid of privacy violations; at the same time,
this aspect is not relevant and consolidated enough to influence subsequent
behavior significantly. In sum, social-psychological research suggests taking
into consideration the situational constraints, the prevailing peer pressure,
and to refer to both personal experiences and attitude strength when opera-
tionalizing privacy attitudes.
A third reason why users may seem to engage in paradoxical behavior
comes from a methodological viewpoint. Presumably, privacy behaviors and
attitudes have not significantly been related in previous research, because of
the ways that they were operationalized. For example, Lewis (2011) opera-
tionalized privacy behaviors by asking respondents if they had an open or a
public profile, which is a dichotomous measure. Similarly, Acquisti and Gross
(2006) asked if their respondents had a Facebook account or not. These mea-
sures were then related to metric scales of privacy attitudes. The dichotomy
of the dependent variables again implies a possible limitation of variance
(Schmidt et al., 1976), which might lead to lower statistical power. In conclu-
sion, methodological considerations suggest operationalizing both privacy
attitudes and privacy behaviors on at least ordinal scales.
A new approach toward the privacy paradox
To carefully consider and combine the aforementioned points in a new ap-
proach, it seems important to adopt a theory based approach that is explicitly
configured to explain privacy behaviors by privacy attitudes. For this study,
we use the theory of planned behavior (TPB; Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen,
2010) due to four reasons: First, the TPB’s variables are conceptualized ac-
cording to the principle of compatibility (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Questions
operationalizing attitudes and behaviors comply in terms of action, target,
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context, and time (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Broad and abstract attitudes such
as privacy concerns are less likely to predict narrow behaviors such as the
use of public versus private profile on SNSs. Questions that share the same
content as the behavior — for example attitudes regarding the use of friend
lists on Facebook as a predictor for the factual use of friend lists — are more
likely to reflect the reality of users. Second, in the TPB specific behaviors
(e.g., “How often do you go running?”) as well as categorical behaviors (e.g.,
“How often do you exercise?”) can be analyzed (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).
Third, the TPB introduces a third variable to bridge the attitude behavior
gap, the behavioral intention. For example, some smokers have the attitude
that smoking is bad, nonetheless they continue to smoke. This discrepancy
can be explained partly by means of the intention: Although some smok-
ers disapprove of smoking, they simply do not want to stop — because, for
example, they think that they are not capable of doing so. Fourth, the TPB
was already successfully used to predict diverse behaviors, including phys-
ical activities (Hagger, Chatzisarantis, & Biddle, 2002) or sexual intercourse
(Terry, Gallois, & McCamish, 1993). For online contexts, Yao (2011) advised
an application of the TPB and Burns and Roberts (2013) used the TPB in a
more general study on online privacy behaviors.
Taking into account the findings from the groundwork of psychological
research on privacy, it seems important to furthermore consider the different
dimensions of privacy (informational, social, psychological, and physical) as
suggested by Burgoon (1982). Because physical privacy is not particularly
relevant for online contexts and also problematic to operationalize,1 it is
not addressed in this study. Also, privacy attitudes and privacy concerns
are distinguished; privacy attitudes are used as main predictor for privacy
behaviors. The theory of planned behavior is thus applied three times: for
linking informational privacy attitudes with informational privacy behaviors,
for linking social privacy attitudes with social privacy behaviors, and for
linking psychological privacy attitudes with psychological privacy behaviors.
1Trepte and Reinecke (2011b) as well as Krämer and Haferkamp (2011) stated that transfer-
ring physical privacy to SNSs does not seem to be feasible; Ruddigkeit et al. (2013) also
reported difficulties in their empirical attempt to measure physical privacy with regard
to digital behaviors. As SNSs deal with the digital representations of people, no physical
points of contact are possible.
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In conclusion, in Hypothesis 1 it is assumed that privacy attitudes and privacy
behaviors are related with each other based on an application of the TPB and
a multidimensional understanding of privacy attitudes and behaviors.
Hypothesis 1: (a) Informational, (b) social, and (c) psychological
privacy attitudes will be related significantly to (a) informational,
(b) social, and (c) psychological privacy behaviors.
As advanced before, the TPB also integrates the behavioral intentions as a me-
diator between attitudes and behaviors. It has been demonstrated previously
that attitudes do not always influence behaviors directly (Fazio & Roskos-
Ewoldsen, 1994). Although people might hold a positive attitude, they do
not necessarily express this attitude in overt behaviors. The TPB emphasizes
that peoples’ behavioral intentions are not only determined by their attitudes,
but also by their subjective norms or their perceived control over changing
a behavior (Ajzen, 1991). For aspects of online privacy, looking at behavioral
intentions for linking privacy attitudes with privacy behaviors seems fruitful
also. Some users might be of the opinion that it is advantageous to use a
nickname on Facebook; however, it could well be that all of their friends use
their authentic names, which might refrain them from choosing a nickname
(subjective norms; c.f., Lewis, 2011). Furthermore, some users might want
to employ a friend list on Facebook to restrict access to their profile, but at
the same time cannot handle the complex technical infrastructure of Face-
book (perceived control). As a result, in Hypothesis 2 the privacy paradox
is addressed accordingly: Intentions are used as a mediator between privacy
attitudes and privacy behaviors, because they include additional information
referring to subjective norms and the perceived behavioral control.
Hypothesis 2: (a) Informational, (b) social, and (c) psychological
privacy attitudes positively influence (a) informational, (b) social,
and (c) psychological privacy intentions, which in turn positively
influence (a) informational, (b) social, and (c) psychological pri-
vacy behaviors.
The question remains: What is the relation between privacy behaviors and
privacy concerns? As shown above, privacy concerns differ from privacy
attitudes in terms of polarity and scope. Both capture people’s opinions to-
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ward various aspects in online contexts, but privacy concerns tend to be
less specific. For example, one item of the scale used by Buchanan et al.
(2007) is: “How concerned are you about your privacy online?” By con-
trast, privacy attitudes are more specific. For example, one item could be:
“I think that communicating personal information on Facebook is disadvan-
tageous / advantageous.” Prior research has shown that privacy concerns
do not determine privacy behaviors (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Tufekci, 2008).
However, it can be suggested that privacy concerns might determine privacy
attitudes: The general skepticism people have toward actions on the Internet
presumably influences their more differentiated attitudes toward diverse pri-
vacy behaviors. Although there is not a direct relation of privacy concerns
with privacy behaviors, there might be an indirect one. As final assumption,
in Hypothesis 3 we thus suggest that privacy concerns first influence privacy
attitudes, which then affect privacy behaviors both directly (Hypothesis 1)
and indirectly (Hypothesis 2).
Hypothesis 3: Privacy concerns will positively influence (a) infor-
mational, (b) social, and (c) psychological privacy attitudes, which
will in turn positively influence (a) informational, (b) social, and
(c) psychological privacy intentions and (a) informational, (b) so-
cial, and (c) psychological privacy behaviors.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Procedure and participants
The study was designed as an online questionnaire with the online tool
Sosci Scientific Survey (Leiner, 2014). Participants were recruited from the
Socio-Scientific Panel (soscisurvey, 2014). At the time of the study, the panel
consisted of 97,199 persons. The panel is noncommercial and based on volun-
tary participation. Each year, panel members receive on average three e-mails
with invitations to take part in selected studies. In order for a study to be
picked for the panel, a formal application and review process takes place.
The soscisurvey panel is used regularly for both German and international
studies. For example, Gottschalk and Kirn (2013) used the panel in a study
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on analyzing cloud computing by means of the theory of reasoned action
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). For further information about the Socio Scientific
Panel itself see, for example, Leiner (2012, March) or soscisurvey (2014).
5000 invitation e-mails were sent to members of the panel. The contact
rate was 98.2%; 88 e-mails could not be delivered successfully. The cooper-
ation rate was 16.3%; 800 people started filling out the questionnaire. The
completion rate was 74.5%; 595 respondents finished the questionnaire. Over-
all, the response rate was 11.9%. The panel’s average cooperation rate is 17%
(soscisurvey, 2014), the response rate of a similar survey 8–10% (Pew Research
Center, 2014). Considering the panel objectives and comparable studies, the
response rate can be considered satisfactory. The data for this study con-
sists of N = 595 respondents who finished the questionnaire (66.67% women,
33.33% men, Mage = 29.75 years, age range: 15–78 years, SD = 10.43 years). The
sample is a convenience sample, as participation was on a voluntary basis.
3.3.2 Measures
The guidelines of Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) were used for designing the TPB
items. Categorical behaviors were conceptualized according to the principle
of compatibility (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). For example, the item measuring
informational privacy behavior was: “How much identifying information
(content) have you now (time) posted (action) on Facebook (context)?” All
items were designed and presented in German. The items that were used
for this study can be found translated into English in Table 3.1. Back and
forward translation was done in order to guarantee translation accuracy. For
each variable’s mean, standard deviation, internal consistency, range, and
skewness see Table 3.2.
Privacy behaviors
Informational privacy behaviors measured how many identifying pieces of
information people shared on their Facebook profile. Participants answered
three items on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from (for example) 1= none to
7= very much. The scale was recoded for analyses with lower values express-
ing lesser extent as opposed to higher values expressing a higher extent
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Table 3.2: Psychometric Properties of the Study Variables
Range
Variable M SD α Potential Actual Skew
Privacy behaviors
(specific)
Indication of
First name 85% 36% 0 - 1 0 - 1 -1.43
Last name 72% 45% 0 - 1 0 - 1 -0.96
Address 6% 24% 0 - 1 0 - 1 3.49
Phone number 3% 16% 0 - 1 0 - 1 5.84
Religious / political
views 39% 49% 0 - 1 0 - 1 0.42
Frequency of posts 4.98 1.35 1 - 7 1 - 7 -0.56
Privacy behaviors
(categorical)
Informational 4.83 1.33 0.77 1 - 7 1.0 - 7.0 -0.51
Social 5.28 1.48 0.85 1 - 7 1.0 - 7.0 -1.07
Psychological 4.96 1.28 0.82 1 - 7 1.0 - 7.0 -0.45
Privacy intentions
Informational 5.42 1.21 0.81 1 - 7 1.3 - 7.0 -0.70
Social 5.50 1.26 0.78 1 - 7 1.0 - 7.0 -1.02
Psychological 4.98 1.36 0.85 1 - 7 1.0 - 7.0 -0.50
Privacy attitudes
Informational 4.50 1.10 0.87 1 - 7 1.0 - 7.0 0.11
Social 5.85 0.93 0.81 1 - 7 2.5 - 7.0 -0.58
Psychological 4.72 1.11 0.89 1 - 7 1.3 - 7.0 0.22
Privacy concerns 3.22 0.76 0.84 1 - 5 1.2 - 5.0 -0.11
63
3 Is the privacy paradox a relic of the past?
of privacy behavior. Social privacy behaviors captured whether people re-
stricted access to their Facebook profile. Participants answered three items
on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from (for example) 1= not at all to 7= very
much. No recoding was applied. Psychological privacy captured the degree
to which people had an intimate and personal Facebook profile. Participants
answered three items on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from (for example)
1= very impersonal to 7= very personal. For psychological privacy, the scale
was recoded with lower scale values expressing a lower and higher values
expressing a higher level of psychological privacy.
Privacy intentions
Adhering to the principle of compatibility (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), three
corresponding privacy intention items were modeled that paralleled items
for privacy behavior in terms of action, target, context, and time. Three in-
formational privacy intention items measured how many identifying pieces
of information people currently wanted to share on their Facebook profile.
Three social privacy intention items comprised how strongly people wanted
to restrict access to their Facebook profile. Three psychological privacy in-
tention items encompassed the degree to which people wanted to have an
intimate and personal Facebook profile.
Privacy attitudes
Privacy attitudes were operationalized by items that measured the general
appraisal of each particular privacy behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). In-
formational privacy attitudes measured respondents’ appraisal of posting
identifying information on Facebook. For each dimension, items consisted of
an introduction, which was followed by six different semantic differentials.
Semantic differentials work both for uni-dimensional (dangerous versus not
dangerous) and for bidimensional (bad versus good) pairs (Fishbein & Ajzen,
2010). For the informational privacy attitude, the introduction was “I think
that providing information on FB that identifies me is: . . . ” The following
semantic differentials were answered on a 7-point scale and ranged, for exam-
ple, from 1= useful to 7= not useful. Social privacy attitude comprised respon-
dents’ appraisal of restricting access to a Facebook profile. The introduction
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was “I think that restricting access to one’s FB profile is: . . . ” The semantic
differentials were answered on a 7-point scale ranging from, for example,
1= very mean to 7= very fair. Psychological privacy attitude captured respon-
dents’ appraisal of sharing personal pieces of information on Facebook. The
introduction was “I think that communicating personal information on FB
is: . . . ” Again, respondents indicated their answers on a 7-point semantic
differential, ranging from, for example, 1= very dangerous to 7= not dangerous.
Online privacy concerns
Online privacy concerns measure the degree to which people are worried
regarding their online privacy. 10 items from the 18-item scale by Buchanan
et al. (2007) were used (see Table 3.1). For reasons of parsimony only 10
items that fit the study’s needs best were chosen. One example item was
“Are you concerned about people online not being who they say they are?”
Respondents answered all items on a 5-point Likert Scale, ranging from
1= not at all to 5= very strongly.
Specific privacy behaviors
In order to answer the research questions, respondents were asked several
questions that captured specific privacy behaviors. Items were chosen with
the aim to replicate those studies that found evidence in favor of the privacy
paradox. Thus, all items resembled the ones used by Tufekci (2008), Acquisti
and Gross (2006), and Taddei and Contena (2013). For all items, possible
answers were 0= no, 1= yes. Respondents were asked the following questions:
(a) “On Facebook, I use my authentic first name (that is, the exact way it is
written in my passport).” (b) “On Facebook, I use my authentic second name
(that is, the exact way it is written in my passport).” (c) “On Facebook, I
indicate my current address.” (d) “On Facebook, I indicate my telephone
number.” (e) “On Facebook, have you ever posted a religious, political, or
ethical statement?” (f) “How often do you leave a post on Facebook?” This
time, possible answers were 1= never, 2= every other month, 3= on a monthly
basis, 4= several times a month, 5= several times a week, 6= once a day, 7= several
times a day.
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3.3.3 Data analysis
The results of Cronbach’s Alpha tests showed that all variables had at least
satisfactory internal consistencies (Table 3.2). All variables were tested for
normal distribution with Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. With large sample sizes,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests overestimate significant differences from the nor-
mal distribution (Field, 2009). Hence, random subsamples of n = 30 were
drawn. The tests did not produce significant results, thus the results did not
imply that the data were not distributed normally.
One of the aims of the study was to replicate already existing research.
In those studies, regression analyses were used (e.g., Utz & Kramer, 2009).
As a result, RQ1 was answered via bivariate regressions. The hypotheses
were analyzed with structural equation models (SEMs). H1, H2, and H3 were
analyzed together in one single SEM. As the hypotheses were tested along
three dimensions — informational, social, and psychological privacy — , three
different SEMs were computed: In SEMINF, H1, H2, and H3 were tested for
the dimension of informational privacy; in SEMSOC, H1, H2, and H3 were
tested for the dimension of social privacy; in the SEMPSY, H1, H2, and H3
were tested for the dimension of psychological privacy. The structure of the
SEMs was configured a priori. For the design of the SEMs, see Figure 3.1.
Missing values were considered missing at random and were replaced
with the full information maximum likelihood Arbuckle (1996). To estimate
effect sizes, the correlation coefficient r was used as suggested by Field (2009).
Values exceeding r = .10 were considered small effects, r = .30 medium effects,
and r = .50 large effects. For structural equation modeling, beta-coefficients
can be interpreted as r-values (e.g., Durlak, 2009). Hypotheses were tested
with a two-tailed .05 level of significance. The data were analyzed with the
Software R, version 3.0.1 (R Core Team, 2016). To conduct the SEMs, the
package lavaan, version 0.5–14 (2012) was used (Rosseel, 2012). Furthermore,
the packages QuantPsyc, moments, boot, psych, and memisc were used.
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Figure 3.1: SEMs with the direct and indirect influences of privacy atti-
tudes and privacy concerns on privacy behaviors. Latent vari-
ables are represented by ovals, and observed variables by rectan-
gles. Dashed arrows represent error terms / residuals. The model
was designed for informational privacy (SEMINF), social privacy
(SEMSOC), and psychological privacy (SEMPSY)
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Research questions: Replicating previous research on the privacy
paradox
RQ1 asked if privacy concerns were related to specific privacy behaviors,
such as the indication of (a) the authentic first name, (b) the authentic second
name, (c) the personal address, (d) the cell-phone number, (e) political or
religious views, and (f) the frequency of posts on SNSs. The results indicated
the following:
• RQ1a: Regression analyses showed privacy concerns to be unrelated to
the online disclosure of the authentic first name (F(1, 586) = 0.51, p = .478,
b < -0.01, β= -.03).
• RQ1b: Privacy concerns were again unrelated to the online disclosure of
the authentic second name (F(1, 586) = 3.00, p = .084, b < -0.01, β= -.07).
67
3 Is the privacy paradox a relic of the past?
• RQ1c: Here, privacy concerns were related to the online disclosure of
the personal address (F(1, 586) = 9.40, p = .002, b = -0.03, β= -.13). This
implies that people who are more concerned about their privacy are
less likely to disclose their personal address online. The size of the effect
of privacy concerns on the online disclosure of the personal address
was small.
• RQ1d: Privacy concerns were unrelated to the disclosure of the cell-
phone number (F(1, 582) = 0.35, p = .552, b < -0.01, β= -.02).
• RQ1e: Privacy concerns were not associated with postings of political
or religious views on Facebook (F(1, 585) = 2.32, p = .128, b < -0.01, β= -
.063).
• RQ1f: Privacy concerns were not related to the frequency of posts on
SNSs (F(1, 585) = 2.25, p = .134, b < 0.01, β= .06).
In sum, with the exception of the minor correlation with address disclosure,
the results are consistent with previous research. The results indicate that
online privacy concerns remain unrelated to specific privacy behaviors such
as the frequency and contents of online disclosures.
3.4.2 Hypotheses: A multidimensional perspective on the privacy
paradox
Model fit
H1, H2, and H3 were tested for the three dimensions informational, social,
and psychological privacy. Thus, three different SEMs were computed. The
three SEMs were first tested regarding model fit. The following guidelines
for testing model fit criteria were applied: χ2 divided by degrees of freedom
was not to exceed a value of 5 (e.g., Marsh & Hocevar, 1985); as a combined
rule, together with an SRMR of .06, the CFI, TLI, and RNI were not to fall
below .90 (Hu & Bentler, 1999); the RMSEA were not exceed values of .08
(Browne & Cudeck, 1992).
SEMINF showed adequate model fit (χ2 / df = 3.57, p < .001, CFI = .91,
TLI = .90, RNI = .91, RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.06, .07], SRMR = .06). SEMSOC
also showed adequate model fit (χ2 / df = 3.35, p < .001, CFI = .90, TLI = .89,
RNI = .90, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.06, .07], SRMR = .06). However, the
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Table 3.3: Fit Indices for the Three SEMs of Informational (SEMINF), Social
(SEMSOC), and Psychological (SEMPSY) Privacy
SEMINF SEMSOC SEMPSY
Fit
indices
Criteria A
priori
Post
hoc
A
priori
Post
hoc
A
priori
Post
hoc
χ2 720.34 534.38 677.26 443.5 634.68 449.07
df 202 179 202 178 202 179
χ2 / df <5a 3.57 2.99 3.35 2.49 3.14 2.51
CFI >.90b 0.91 0.94 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.96
TLI >.90b 0.90 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.95
RNI >.90b 0.91 0.94 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.96
RMSEA <.08c .07 .06 .06 .05 .06 .05
SRMR <.08d .06 .06 .06 .05 .05 .05
Note: Note. aMarsh and Hocevar, 1985; bHu and Bentler, 1999; cBrowne and Cudeck, 1992; ,
dHu and Bentler, 1999
TLI did not reach the expected .90. SEMPSY showed good model fit
(χ2 / df = 3.14, p < .001, CFI = .93, TLI = .92, RNI = .93, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.06,
.07], SRMR = .05). For a comprehensive overview, see Table 3.3. In conclusion,
the a priori models showed adequate model fit. However, further analyses
suggested model adjustments, which are explained below.
Factorial validity
Table 3.4 shows the SEMs’ measurement model. Except item ATTSOC3, all
items exceeded a threshold of .50, implying adequate overall model fit. Two
items were removed: Item ATTSOC3 (“I think that restricting access to one’s
FB profile is: worrying – not worrying”) was removed for inadequate fit
(γ= .46). Item PC5 (“Are you concerned that information about you could
be found on an old computer?”) was removed because it is not necessarily
associated with privacy concerns in online contexts and was thus deemed
theoretically irrelevant. To check for individual cross-loadings and error co-
variances, modification indices were computed. No significant cross-loadings
were found that warranted inclusion in the model. With respect to error co-
variances, indices showed that some items (ATTSOC5, ATTSOC6; PC4, PC5;
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PC8, PC9, PC10) were correlated substantially. As the items’ formulations
were especially parallel (see Table 3.1), the correlations seemed plausible and
were integrated into the new model.
To further check for factorial validity, the average variance extracted (AVE)
was computed. Except for the privacy concerns, the values for all variables
were above the minimum of AVE = .50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981, see Table 3.4).
To analyze factor reliability, the composite reliability REL(ξ) was computed.
All variables were above the minimum of REL(ξ) = .60 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988).
In general, analyses showed that the privacy concern scale did not perform
well. However, it was maintained due to its importance in answering research
questions. The removal of the two items (ATTsoc3 and PC5) and the inclusion
of the item error covariances improved model fit significantly. The three new
models showed good fit (Table 3.3).
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 1 stated that (a) informational, (b) social, and
(c) psychological privacy attitudes would have a direct positive effect on
corresponding privacy behaviors.
Results indicated that informational privacy attitudes did have a positive
direct effect on informational privacy behavior (b = 0.12, 95% CI [0.05, 0.19],
β= .11, p = .04, SE = .06). This implies that people who favor disguising their
identity on Facebook are also less identifiable on Facebook. The effect is
small.
For social privacy, results showed that social privacy attitudes also did
have a positive direct effect on social privacy behavior (b = 0.36, 95% CI [0.16,
0.56], β= .20, p = .001, SE = .10) demonstrating that people who have a positive
opinion toward restricting access to their profiles on Facebook also employ
more profile restrictions on Facebook. The effect is also small.
In terms of psychological privacy, results showed that psychological pri-
vacy attitudes did have a positive direct effect on psychological privacy be-
havior (b = 0.05, 95% CI [0.01, 0.10], β= .08, p = .030, SE = .02). This implies
that people who hold the belief that it is not good to have a Facebook profile
full of personal information also have a Facebook profile that is less personal.
Again, the effect is small.
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Table 3.4: Indices for Measurement Models: Factor Loadings (γ), Composite
Reliability (Rel (ξ)), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of the
SEMs
SEMINF SEMSOC SEMPSY
γ Rel
(ξ)
AVE γ Rel
(ξ)
AVE γ Rel
(ξ)
AVE
P. Behaviors 0.79 0.57 0.85 0.66 0.83 0.62
PB1 .88* .83* .62*
PB2 .83* .88* .83*
PB3 .51* .72* .89*
P. Intentions 0.85 0.66 0.95 0.60 0.86 0.68
PI1 .92* .57* .65*
PI2 .91* .85* .88*
PI3 .54* .83* .92*
P. Attitudes 0.93 0.55 0.93 0.54 0.95 0.60
PA1 .77* .77* .86*
PA2 .77* .70* .82*
PA3 .67* .46*a .62*
PA4 .63* .69* .63*
PA5 .71* .56* .77*
PA6 .81* .71* .85*
P. Concerns 0.83 0.35 0.83 0.35 0.83 0.35
PC1 .58* .57* .56*
PC2 .61* .62* .62*
PC3 .62* .61* .61*
PC4 .56* .56* .57*
PC5 .57* .58* .58*
PC6 .51*a .52*a .51*a
PC7 .63* .64* .62*
PC8 .61* .61* .61*
PC9 .50* .50* .50*
PC10 .61* .61* .62*
Note: *p < .001. aItem was deleted post hoc.
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Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 2 stated that (a) informational, (b) social, and (c)
psychological privacy attitudes would positively influence (a) informational,
(b) social, and (c) psychological privacy intentions, which in turn would
positively influence (a) informational, (b) social, and (c) psychological privacy
behaviors.
Results showed that informational privacy attitudes did have a positive
indirect effect on informational privacy behaviors, mediated by informational
privacy intentions (b = 0.47, 95% CI [0.38, 0.57], β= .44, p < .001, SE = .05). This
implies that people who have a positive opinion on disguising their identity
on Facebook also report an increased intention to do so, which finally leads
to the fact that they are less identifiable on Facebook. The effect can be
considered medium to large.
For social privacy, it was revealed that social privacy attitudes also had a
positive indirect effect on social privacy behaviors, mediated by social pri-
vacy intentions (b = 0.49, 95% CI [0.34, 0.63], β= .28, p < .001, SE = .07). This
indicates that people who have a positive opinion on restricting access to
their profiles on Facebook also have an increased intention to do so, which in
turn leads to the fact that they employ more profile restrictions on Facebook.
The effect is to be considered small to medium.
Regarding psychological privacy, results demonstrated that attitudes also
had a positive indirect effect on psychological privacy behaviors mediated by
psychological privacy intentions (b = 0.29, 95% CI [0.23, 0.35], β= .46, p < .001,
SE = 0.03). People who disapprove of having a Facebook profile showing per-
sonal information also have the intention to withhold personal information
and therefore have a Facebook profile that is less personal. The effect can be
considered medium to large.
In technical terms, the three significant direct effects of H1 and the three
significant indirect effects of H2 demonstrate partial mediation. To assess
mediation size, the proportion of mediation was computed (e.g., Iacobucci,
Saldanha, & Deng, 2007). For all three dimensions, the proportion of the
indirect effect on the total effect was large (informational = .80, social = .59,
psychological = .84). Hence, mediation analyses also confirmed the impor-
tance of using intentions as mediator between privacy attitudes and privacy
behaviors.
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Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 posited that privacy concerns would positively
influence (a) informational, (b) social, and (c) psychological privacy attitudes,
which in turn would positively influence (a) informational, (b) social, and (c)
psychological privacy intentions and the (a) informational, (b) social, and (c)
psychological privacy behaviors.
Results showed that privacy concerns did have an indirect effect on in-
formational privacy behaviors (b = 0.54, 95% CI [0.39, 0.70], β= .23, p < .001,
SE = .08). First, privacy concerns were related to informational privacy at-
titudes; informational privacy attitudes in turn had both a direct effect on
informational privacy behaviors (as was already shown in H1) and an indi-
rect effect (as already shown in H2). This implies that respondents who have
pronounced privacy concerns are also more skeptical regarding the posting
of identifiable information on Facebook, which in turn is both directly and
indirectly associated with a profile that features less identifiable information
online. The effect is small.
The effect also was shown for social privacy behaviors (b = 0.38, 95% CI
[0.24, 0.51], β= .16, p < .001, SE = .07). This indicates that people who have
pronounced privacy concerns also think that it is good to restrict access to
their Facebook profile, which in turn is directly and indirectly associated
with a more restricted Facebook profile. The effect is small.
Finally, the effect also existed for psychological privacy behaviors (b = 0.22,
β= .12, p < .001, SE = 0.05). This implies that respondents who have increased
privacy concerns also believe that it is good not to post too much personal
information on Facebook. This attitude is then both directly and indirectly
accompanied with a less personal Facebook profile. The effect is small.
Additional analyses and modification indices showed that no direct effect
of privacy concerns on privacy behavior existed, which is why no proportion
of mediation was computed. For an overview of all effects, see Table 3.5. For
a visual representation of the results of H1–H3, see Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Visualization of effects for the three SEMs of informational pri-
vacy (SEMINF), social privacy (SEMSOC), and psychological pri-
vacy (SEMPSY). Path c represents Hypothesis 1, path a x b repre-
sents Hypothesis 2, and path (d x c) + (d x a x b) represents Hy-
pothesis 3. All effects are significant on the basis of a level of
significance of p < .05
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Implications
The privacy paradox The first aim of this study was to replicate former
studies that investigated the privacy paradox. Results of prior research were
twofold: Some studies showed that privacy concerns were not associated
with specific privacy behaviors (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Trepte et al., 2014;
Ellison et al., 2011; Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Nosko et al., 2012; Stutzman &
Kramer-Duffield, 2010; Taddei & Contena, 2013; Tufekci, 2008); others found
that by using variables that closely refer to privacy concerns (e.g., perceived
privacy risks; Mohamed & Ahmad, 2012) privacy behaviors can be explained
to a certain degree (Debatin et al., 2009; Joinson et al., 2010; Krasnova et al.,
2010; Mohamed & Ahmad, 2012; Stutzman et al., 2012).
The results of this study showed that privacy concerns were mostly un-
related to specific privacy behaviors on SNSs. People who were concerned
about their privacy were not less likely to indicate their authentic first name,
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their authentic second name, their cell-phone number, or their political views
on Facebook. Also, privacy concerns were demonstrated to be unrelated to
the frequency of status posts on Facebook. However, one inconsistent ob-
servation was made: Privacy concerns were negatively associated with the
disclosure of the personal address on Facebook. Taken together, the results
suggest the following: Privacy concerns do not sufficiently predict specific
privacy behaviors, and even when they do the effects are small. This shows
that privacy concerns do not play a major part when it comes to explaining
specific actions on SNSs. Thus, it can be summarized that also after several
years the privacy paradox can still be found — as long as it is investigated as
suggested and outlined above.
Advances to the privacy paradox In a second aim of the research, a new
approach toward the privacy paradox was suggested. This new approach
was based on the TPB and a fine-grained definition of privacy as referring to
informational, psychological, and social aspects.
It was demonstrated that informational, social, and psychological privacy
attitudes were significantly related to informational, social, and psychological
privacy behaviors. It does make a difference if people think that it is for ex-
ample (a) useful to indicate one’s authentic name on Facebook (informational
privacy dimension), that it is (b) good to use friend lists to restrict access to
one’s profile (social privacy dimension), or that it is (c) dangerous to disclose
personal pieces of information on Facebook (psychological privacy dimen-
sion). If users of SNSs are of these opinions, their attitudes do affect their
corresponding privacy behaviors. In addition to the direct effect, attitudes
were found to also indirectly affect behavior through intentions: Attitudes
are associated with an increased intention to show these behaviors, which
in turn is associated with an increased privacy behavior. More important,
effect sizes indicate that these associations are substantial: Privacy attitudes
are decisive when it comes to understanding people’s privacy behaviors.
In addition, results showed that privacy concerns were indirectly asso-
ciated with privacy behaviors on all three dimensions. Although privacy
concerns are not directly related to privacy behaviors, they nonetheless af-
fect privacy behaviors indirectly. Thus when operationalized adequately, it
can be shown that privacy concerns play a significant role when it comes
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to explaining privacy behaviors. The results correspond with the findings
of Taddei and Contena (2013): In their study, privacy concerns also did not
relate directly to privacy behaviors. The authors nevertheless found that pri-
vacy concerns interacted with the general trust users had toward webpages,
which was then associated directly with self-disclosure behaviors.
Arguably, the methodological alterations have proven to be worthwhile.
The significant effects showed that applying the principle of compatibility to
measures (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) generally narrowed and even bridged the
attitude-behavior gap (Kaiser et al., 2010). Also, the differentiation between
the three dimensions of privacy can be considered worthwhile: The three
SEMs differed regarding the coefficients’ estimates. For example, the relation
between intentions and behaviors was the strongest in SEMPSY. The coeffi-
cient β= .79 implies that people are capable of disclosing almost exactly as
much information as they want to disclose. By contrast, the coefficient β= .47
for the same relation in the SEMSOC indicates that even when people intend
to restrict access to their Facebook profile, they are not equally capable of
showing that behavior.
3.5.2 Limitations and future perspective
First, the results are based on cross-sectional data. Thus, the direction or
causality of effects cannot be demonstrated statistically. It appears that atti-
tudes influence behaviors; however, as has been shown for cognitive disso-
nance (Festinger, 1957), actions can also influence attitudes. Second, partic-
ipation was voluntary, self-selective, and resulted in a convenience sample.
This implies that the sample cannot be considered statistically representative.
Third, the data are based on respondents’ self-reports. This is especially rel-
evant when it comes to measuring behavior; an objective procedure is to be
preferred here. All the same, it has been shown for behaviors on SNSs that
self-reports correspond closely to objective data (Hampton, Goulet, Marlow,
& Rainie, 2012). Fourth, with respect to the SEM’s quality, though adequate,
the factorial validity and the model fit could have been better: Of the 58
items in use, 1 item performed poorly and 8 only just adequately. Also, the
privacy concern scale needs to be reconsidered regarding the just acceptable
internal factorial validity. It might prove worthwhile to update the scale as to
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better correspond to contemporary online contexts. As a final note, the TPB
was designed to measure repeated behavior from a longitudinal perspective
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). This suggests an experimental or panel study with
multiple measurements. Behaviors that were used in this study cannot be
regarded as repeated; most people choose their profile name only once. Even
so, it has been shown that a substantial part of users do change their privacy
settings at some point — Utz and Kramer (2009) found that 90% of all users
already did so.
The present study can be further analyzed regarding the three dimensions’
distinct characteristics; for reasons of parsimony, those analyses were not
included here. In addition, to corroborate the findings, future studies might
want to develop alternative ways to measure overt behaviors. For example,
the current results could be validated in experimental settings: Do observable
privacy behaviors change when privacy attitudes are manipulated by, for
example, exposure to news stories of online data fraud?
3.5.3 Conclusion
The findings of our study suggest the following: First, the privacy paradox is
still a phenomenon to be detected in empirical data when analyzed exactly
as it was done in prior research. Second, and more important, the privacy
paradox disappears when (1) distinguishing between privacy concerns and
privacy attitudes, by (2) using the TPB as a theory driven framework to oper-
ationalize the research design, and by (3) differentiating privacy dimensions
(informational, social, and psychological) as proposed by Burgoon (1982). In
conclusion, the privacy paradox can be dissolved: The results of our study
clearly show that online privacy behaviors are not paradoxical in nature, but
that they are based on distinct privacy attitudes. The privacy paradox can be
considered a relic of the past.
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for SNSs — Analyzing self-disclosure
and self-withdrawal in a
representative U.S. sample
Preamble
Abstract
The privacy calculus established that online self-disclosures are based on a
cost-benefit tradeoff. For the context of SNSs, however, the privacy calculus
still needs further support as most studies consist of small student samples
and analyze self-disclosure only, excluding self-withdrawal (e.g., the deletion
of posts), which is essential in SNS contexts. Thus, this study used a U.S.
representative sample to test the privacy calculus’ generalizability and ex-
tend its theoretical framework by including both self-withdrawal behaviors
and privacy self-efficacy. Results confirmed the extended privacy calculus
model. Moreover, both privacy concerns and privacy self-efficacy positively
predicted use of self-withdrawal. With regard to predicting self-disclosure
in SNSs, benefits outweighed privacy concerns; regarding self-withdrawal,
privacy concerns outweighed both privacy self-efficacy and benefits.
Keywords: privacy calculus, privacy paradox, self-efficacy, Facebook, struc-
tural equation modeling, representative sample
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4.1 Introduction
With literally billions of users today, social network sites (SNSs) play a central
role in everyday life. This is because SNSs offer several benefits such as
helping users initiate or maintain social relationships, share information, or
provide entertainment (e.g., Choi & Bazarova, 2015). However, SNSs also pose
risks, for example, users can become victims of cyberbullying, surveillance
by government agencies and private companies, and information can be
accessed by unintended audiences (e.g., Marwick & boyd, 2011). Most of the
risks relate to aspects of privacy, which helps explain why a lot of people
have strong concerns when it comes to having control over the information
they provide online (Pew Research Center, 2015).
Nonetheless understanding why, how, and to what effect people use SNSs
despite the risks to privacy remains a major challenge for researchers (Zhang
& Leung, 2015). Given that SNSs introduced a completely new infrastructure
of communication, changed interpersonal processes in a way that can be
compared only to the effect of the telephone, and enticed people to provide
personal information to private companies on a scale never before seen, it is
crucial to further our understanding of SNS behavior. And Facebook, despite
the fact that other SNSs such as Instagram or Snapchat are becoming increas-
ingly popular, is an important center of focus when it comes to privacy issues
with more than one billion users worldwide.
As shown by Krasnova, Spiekermann, Koroleva, and Hildebrand (2010),
the best explanation of SNS use despite privacy fears is that of the “privacy
calculus” theory, which states that people will self-disclose personal infor-
mation when perceived benefits exceed perceived negative consequences.
Although this makes intuitive sense, in practice using the privacy calculus
to explain self-disclosure on SNSs has proved to be difficult. According to
the privacy calculus, people should disclose information on SNSs only when
they perceive the benefits of doing so outweigh the perceived costs. Yet, some
studies found that people disclosed information in SNSs even when they felt
the risks were high (e.g., Taddicken, 2014), which has been called the “privacy
paradox.” This sparked a great deal of research, which sometimes did find
significant statistical relations between privacy concerns (or perceived risks)
and self-disclosure behavior in SNSs (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Zlatolas,
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Welzer, Hericˇko, & Hölbl, 2015). Hence, our first aim is to replicate earlier
findings of the privacy calculus suggesting that both perceived benefits and
potential risks affect self-disclosure.
Though prior research has applied the privacy calculus to SNSs, the gen-
eralizability of this finding needs to be substantiated. Altogether, we found
7 published studies that have analyzed the privacy calculus specifically, of
which 5 focused on youth (e.g, Krasnova et al., 2010; Krasnova, Veltri, & Gün-
ther, 2012), 5 had small sample sizes (N < 300; e.g., Shibchurn & Yan, 2015; F.
Xu, Michael, & Chen, 2013), and 6 used convenience samples (e.g., Sun, Wang,
Shen, & Zhang, 2015). Moreover, even though SNSs initially came from the
U.S., an extensive study on the privacy calculus using a large sample in the
U.S. is still missing — so far, large-scale studies have only been conducted in
China (Cheung, Lee, & Chan, 2015) and Korea (Min & Kim, 2015), or have
focused on similar but distinct notions such as the privacy paradox (e.g., Tad-
dicken, 2014).1 Even these studies yield conflicting findings, as some report
no relationship between perceived privacy risks and self-disclosure (Cheung
et al., 2015; Taddicken, 2014) and others a negative relationship (Min & Kim,
2015). Hence, the second aim of this study is to improve the generalizability
of the privacy calculus by analyzing it in a U.S. representative sample.
The third aim of this research is to elaborate the privacy calculus theory.
One central finding of research that has not been addressed adequately in
the theory is the concept of self-withdrawal. Unlike self-disclosure, which is
the typical focus within this literature, self-withdrawal refers to the active
retention of information (Altman, 1975). Yong Jin Park (2015) and others
have demonstrated the importance of considering both self-disclosure and
self-withdrawal in privacy research. And both aspects of privacy behavior are
particularly salient for research on SNSs, as privacy behavior in SNSs is not
limited to self-disclosure but also includes self-protection via withholding
information. This is true for many reasons: For example, because of the
1Unlike the other studies cited here that focused on the privacy calculus within SNSs only,
Taddicken (2014) examined privacy behavior across SNSs, blogs, wikis, discussion forums,
photo and video sharing sites. While her study does not explicitly examine the privacy
calculus, it does analyze the relationship between privacy concern and self-disclosure.
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collapse of formerly distinct social contexts into a single audience on SNSs
(Marwick & boyd, 2011), users need to be able to make some information
inaccessible to particular people.
4.2 Theory
4.2.1 Privacy theory
Theorists disagree about how to define privacy as well as what it includes.
According to Burgoon (1982), it is possible to distinguish physical privacy
(freedom from surveillance and unwanted intrusions upon one’s physical
space), social privacy (control over social encounters), psychological privacy
(protects from intrusions upon one’s thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and val-
ues) and informational privacy (the ability to control the aggregation and
dissemination of information). As privacy in SNSs is largely about the dis-
semination and retention of personal information, we hence focus on aspects
of informational privacy.
According to Westin (1967), “privacy is the voluntary and temporary with-
drawal of a person from the general society through physical or psychological
means” (p. 7). This definition is pivotal in the privacy literature and shows
the two major components of privacy theory: Privacy is, first of all, a with-
drawal from others (e.g., Westin, 1967) that, second, must happen voluntarily
by people who are in control of their withdrawal (e.g., Altman, 1975). With-
drawal can be determined by physical aspects such as clothes, walls, or spatial
distance; similarly, withdrawal can also be determined by immaterial aspects
such as choosing not to disclose certain information (Westin, 1967). People
withdraw from others for many reasons, for example, to make autonomous
decisions, to foster intimate relationships, or to regulate emotions (Westin,
1967). Self-withdrawal is largely about trying to avoid negative outcomes of
communication; which is why it can be considered a form of self-protection
behavior (see Rogers, 1983).
On the other hand, people need to interact with one another to foster
social relationships, and interacting with others always requires some form
of self-disclosure — which in turn reduces privacy (Altman, 1975). Hence,
people regulate their privacy most prominently by either self-withdrawing
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or self-disclosing (see also Petronio, 2012). But when do people withdraw
from social interactions and when do they partake? Referring to the “calculus
of behavior” (p. 35), Laufer and Wolfe (1977) were one of the first to analyze
this question.
4.2.2 The privacy calculus
The answer provided by Laufer and Wolfe (1977) is that people weigh the
potential risks and benefits in terms of the consequences for them in the
future. Of course, people cannot know in advance what those risks and
benefits might be, so they rely on past experience, intuition, or perception to
assess them. Applying this perspective to SNSs, when users weigh perceived
benefits more heavily than the risks to privacy — which are often nebulous
and uncertain — disclosure is likely to occur. Indeed, some research suggests
that disclosure behavior may be primarily motivated by the more proximate
social benefits of SNS use rather than by the more distal risks to privacy
(Krasnova et al., 2010).
The notion that expected risks and benefits influence peoples’ behavior
originally comes from economic literature (hence the term “homo economi-
cus”), and stresses that human decision-making is often based on mathe-
matical calculations. Later, social sciences adopted the calculus perspective
in order to explain interpersonal behavior, often with a stronger focus on
affect: Social exchange theory, for example, posits that when people expect
to get more rewards than punishments they will engage in interpersonal
interactions (Homans, 1974). Estimating the consequences of behaviors is dif-
ficult, as people cannot calculate the risks and benefits rationally, but rather
have to perceive them psychologically (Rogers, 1983). Regarding the negative
consequences of behavior, protection motivation theory hence argues that
subjective, rather than objective, threat appraisals are the driving factor that
determines behavior (Rogers, 1983). Empirical studies on SNSs support this
theoretical reasoning; for example, F. Xu et al. (2013) found that the perceived
privacy risk strongly predicted privacy concern in SNSs.
In an e-commerce setting, Culnan and Armstrong (1999) found that when
people were not explicitly told that their personal data would be handled
with care, people with greater privacy concerns were less willing to provide
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personal data. Culnan and Armstrong were the first to call this tradeoff the
“privacy calculus” (p. 106). Building on behavior calculus theory (Laufer &
Wolfe, 1977), the privacy calculus posits that people will disclose personal in-
formation when the perceived benefits exceed the potential costs. The privacy
calculus has now been used to explain self-disclosure behaviors in various
online contexts, but Krasnova et al. (2010) were the first to analyze the pri-
vacy calculus in the context of SNSs. The authors found that users who
reported having higher perceived privacy risks had a less comprehensive
Facebook profile and users who reported getting more benefits had a more
comprehensive profile.
4.3 A new privacy calculus model
4.3.1 Distinction of self-disclosure and self-withdrawal
As stated earlier, one objective of this study is to integrate important tenets of
privacy theory in an extended privacy calculus model. This is because prior
research on the privacy calculus arguably has failed to integrate an impor-
tant finding. That is, to date, most studies involving the privacy calculus have
focused on self-disclosure only (e.g., Cheung et al., 2015). However, using
SNSs does not only involve the dispersion of information (i.e., self-disclosure),
but also the active retention of information (i.e., self-withdrawal; for example,
limiting the audience for one’s posts). Although related, SNS self-disclosure
and self-withdrawal are not simple mirror-images of one another, but rather
are distinct concepts (see Christofides, Muise, & Desmarais, 2009). For exam-
ple, high self-disclosure does not necessitate low self-withdrawal (e.g., it is
possible to disclose extensively on one topic while talking to a small group of
people). For this reason, both concepts should be considered in the privacy
calculus.
The basic tenet of communication privacy management theory (CPM, Petro-
nio, 2012) is that disclosure and withdrawal stand in dialectical tension with
one another. This means that people feel competing simultaneous needs to be
both social (by disclosing information) and private (by withholding informa-
tion). CPM differs from other theories in its view that in order to understand
how people navigate privacy disclosure must always be considered in re-
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lation to the desire to protect information. People handle these competing
needs by making decisions about the extent of privacy and publicness they
want to have in a given interaction (Petronio, 2012). People hence establish
privacy rules for both information disclosure and information withholding
(for example, not to reveal one’s medical history to a stranger).
Although CPM theory was developed for interpersonal interactions, the no-
tion of competing desires for disclosure and privacy is also relevant in SNSs.
For example, while most attention has been directed toward disclosure, SNS
users can and do enact rules about untagging themselves in particular pho-
tos, posting only certain types of content, or being selective about whom they
‘friend’ as a means to protect their privacy. In accordance, Marwick and boyd
(2011) posited that in order to leverage the benefits of SNSs, users have to
make some information available to certain groups of users but not to others.
We argue that such mechanisms can be considered self-withdrawal behaviors
and are central facets of privacy-related behavior in SNSs. If self-disclosure is
one side of the privacy coin, self-withdrawal is the other; and so far, whereas
research on similar online phenomena has included this differentiation (Yong
Jin Park, 2015), research on the privacy calculus has tended to focus on only
one side.
4.3.2 Privacy concerns as costs
In privacy calculus research to date, “costs” of SNS use have been measured
by either perceived privacy risks or privacy concerns. Privacy risks are “the
expectation of losses associated with the release of personal information”
(H. Xu, Luo, Carroll, & Rosson, 2011, p. 46), and privacy concerns are “the
degree to which an Internet user is concerned about website practices related
to the collection and use of his or her personal information” (Hong & Thong,
2013, p. 276). These definitions show that both privacy risks and privacy
concerns involve fear concerning potential losses due to the disclosure of,
or lack of control over, personal information. Protection motivation theory
(Rogers, 1983) shows that fear is a strong driving factor in why people employ
preventive measures, which may include self-withdrawal (i.e., withholding
information) in SNS contexts. Most research on SNSs has operationalized
costs as concerns (e.g., Min & Kim, 2015). Moreover, F. Xu et al. (2013) found
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that privacy risks predicted privacy concerns, which in turn determined self-
disclosure. As a result, we focus on privacy concerns as a mitigating cost
factor for self-disclosure and as a reinforcing factor for self-withdrawal.
4.3.3 Integrating privacy self-efficacy
Establishing self-protective behaviors can be difficult in any context (Rogers,
1983), and this may be especially true in SNSs, as enacting behaviors to
protect privacy requires knowledge of how to implement the multitude pri-
vacy settings that are available and that change over time (Marwick & boyd,
2011). Protection motivation theory suggests that if people want to establish
self-protecting behaviors, experiencing fear or concern does not suffice to ef-
fectively change behavior, as people also need to have sufficient self-efficacy
(Rogers, 1983). Self-efficacy refers to the belief in one’s ability to execute
certain behaviors. As a result, we suggest integrating privacy self-efficacy as
third predictor of SNS behavior in our extended privacy calculus model. To
date, no studies of the privacy calculus have included this factor.
4.4 Hypotheses
4.4.1 Benefits
The most important factors to explain self-disclosure on SNSs are the posi-
tive aspects of SNS use, for example, making new friends or learning about
things that are important or useful. In the context of SNSs, research shows
that people have manifold motives for using SNSs: for example, information
exchange, relational development, or entertainment (e.g., Choi & Bazarova,
2015). Several studies have also found empirical evidence that these motives
for using SNSs manifest in several specific benefits, such as increased so-
cial capital, leveraged social support, or enacted identity management (e.g.,
Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2014). All seven empirical studies on the privacy
calculus for SNSs showed that if users expected benefits from using SNSs they
disclosed more personal information. Benefits explained between 5% (Kras-
96
4 The extended privacy calculus model for SNSs
nova et al., 2012) and 66% (F. Xu et al., 2013) of variance in self-disclosure,
and thus demonstrated that expected benefits have good predictive power.
Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: The more people expect benefits by using Facebook,
the more they will disclose information about themselves.
The question remains though whether the expected benefits of participat-
ing in SNSs also influence self-protective behaviors online. Referring to
Christofides et al. (2009), we argued that self-disclosure and self-withdrawal
behaviors are related but nonetheless distinct behaviors. For example, on
SNSs it is possible to have few users as friends (high self-withdrawal) to
whom one nevertheless reveals a lot of information (high self-disclosure).
On the one hand, one could argue that if people expect benefits from using
SNSs they should withdraw less in order to maximize their outcomes; on
the other hand, protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1983) suggests that
only negative threat appraisals (i.e., privacy concerns), rather than positive
feelings (i.e., expected benefits), determine self-protective behaviors. Hence,
as we are not aware of any studies that analyzed the relationship between
expected benefits and self-withdrawal empirically, and because of conflicting
theoretical considerations, we propose the following research question:
Research question 1: Do people who expect more benefits from
using Facebook show more or less self-withdrawal behaviors?
4.4.2 Privacy concerns
For the Internet in general, privacy concerns have been found to negatively
predict self-disclosure (e.g., Metzger, 2004). Also, for SNSs in particular, pri-
vacy concerns have been shown to negatively relate to self-disclosure: For
example, SNS users who were concerned about their privacy tended to have
profiles that were less personal, and also tended to disclose less identifying
information (Dienlin & Trepte, 2015). Six of the seven studies on the privacy
calculus in SNSs showed significant negative effects of concerns or risks on
self-disclosure — only the study by Cheung et al. (2015) and the U.S. subsam-
ple in the study by Krasnova et al. (2012) did not show significant results.
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Similarly, in a representative survey of German social media users, Taddicken
(2014) examined privacy behavior in blogs, SNS, wikis, discussion forums,
photo and video sharing sites and found that, across these platforms, disclo-
sure varied depending on the sensitivity of the information to be disclosed.
At the same time, no significant direct relation between privacy concern and
self-disclosure was found, which shows that the relation between privacy con-
cern and self-disclosure is still somewhat capricious. Hence, despite some
inconsistency in the literature, a growing body of empirical studies has sup-
ported that concern about privacy and self-disclosure on SNSs are negatively
associated with one another.
Hypothesis 2a: The more concerned people are regarding privacy,
the less information they will disclose about themselves in Face-
book.
We also predict that privacy concerns are related to the active retention of
information. Several studies report that concepts relating to privacy concerns
are related to self-withdrawal behaviors: For example, Korzaan and Boswell
(2008) found that users’ level of information privacy concern predicted behav-
ioral intentions to, for example, remove their name from commercial mailing
lists. This association also holds in the SNS context: In a study with 340
Malaysian university students, privacy concerns were found to directly and
significantly predict self-withdrawal measures on SNSs (Mohamed & Ahmad,
2012). Utz and Kramer (2009) similarly found that privacy concerns were as-
sociated with the use of privacy settings on Hyves, a SNS in the Netherlands.
We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2b: The more concerned people are regarding privacy,
the more they will engage in acts of self-withdrawal in Facebook.
4.4.3 Self-efficacy
The extant literature supports the notion that self-efficacy should predict
implementing privacy enhancing or self-withdrawal behaviors online. For
example, users who reported having more technical Internet skills related to
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privacy (e.g., phishing, p3p, or cache) also report employing more privacy-
enhancing behaviors (e.g., using fake names for SNSs, clearing browser his-
tory, or deletion of cookies; Y. J. Park, 2013). Lee, LaRose, and Rifon (2008)
found that users who reported more self-efficacy in using virus protection
measures had a stronger intention to adopt virus protection behaviors. Simi-
lar results can be found for the context of SNSs: Both Cheung et al. (2015) and
Zlatolas et al. (2015) evidenced that people who perceive to be in control of
their privacy report less privacy concerns. Likewise, Mohamed and Ahmad
(2012) found that both self-efficacy and response efficacy had a positive effect
on the use of privacy measures.
Hypothesis 3: People with greater privacy self-efficacy will engage
in more self-withdrawal behaviors.
Finally, the question remains whether privacy self-efficacy might also affect
self-disclosure. Niemann and Schenk (2014) found that privacy self-efficacy
influenced self-withdrawal but not self-disclosure behaviors in SNSs. Also,
from a theoretical perspective it can be argued that because the entire infras-
tructure of SNSs is built for self-disclosure, self-disclosing on SNSs is easy
and does not necessitate high levels of competence or perceived behavioral
control. However, privacy self-efficacy is conceptually close to self-efficacy
regarding self-presentation, which has been shown to increase information
disclosure (Krämer & Winter, 2008). Indeed, people who feel better able to
protect themselves by using available SNS privacy settings, for example, may
be more willing to disclose. Thus, because of conflicting theoretical and em-
pirical considerations, we pose the following research question:
Research question 2: Do people with greater privacy self-efficacy
show more or less self-disclosure?
4.4.4 The extended privacy calculus model
The predictions advanced in the four hypotheses combine to suggest a novel
framework to analyze the privacy calculus that we call the extended privacy
calculus model. In accordance with CPM theory (Petronio, 2012), the model
has two dependent variables: self-disclosure and self-withdrawal. We reason
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that these two variables are explained by different factors: Self-disclosure is
explained on the basis of expected benefits and privacy concern, whereas self-
withdrawal is explained by privacy concern and privacy self-efficacy. Due to
a lack of theoretical and empirical clarity, we ask in two research questions
whether perceived benefits predict privacy behaviors and whether privacy
self-efficacy predicts self-disclosure.
4.5 Method
4.5.1 Procedure and participants
The data are representative of adult Facebook users ages 18 and over residing
in the U.S. and were collected by the research firm GFK (www.gfk.com) in
October 2012 by means of an online questionnaire. GfK samples households
from its KnowledgePanel, which is a probability-based web panel designed to
be representative of the U.S. To qualify for the main survey, a panel member
must have had a Facebook account, as determined by a screener question at
the time of data collection. The median participation time was 20 minutes.
The resulting sample consisted of N = 1,156 respondents ranging in age
from 18 to 86 (M = 46.91) years. 57.35% of the respondents were female. Re-
garding ethnicity, 77.5% of the respondents were White, Non-Hispanic, 6.8%
Black, Non-Hispanic, 3.2% Other, Non-Hispanic, 8.5% Hispanic, and 4% 2+
Races, Non-Hispanic. In relation to education, 6.1% indicated less than high
school, 24.3% high school, 32.8% some college, and 36.8% bachelor’s degree
or higher. The median household income was between $60,000 to $74,999 per
year. Regarding current residency, 18.9% of the respondents came from the
Northeast, 22.6% from the Midwest, 34.3% from the South, and 24.2% from
the West of the U.S.
4.5.2 Measures
Based on established scales and additional items that we designed in order
to fit the research question more closely, confirmatory factor analyses (CFA)
were run for each variable to select items that formed a unidimensional struc-
ture. To assess the assumption of normality, Shapiro-Wilk normality tests
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were done. As the results showed violations of normality, we used the more
robust Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistic. Items that did not sufficiently load
on the latent factor were deleted. To assess reliability of the constructed and
congeneric scales, the usual fit indices (χ2, CFI, TLI, RMSEA, SRNR), McDon-
ald’s composite reliability omega, and Cronbach’s alpha were calculated. All
scales had adequate to good factorial validity and reliability. The variables
and their psychometrics appear in Table 4.1; all questionnaire items, the data,
item distributions, and the CFAs can be found in the online supplementary
material.2
Facebook benefits
Facebook benefits measured how many positive aspects people attributed
to Facebook use. Twelve items were initially developed based on an earlier
focus group pilot study of users who discussed the benefits and risks that
they experience as a result of using Facebook. Of the 12 items, 10 were used as
determined by the data preparation analysis discussed above that included,
for example, using Facebook for self-expression, learning new things, and
making new personal or business contacts (see Appendix). Respondents
answered all items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1= strongly disagree to
5= strongly agree.
Privacy concerns
Privacy concerns measured how strongly people worried about their privacy
online. Four items were developed based on Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal
(2004), which all were used — for example, “I do not feel especially concerned
about my privacy online.” Respondents answered both items on a 5-point
scale ranging from 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree. Several answers
were reverse coded.
2https://osf.io/e3j98/?view_only=cf4c10222def4efdbecae20c1dca7dc6
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Facebook privacy self-efficacy
Facebook privacy self-efficacy measured if people felt confident and capable
of adjusting their privacy options on Facebook. We adapted the perceived
privacy control scale by Krasnova et al. (2010) in order to better represent
self-efficacy, and used all 5 items. One example item is: “I feel confident in
my ability to protect myself using Facebook’s privacy settings.” Answers
ranged from 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree.
Facebook self-disclosure
Facebook self-disclosure measured the extent to which people share personal
information on Facebook. We extended the self-disclosure scale by Krasnova
et al. (2010) using 5 of the 7 items, including “I have put a lot of information
about myself in my Facebook profile.” Respondents answered all items on a
5-point scale ranging from 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree.
Facebook self-withdrawal
This variable measured how many deliberate privacy-preserving behaviors
people engaged in that helped to make their profiles more private. In line
with Mohamed and Ahmad (2012), we asked respondents on a binary scale
whether they have already implemented various privacy measures, such as
the untagging of posts or photos, or making one’s profile unsearchable. Re-
spondents answered each item with either 0= no or 1= yes. 10 items were
developed, of which 6 items formed a unidimensional scale.
4.5.3 Data analysis
All hypotheses were tested with a saturated structural equation model (SEM).
Again, we used the robust Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistic. Because of
the high number of items, which increases the complexity of the SEM, we
used item parceling (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). Item-
parcels average the information of several items into individual parcels. As a
precondition, items that are parceled need to show unidimensionality, which
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Table 4.1: Psychometric Properties of Variables
Recom.
Crit.
FB
benefits
Privacy
concerns
FB privacy
self-
efficacy
FB self-
disclo-
sure
FB self-
with-
drawal
m 3.13 3.34 2.89 2.65 0.67
sd 0.91 0.97 0.95 1.04 0.41
skew. -0.49 -0.17 -0.04 0.07 -1.03
kurt. 0.09 -0.39 -0.49 -0.69 0.77
χ2 158.50 6.06 12.14 25.34 30.47
df 35 2 5 5 9
p >.05a <.001 .050 .030 <.001 <.001
CFI >.95a 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.96
TLI >.95a 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.93
RMSEA <.08a 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
SRMR <.08a 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06
α >.70a 0.91 0.67 0.91 0.80 0.74
ω >.60a 0.91 0.68 0.91 0.81 0.56
AVE >.50a 0.77 0.55 0.83 0.71 0.32
MSV < AVEa 0.37 0.15 0.08 0.37 0.15
ASV < AVEa 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.04
Note: aHair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010); α = Cronbach’s alpha; ω = composite reli-
ability. AVE = average variance extracted, MSV = maximum shared variance, ASV =
average shared variance (all measured in final SEM).
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was positive in our case (see Table 4.1). We used the item-to-construct balance
approach and measured each variable with 2 parcels, and when possible as
recommended with 3 parcels (Little et al., 2002).
Missing data were treated with listwise deletion. We tested Hypothe-
ses with a two-tailed .05 significance level. Regarding effect sizes, coeffi-
cients with values exceeding β= .10 were considered small effects, β= .30
medium effects, and β= .50 large effects. We decided against including post-
stratification weights and demographic control variables.3 The software R
was used (version 3.1.2) for the analyses, supplemented by packages such as
lavaan (version 0.5-17).
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Model fit
The SEM showed adequate fit (χ2 = 99.70, df = 44, p < .001, CFI = 0.99, TLI = 0.99,
RMSEA = 0.03, SRMS = 0.03). To assess convergent factorial validity, the aver-
age variance extracted (AVE) was calculated. Values above AVE = .5 indicate
good convergent validity. Four of the five variables were above this thresh-
old, and one was below (Facebook self-withdrawal, AVE = .32; see Table 4.1).
Given that Facebook self-withdrawal was measured with binary items only,
factorial validity can thus be considered acceptable. To assess discriminant
validity, the AVE was compared to the maximum shared variance (MSV) and
the average shared variance (ASV). Results showed that AVE values were
above MSV and ASV values (see Table 4.1), which supports that the variables
had sufficient discriminant validity.4
3To improve representativeness, GFK offers post-stratification weights that account for sys-
tematic under- and oversampling of specific parts of the population. The question of
whether or not to use weights is somewhat ambivalent. We followed the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics advice to not use weights when conducting inferential statistics (i.e.,
regressions). For the results with weights, please see the online supplementary material.
Generally, demographic control variables should only be included if they are theoretically
related to the variables of interest. Even though demographic variables are related to
privacy behavior online, they were not of major theoretical interest. For results without
the control variables, please see the online supplementary material. Both alternative SEMs
produced very similar results to the main SEM.
4When all items are measured on the basis of a single online questionnaire — as was the case
for this study — a bias due to common method might occur. Several statistical methods
exist to test for common method bias. However, the practice of testing for common method
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4.6.2 Hypotheses
Facebook benefits as predictor
Hypothesis 1 stated that the more benefits people expect from using Face-
book, the more they would self-disclose. The data supported Hypothesis
1: Respondents who reported that they would get more social benefits on
Facebook also posted more personal information (b = 0.65, 95% CI [0.57,
0.73], β= .57, p < .001, SE = 0.04). The standardized regression coefficient of
β= .57 showed that the effect was strong. Research question 1 asked whether
Facebook benefits would predict Facebook self-withdrawal. Results indi-
cated there was no significant effect of Facebook benefits on self-withdrawal
(b = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.04], SE = 0.02, p = .713, β= .02).
Privacy concerns as predictor
Hypothesis 2a predicted that the more concerned people are about privacy,
the less information they would disclose. The data supported Hypothesis
2a: Respondents who reported higher levels of concern about their privacy
also posted less personal information on Facebook (b = -0.29, 95% CI [-0.38,
-0.20], β= -.23, p < .001, SE = 0.05). The standardized regression coefficient of
β= -.23 indicated that the effect was small. Hypothesis 2b stated that the
more concerned people are regarding privacy, the more they would employ
active self-withdrawal. The data supported Hypothesis 2b: Respondents who
reported greater concern about their privacy also reported using more self-
withdrawal mechanisms on Facebook (b = 0.19, 95% CI [0.15, 0.23], β= .45,
p < .001, SE = 0.02). The standardized regression coefficient of β= .45 showed
that the effect was of medium strength. Bootstrap analyses with N = 2000
draws indicated that, taken together, privacy concerns explained 41.2% of
variance in self-disclosure and self-withdrawal (95% CI [26.9%, 56.6%]).
bias by means of statistical post hoc test has been criticized. As a result, we used a priori
precautions; for example, we took care that items did not semantically overlap on different
constructs (see Table 4.1) or used some inverted items.
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Privacy self-efficacy as predictor
Hypothesis 3 anticipated that people with greater Facebook privacy self-
efficacy would employ active self-withdrawal more than those with lower
self-efficacy. The data supported Hypothesis 3: Respondents who reported
higher self-efficacy in terms of managing their privacy also reported using
more self-withdrawal mechanisms on Facebook (b = 0.08, 95% CI [0.05, 0.11],
β= .27, p < .001, SE = 0.01). The standardized regression coefficient of β= .27
indicated that this effect was small. Research question 2 asked whether pri-
vacy self-efficacy would also predict Facebook self-disclosure. Results showed
that there was no significant effect of Facebook privacy self-efficacy on self-
disclosure (b = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.09], SE = 0.03, p = .308, β= .03).
Comparison of effects
Regarding effects on Facebook self-disclosure, comparison of confidence in-
tervals shows that the net effect of benefits exceeded that of privacy concerns,
which in turn exceeded that of privacy self-efficacy. Taken together, all three
variables explained 37.87% of Facebook self-disclosure. With regard to ef-
fects on Facebook self-withdrawal, comparison of the confidence intervals
shows that the net effect of privacy concern exceeded that of privacy self-
efficacy, which in turn exceeded that of Facebook benefits. Taken together, all
three variables explained 27.58% of Facebook self-withdrawal. In addition,
we tested whether expected benefits or privacy concerns explained more
variance of both dependent variables taken together (i.e., self-disclosure plus
self-withdrawal behavior). Bootstrap analyses with N = 2000 draws showed
that Facebook benefits altogether explained 32.9% of variance (95% CI [26.0%,
38.9%]) and that privacy concerns explained 41.2% of variance (95% CI [26.9%,
56.6%]). As the confidence intervals do not overlap, this shows that both vari-
ables did not differ significantly in their overall predictive power. For a list
of all regression statistics see Table 4.2, and for a visual representation see
Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Results of the structural equation model. Only significant path
coefficients are shown (.05 significance level). The effects are stan-
dardized. Dashed arrows indicate negative relations.
Table 4.2: Regression Coefficients
b (LL) (UL) se p β
Facebook self-disclosure
Facebook benefits 0.65 0.57 0.73 0.04 <.001 .57
Facebook concerns -0.29 -0.38 -0.20 0.05 <.001 -.23
Facebook privacy 0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.03 .308 .03
self-efficacy
Facebook self-withdrawal
Privacy benefits 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.02 .713 .02
Facebook concerns 0.19 0.15 0.23 0.02 <.001 .45
Facebook privacy 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.01 <.001 .27
self-efficacy
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4.7 Discussion
4.7.1 Implications
This study set out to see if prior findings on the privacy calculus and its effect
on self-disclosure in SNS could be replicated, to analyze the generalizability
of the privacy calculus to a larger and representative U.S. sample, and to
extend its theoretical framework.
The importance of replication in research has been discussed widely in
recent years. Thus the first major finding of this study is that the privacy
calculus findings of past work could be replicated. Specifically, this study
finds that when people decide whether to self-disclose in SNSs, both concerns
and benefits compete with one another. This is relevant as some research
on the privacy paradox showed no, small, or complex relations between
concerns and disclosure; Taddicken (2014), for example, found that perceived
social relevance mediated the relation between privacy concerns and self-
disclosure. The mixed findings could partly result from the fact that privacy
concerns have often been operationalized differently and in specific contexts
(e.g., ecommerce, SNSs); hence, results from any one study should not be
overly generalized. Overall, by finding evidence for the privacy calculus, this
study adds to a growing body of research that fails to find evidence for
the privacy paradox in the context of SNSs (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015).
However when predicting Facebook self-disclosure, expected benefits still
have more predictive power than privacy concerns. This replicates findings
by Min and Kim (2015) and supports the idea that when partaking actively
in SNSs, benefits loom larger than concerns.
The second major finding of this study is that, by means of a nationwide
representative study, the data confirmed that the privacy calculus can be
generalized to the U.S. adult Facebook population. Prior research on the
privacy calculus has mainly been conducted with college-age samples only,
whereas this study included people from across different generations and
people from a much wider variety of educational and ethnical backgrounds.
As a result, this study substantiates the empirical foundation for the privacy
calculus laid by prior research and, by showing that it can be applied to Face-
book users in an entire nation, adds to its robustness. The third and perhaps
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most interesting finding is that this study makes several contributions to
the privacy calculus’s theoretical framework. In our extended privacy cal-
culus model we included self-withdrawal behaviors as a new criterion and
added privacy self-efficacy as a predictor. Although other studies have in-
vestigated the mechanisms underlying the privacy calculus by, for example,
examining further predictors of self-disclosure (Min & Kim, 2015) or pri-
vacy risks (Krasnova et al., 2010), to our knowledge, this is the first study
to show that both self-disclosure and self-withdrawal behaviors can be an-
alyzed in a single model. This helps to show two things: First, the results
further underscore the relevance of privacy concerns, as privacy concerns
not only explained self-disclosure but also self-withdrawal. Hence, privacy
concerns are more powerful as initially thought and play an important role in
determining SNS behavior. Second, different factors help to explain variance
in self-disclosure and in self-withdrawal. That is, whereas benefits predicted
only self-disclosure, privacy concerns predicted both self-disclosure and self-
withdrawal behaviors. A comparison of the combined effects even confirmed
that benefits and concerns have equal predictive power for self-disclosure
and self-withdrawal.
The results of the research questions shed further light on the role of both
perceived benefits and privacy concerns in SNS, as well as self-efficacy. Prior
to this study it was unclear whether perceived benefits, in addition to in-
creasing self-disclosure, influence self-withdrawal in SNSs since no research
had investigated this relationship. The data from this study support the
suggestion from protection motivation theory that only negative threat ap-
praisals (e.g., privacy concerns) should impact self-protection behaviors (e.g.,
self-withdrawal in SNS contexts).
Finally, this study showed that privacy self-efficacy is not related to dis-
closure in SNSs. This relation has not been studied previously but could be
supported by research on optimistic bias (see Klein & Helweg-Larsen, 2002)
in that privacy self-efficacy might impart a sense of invulnerability to poten-
tial negative consequences of using SNSs. However, we found no evidence for
this notion. This study also revealed that privacy self-efficacy significantly
predicted self-withdrawal, which supports one of privacy theory’s central
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tenets that in order to regulate privacy effectively, people also need to have
sufficient control (Westin, 1967), including the psychological perception that
they are able to enact such control.
4.7.2 Limitations and future perspective
A limitation of the privacy calculus theory, as well as the model advanced
in this study, is that it explicitly focuses on the individual. Yet, within SNS
contexts, privacy is both an individual and a social issue. Indeed, one of the
most exciting recent developments in the privacy research literature is the
notion of “networked privacy” (Marwick & boyd d., 2014), which refers to the
fact that control of information disclosure in networked environments such
as SNSs does not solely reside in the actions taken by an individual user — it
is collectively affected by network ties. For example, one user’s action (e.g.,
self-disclosure, “liking,” tagging, etc.) can reveal information about other
users in the network to unknown or unauthorized audiences.
The idea of networked privacy, or the fact that privacy is socially contex-
tualized in networked environments, has not been studied extensively in the
privacy calculus literature, and yet an individual’s calculus of the costs and
benefits of using SNSs is most certainly affected by their network linkages.
Indeed, Cheung et al. (2015) showed that social influences can explain up to
16% of variance in self-disclosure. Social influences on the privacy calculus
need to be examined in future research, and it would be valuable to integrate
socially-oriented theories to do so (e.g., the theory of planned behavior). That
said, given that three variables can explain 38% of self-disclosure and 28% of
self-withdrawal behavior, the extended privacy calculus offers a both parsi-
monious and effective approach for understanding privacy in SNSs. Because
the study used cross-sectional data, the postulated directions of effects have
yet to be verified with a longitudinal design. In addition, the scales used in
this study need to be further optimized, as some items could not be used
due to lack of reliability or factorial validity.
The study presents the psychology and behaviors of Facebook users in
2012. Since then, the online world has changed significantly: New SNSs such
as Instagram entered the market, new messengers such as Snapchat appeared,
and new risky behaviors such as novel forms of sexting or taking extreme
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selfies manifested. As a result, it is important to find out whether the ex-
tended privacy calculus model also helps to explain these novel behaviors,
or whether other aspects such as fear of missing out (FoMO) or sensation
seeking become increasingly relevant. It is important for future research to ex-
amine if the extended privacy calculus model holds for newer SNS platforms.
It is possible, for example, that SNSs which allow for ephemeral communica-
tion (e.g., Snapchat) may alter an individual’s cost-benefit calculus of posting
risky messages with impacts to their self-disclosure and self-withdrawal be-
haviors. That said, the results of this study likely remain valid for Facebook
and platforms like it, as the core structures (news feed, timeline, groups,
messenger) and the main ways people interact in it (post, like, share, mes-
sage) did not change significantly since the time the data for this study were
collected.
4.7.3 Conclusion
By using U.S. representative data, this study adds to a growing literature that
confirms the privacy calculus in SNSs. The extended privacy calculus model
is the first to integrate the theoretical tenets of both SNS self-disclosure and
self-withdrawal into a single model. We believe that this novel integration
is important. To illustrate consider the following figurative example from
the context of automobiles: To date, separate strands of research have ana-
lyzed either how cars accelerate or how they slow down. However, research
should now aim to advance theory by answering these related questions
together within one single model (Popper, 1959/2005) because this offers the
advantage to analyze influences that are either specific to both processes (e.g.,
engine / brakes) or more general (e.g., aerodynamic drag). Regarding SNSs,
the extended privacy calculus model is the first integrated model to show
that expected benefits are a specific influence for self-disclosure, whereas
self-efficacy is a specific influence for self-withdrawal. Privacy concerns, ad-
versely, influence both SNS self-disclosure and self-withdrawal. Overall, this
study thus supports the basic tenets of privacy theory in SNSs (Petronio,
2012), finds further evidence against the privacy paradox, and proposes a
novel extended privacy calculus model for SNSs.
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5 “Nothing to hide”: Predicting the
desire for privacy
Preamble
Abstract
Objective: This study analyzes how personality relates to peoples’ desire for
privacy. Specifically, we investigated whether the syllogism “I don’t mind
surveillance because I have nothing to hide” is correct: Do people who lack
integrity (given they have something to hide) indeed desire more privacy?
Method: Study 1 featured an online questionnaire (N = 268, Mage = 20 years,
72% female) and Study 2 a laboratory experiment (N = 87, Mage = 20 years,
51% female), where participants wrote an essay about past negative, positive,
or neutral behaviors to analyze effects on desire for privacy.
Results: Study 1 showed that respondents who are more shy, less anxious,
and more risk averse desired more privacy. Respondents who self-reported
lacking integrity reported desiring more privacy from government and more
anonymity. Study 2 replicated these results and showed a statistical trend
(p = .052) that writing about negative past behaviors increased desire for in-
terpersonal privacy. Moreover, the integrity IAT showed significant relations
with desire for privacy from government.
Conclusion: It is possible to predict peoples’ desire for privacy based on
their lack of integrity. However, other neutral personality facets also explain
desire for privacy. Hence, putting everyone who desires privacy under gen-
eral suspicion would be incorrect.
Keywords: privacy, integrity, anonymity, personality, SEM
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Status of publication
The study has already been submitted at an academic journal. At the time
of the publication of this dissertation, the results of the first reviews had not
yet arrived. If the manuscript should be accepted, the published text is likely
going to differ from the text that is presented here due to further adjustments
that might result from the review process.
119
5 Predicting the desire for privacy
5.1 Introduction
In his novel The Circle, Eggers (2013) describes a dystopian society in which
people are gradually forfeiting their privacy. People decide to become “trans-
parent”, which means that they start carrying a small camera around the neck
in order to broadcast their daily lives to the Internet. Eventually, this causes a
societal upheaval: “The pressure on those who hadn’t gone transparent went
from polite to oppressive. The question, from pundits and constituents, was
obvious and loud: If you aren’t transparent, what are you hiding?” (Eggers,
2013, p. 129). The main argument being offered to justify the surveillance
is: “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.” This syllogism is
familiar, given that it commonly appears in also nonfictional conversations
(Sieradski, 2013.08.06). Consider, for example, the following tweet: “I don’t
download illegally. I don’t have anything on my comp[uter] to hide. Hell,
I’m sure the #NSA gave up on me years ago.” (Beautiful Disaster, 14.08.2015).
However, to date there is only little research on why people desire privacy
and how the desire for privacy can be predicted by aspects of personality.
More specifically, and to the best of our knowledge, so far no study exists that
has analyzed the nothing-to-hide argument from a scientific and empirical
perspective. Why do some people not care whether government agencies
such as the NSA are collecting their data (G. Greenwald, 2013.06.06), and why
do others protest vehemently in order to protect their privacy? Answering
this question is important: Given that government agencies are collecting
large amounts of data hoping to reduce criminality and terrorism, and given
that government agencies are collecting this data preemptively and without
concrete suspicions, it is relevant to find out whether this practice of mass
surveillance can be justified based on the nothing-to-hide argument. As a
result, the main question of this paper is: Do people who desire more privacy
really have more to hide and, more generally, what are personality facets that
determine peoples’ overall desire for privacy?
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5.2 Theory
5.2.1 Desire for privacy
Privacy captures the extent of voluntary withdrawal from others (Westin,
1967). Several models suggest that privacy is a multi-dimensional concept:
For example, in a theory-driven treatise Burgoon (1982) argued that privacy
has four dimensions: informational, social, psychological, and physical pri-
vacy. Pedersen (1979), by contrast, did an empirical factor analysis (initially
starting with 94 items) and suggested that privacy exists on six dimensions:
reserve, isolation, solitude, intimacy with friends, intimacy with family, and
anonymity. In addition, Schwartz (1968) differentiated between horizontal
and vertical privacy: Whereas horizontal privacy captures withdrawal from
peers, vertical privacy refers to withdrawal from superiors or institutions
(e.g., government agencies). Next to being multi-dimensional, privacy is also
contingent (Dienlin, 2014): One can, for example, distinguish between the ob-
jective privacy context, the subsequent subjective perception of privacy, the
psychological desire for privacy (which is both a situational and dispositional
need), and the resulting privacy behavior (as represented by self-disclosure).
For the purpose of this study, we combine the aforementioned theories and
focus on (a) vertical privacy with regard to the desire for withdrawal from
government surveillance, (b) horizontal privacy in terms of the desire for
withdrawal from peers, friends, or acquaintances, and (c) both horizontal
and vertical privacy as captured by the general desire for anonymity.
5.2.2 Integrity
Which specific aspects of personality help predict desire for privacy? At
its core, the nothing-to-hide argument implies that lack of integrity is an
important predictor of why people desire privacy. This becomes especially
apparent when we consider the definition of Solove’s (2007) nothing-to-hide
argument (notably, Solove is a strong critic of the nothing-to-hide argument):
The NSA surveillance, data mining, or other government informa-
tion gathering programs will result in the disclosure of particular
pieces of information to a few government officials, or perhaps
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only to government computers. This very limited disclosure of the
particular information involved is not likely to be threatening to
the privacy of law-abiding citizens. Only those who are engaged
in illegal activities have a reason to hide this information. (Solove,
2007, p. 753)
This definition helps illustrate the link between lack of integrity and desire
for privacy: People who have “engaged in illegal activities” can be consid-
ered, by definition, to lack integrity (Paunonen, 2002), which is why they
have a reason “to hide this information” (or, in other words, to desire more
privacy). In terms of a scientific definition of integrity there is no real consen-
sus, however most scholars agree that integrity “incorporates a tendency to
comply with social norms, avoid deviant behavior, and embrace a sense of
justice, truthfulness, and fairness” (Connelly, Lilienfeld, & Schmeelk, 2006, p.
82).
5.2.3 The relation between integrity and desire for privacy
Several theoretical arguments exist why lack of integrity might correlate
with desire for privacy. In general, any self-disclosure is a potential risk
because others might disagree, disapprove, or misuse the information in
other contexts (Petronio, 2000). Privacy regulation theory showed that if self-
disclosures are too risky, people raise their desired level of privacy, intensify
their boundary regulation, and employ more mechanisms to seclude and pro-
tect themselves (Altman, 1976). In traditional contexts, this could range from
moderate behaviors like closing doors, to extreme behaviors such as physi-
cally tossing someone out of the room (Altman, 1976). In modern contexts,
protecting one’s privacy can mean to avoid photographs or to deliberately
shun public places that have surveillance cameras. People who have actually
committed something bad, treacherous, or illegal become even more vulner-
able and face a significant risk of self-disclosure, because others will surely
disapprove of these activities (e.g., Petronio, 2000). Hence, the foregoing argu-
ments illuminate an indirect link between integrity and desire for privacy: By
definition, people who participate in negative activities are considered to lack
integrity (Paunonen, 2002). People who have engaged in negative activities
have, by definition, more to hide, and disclosures concerning those activities
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pose a high risk. Because of this increased risk, people will arguably desire
more privacy, as a means to mitigate their felt risk (Altman, 1976). In this
way, the current research extends Altman’s privacy regulation theory (1976)
by suggesting that lack of integrity is an important yet unexamined factor
that could increase peoples’ desired level of privacy.
A few studies can be found that imply a relation between privacy and in-
tegrity. For example, several studies found that surveillance reduces cheating
behaviors (Corcoran & Rotter, 1987; Covey, Saladin, & Killen, 1989). Covey
et al. (1989) asked students to solve an impossible maze. In the high surveil-
lance condition, the experimenter stood in front of the students and closely
monitored their behavior. In the low surveillance condition, the experimenter
stood behind the students, did not monitor their behavior, and visual dividers
were used to block the experimenter’s view of the students. Results showed
that students were more likely to cheat in the low surveillance condition,
suggesting that in situations of surveillance (i.e., less privacy), people show
fewer cheating behaviors (i.e., more integrity). Similarly, people are more
likely to prevent others from stealing when security cameras are visible (van
Bommel, van Prooijen, Elffers, & van Lange, 2014), which is also a sign of
higher integrity. Next, in a longitudinal sample with 457 respondents in Ger-
many (Trepte & Reinecke, 2013), people who reported needing more privacy
were less satisfied with their lives (r = -.47), had more (r = .41) and less posi-
tive affect (r = -.39). More importantly however, people who felt they needed
more privacy were also less authentic on their SNSs profiles (r = -.48) and less
authentic in their personal relationships (r = -.28; Trepte & Reinecke, 2013).
For example, people who agreed to items like “I do not talk about personal
issues unless my conversation partner brings them up first” were more likely
to report that their online profiles did not truly represent their personality.
Given the argument that authenticity is a subset of integrity (Sheldon, 2004),
we reason that the concept of integrity might relate to the desired level of
privacy. Finally, Pedersen (1982) showed that three dimensions of need for
privacy related to self-esteem: In his study with N = 70 undergraduate stu-
dents, respondents who held a lower self-esteem were more reserved (r = .29),
needed more anonymity (r = .21) and preferred solitude (r = .24). Granted,
self-esteem and integrity are generally distinct concepts; however, Pedersen’s
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specific operationalization of self-esteem integrated several aspects of in-
tegrity (e.g., by using items such as “moral, nice, fair, unselfish, good, honest,
reputable, sane” to measure self-esteem). Thus, our overarching hypothesis
is that people who lack integrity have a greater desire for privacy.
5.3 Study 1
In Study 1, we used a questionnaire-based design to analyze how lack of
integrity and other personality facets relate to desire for privacy. In accor-
dance with the reasoning mentioned above, we suggest that people with less
integrity feel a greater desire for privacy. Specifically, we argue that integrity
may relate to the desire for privacy from (a) government surveillance, as
governments have the legitimate power to prosecute illegal activities. Next,
we hypothesize that integrity relates to the desire privacy for (b) anonymity.
Anonymity makes it more difficult for both legal and social agents to identify
and address potential wrongdoers, which is why people with less integrity
will prefer situations in which they are anonymous. Finally, lack of integrity
likely also relates to an increased desire for privacy from (c) other people, as
most other people will disapprove of immoral or illegal activities, and might
reveal those activities to authorities.
Hypothesis 1: People who feel lower in self-perceived integrity
desire more privacy from government surveillance (H1a), more
anonymity (H1b), and more privacy from other persons (H1c).
5.3.1 The relation between personality facets and privacy desire
Critics of the nothing-to-hide argument hold that people who desire privacy
should not automatically be confronted with suspicion, and that privacy has
several purposes that are not related to criminal behavior (e.g., Marlinspike,
13.06.2013). Westin (1967), for example, defined four primary purposes of
privacy: (1) self-development (i.e., the integration of experiences into mean-
ingful patterns), (2) autonomy (i.e., the desire to avoid being manipulated
and dominated), (3) emotional release (i.e., the release of tension from social
role demands), and (4) protected communication (i.e., the ability to foster in-
timate relationships). These are all important social factors for which people
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desire privacy. Hence, the argument is that people who desire privacy can
have several legitimate reasons for doing so; reasons which are essential for
psychosocial wellbeing and which relate to different factors of personality.
Below, we thus explore other (neutral) aspects of personality that potentially
predict desire for privacy. In order to be more precise, we follow the advice
by Paunonen and Ashton (2001) and, instead of using generic personality
factors as predictors, refer to specific personality facets.
First, we argue that people who are more reserved, who feel less comfort-
able in social situations, generally desire more anonymity and more interper-
sonal privacy. Given that privacy is, by definition, a voluntary withdrawal
from society (Westin, 1967), we expect that people who are more reserved or
more shy desire more privacy from others. Several empirical studies support
this hypothesis: Extroverted people desire less privacy (Morton, 2013), peo-
ple who describe themselves as introverted thinkers are more likely to prefer
social isolation (Pedersen, 1982), and introverted people are more likely to
report invasions of privacy (Stone, 1986). Finally, we did not find convincing
theoretical and empirical arguments for why shyness should relate to an
increased desire for privacy from government surveillance, which is why we
did not include a hypothesis on this relation.
Hypothesis 2: People who are more shy desire more anonymity
(H2a) and more privacy from other persons (H2b).
Of course, there are also reasons why people might desire less privacy.
Government agencies often curtail privacy with the aim to prevent crime:
For example, the NSA’s surveillance programs are often considered a direct
response to the 9/ 11 terrorists attacks (G. Greenwald, 2013.06.06). It seems
plausible that people who are more afraid of terrorist attacks are also more
likely to consent to these surveillance programs, given that these programs
promise to reduce the likelihood of future attacks. One can then argue that
people who are afraid of terrorist attacks are also more afraid of threats
overall, which is why we suggest that people who are, in general, more
anxious desire less privacy from government surveillance and less anonymity.
We did not include a hypothesis on the potential relation between anxiety
and desire for interpersonal privacy. On the one hand, one could argue that
people who are more anxious are more reserved, given that social interactions
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can pose significant risks (especially with strangers or weak ties; Granovetter,
1973). At the same time, one could suggest that especially those people who
are more anxious desire less privacy from others (and especially their strong
ties), in order to cope better with their daily challenges. At the end, given that
we measure interpersonal privacy on a general level (and do not distinguish
between desire for privacy from (a) weak ties and (b) strong ties), it seems
plausible that both effects could cancel each other out.
Hypothesis 3: People who are more anxious desire less privacy
from government surveillance (H3a) and more anonymity (H3b).
Disclosing personal information always poses a certain risk, given that
others can misuse self-disclosed personal information in different contexts,
which can lead to severe consequences (Altman, 1976). Not everyone will feel
intimidated by this hypothetical threat — except those who have a general
tendency to avoid taking unnecessary risks. The most cautious strategy to
minimize risks of personal self-disclosures would be, arguably, to keep as
much information as possible private. Hence, we suggest that people who
are, in general, more risk averse have a good reason to desire more privacy
in all three aforementioned contexts.
Hypothesis 4: People who are more risk averse desire more privacy
from government surveillance (H4a), more anonymity (H4b), and
more privacy from other persons (H4c).
The personal computer and the Internet have rendered the world increas-
ingly digitized: Social interactions, purchases, and medical treatments nowa-
days all produce digital traces, which can be combined into accurate latent
user profiles. Given the features of digital information (i.e., information is
persistent, searchable, reproducible, and scalable; boyd, 2008), this allows for
unprecedented ways and degrees of surveillance. Mark Zuckerberg famously
observed that privacy is no longer a “social norm,” rather that people share
personal information (Johnson, 2010.01.11). Hence, in order to be part of
contemporary life (e.g., by using SNSs), it seems necessary to give up some
privacy. However, arguably not everyone is willing to pay that price, and
especially people who are more conservative might prefer to stick to their
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usual routines and decide against giving up their privacy. This is supported
by empirical research: Older people, who are generally less open and more
traditional (Donnellan & Lucas, 2008), are more concerned about their pri-
vacy than younger people (Fife & Orjuel, 2012). Taken together, we suggest
that people who are more traditional also desire more privacy in all three
aforementioned contexts.
Hypothesis 5: People who are more traditional desire more privacy
from government surveillance (H5a), more anonymity (H5b), and
more privacy from other persons (H5c).
5.3.2 Method
Procedure and participants
Participants were students from a university in the western U.S. who received
course credit for taking part in the study. The sample consisted of N = 296
respondents, with an age that ranged from 18 to 56 years (M = 20 years).
72% of the respondents were female. The median participation time was 24
minutes. Regarding ethnicity, 37% of the respondents were Non-Hispanic
White / Caucasian, 4% Black / African American, 21% Hispanic / Latino, 24%
Asian / Pacific Islander, 0% Native American, 5% others, and 8% nonresponse.
Measures
Despite the fact that we mostly used well-established scales, confirmatory fac-
tor analyses (CFAs) showed that some of the original items had to be deleted
in order to achieve adequate factorial validity. The final scales showed accept-
able fit (CFI > .90, TLI > .90, RMSEA < .10, SRMR < .10), good composite reli-
ability (REL(ω) > .60), and adequate convergent factorial validity (AVE > .50;
see Table 5.1). Respondents answered all items on a 7-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
The data, all items (including deleted ones), results of CFAs, item statistics,
and distribution plots can be found in the online supplementary material.1
1https://osf.io/7ncpk/?view_only=38283fd9262646378e4ba1e19c9d707f
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Lack of integrity Integrity measures the extent to which people comply
with social norms and values. When measuring integrity, the question arises
whether it is possible to measure integrity based on self-reports. Interest-
ingly, integrity tests that are based on self-reports have been shown to work
successfully, given that they can predict unwanted professional workplace
behavior sufficiently (e.g., theft, drug and alcohol problems, or absenteeism;
Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993). In order to measure lack of integrity,
we thus used 4 items of the subscale integrity of the Supernumerary Person-
ality Inventory (Paunonen, 2002). An example item is “I don’t think there’s
anything wrong with cheating a little on one’s income tax forms.”
Shyness Shyness captures whether people prefer to spend their time alone
or in company. We measured shyness with 4 items of the inverted extraver-
sion subscale gregariousness (Costa & McCrae, 1992). An example item is “I
shy away from crowds of people.”
Anxiety. Anxiety measures whether people are afraid of negative external
influences. We measured anxiety with 4 items of the neuroticism subscale
anxiety (Costa & McCrae, 1992). An example item is “I am easily frightened.”
Risk avoidance. Risk avoidance captures whether people abstain from tak-
ing risks. We measured risk avoidance with 4 items of the conscientiousness
subscale deliberation (Costa & McCrae, 1992). An example item is “I think
twice before I answer a question.”
Traditionalism. Traditionalism measures whether people prefer to stick
with their usual routines. We measured traditionalism with 4 items of the
inverted openness to experiences subscale actions (Costa & McCrae, 1992).
An example item is “I’m pretty set in my ways.”
Desire for privacy. We measured desire for privacy on three dimensions: (a)
Desire for privacy from government surveillance, which represents the extent
to which people want the government to abstain from collecting information
about their personal life. One example item is “I feel the need to protect
my privacy from government agencies.” (b) Desire for anonymity, which
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measures the extent to which people feel the need to avoid identification(“I
need to be able to use a fake name on social network sites to preserve my
privacy”). (c) Desire for privacy from other people, which measures the extent
to which people want to withhold personal information from others(“I don’t
feel the need to tell my friends all my secrets”). For each dimension, we used
3 self-developed items that build on prior studies (e.g., Masur, 2016).
Data analyses
All hypotheses were tested with structural equation modeling (SEM). To
assess the SEM assumption of multivariate normality, we computed a multi-
variate Shapiro-Wilk normality test. The results showed a violation of multi-
variate normality (W = 0.90, p < .001), which is why we used the more robust
Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistic as estimator. We treated missing data with
casewise deletion and tested all hypotheses with a two-tailed p < .050 signif-
icance level; values between p = .050 and p = .010 were considered trends to-
ward significance. Regarding effect sizes, we classified regression coefficients
with values exceeding β= .10 as small effects, β= .30 as medium effects, and
β= .50 as large effects.
In order to estimate a convenient sample size for the SEM, we referred to
the recommendations by Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010). For the
design of this study, Hair et al. (2010) would recommend a sample size of
N≥ 300. We did not determine sample size based on a priori power analyses,
because we analyzed a novel research question and no information on effect
sizes was available. We decided against including social desirability as a
control variable, because even though social desirability can affect answers
to sensitive questions (de Jong, Pieters, & Stremersch, 2012), it is more likely
to reflect a true personality trait than false answering behavior (de Vries,
Zettler, & Hilbig, 2014). Likewise, we did not include demographic control
variables such as age or education, because we used a typical student sample
with little demographic variance. To analyze the data, we used the software
R (R Core Team, 2016, version 3.3.0) for the analyses, alongside additional
packages such as lavaan (Rosseel, 2012, version 0.5-20).
129
5 Predicting the desire for privacy
Table 5.1: Psychometric Properties and Factorial Validity of Variables
M sd skew curt α ω ave p(χ2) cfi rmsea
Privacy desire .80 .83 .46 <.01 0.93 0.08
Government 4.09 1.3 -0.15 -0.25
Anonymity 2.96 1.18 0.47 -0.11
Interpersonal 4.23 0.96 -0.05 0.14
Lack of integrity 2.61 1.17 0.39 -0.67 .78 .78 .47 .15 0.99 0.06
Shyness 3.07 1.09 0.44 0.11 .78 .78 .48 .02 0.98 0.10
Fearfulness 4.28 1.13 -0.21 -0.37 .76 .76 .44 .03 0.98 0.09
Risk avoidance 4.75 1.01 -0.69 1.23 .75 .75 .44 .73 1 <.01
Traditionalism 4.72 0.99 -0.33 0.28 .76 .76 .44 .06 0.99 0.08
5.3.3 Results
Model fit and factorial validity
In reference to the usually recommended fit criteria (e.g., Hair et al., 2010), the
SEM showed acceptable fit (χ2 (349) = 491.38, p < .001, CFI = 0.92, TLI = 0.91,
RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.05), acceptable total convergent factorial validity
(AVE = .45), and good total internal consistency (ω= .86).
Hypotheses
The data confirmed Hypothesis 1a: Respondents who self-reported lower
integrity were less willing to accept government surveillance (b = 0.20, β= .18,
p = .022). The effect size was small. The data also confirmed Hypothesis
1b: Respondents who reported being of lower integrity were less willing to
identify themselves in various contexts (b = 0.40, β= .43, p < .001). The effect
size was medium. The data did not confirm Hypothesis 1c: Respondents
who reported lower integrity were not more willing to withhold information
about themselves from other people (b = 0.10, β= .16, p = .085). However, the
p-value .085 showed a trend toward significance.
Results supported H2: People who reported being more shy also reported
desiring more anonymity (H2a; b = 0.18, β= .19, p = .035; small effect) and
more privacy from other persons (H2b; b = 0.21, β= .33, p = .002; medium
effect). As expected, respondents who were more shy did not desire more
privacy from the government (b = 0.15, β= -.13, p = .134).
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Table 5.2: Personality Facets as Predictors of (1) Privacy Desire Government,
(2) Privacy Desire Anonymity, and (3) Privacy Desire Interpersonal
b (LL) (UL) se p β
Privacy desire government
Lack of integrity 0.20 0.05 0.35 0.08 .022 .18
Shyness 0.15 -0.02 0.32 0.09 .134 .13
Fearfulness -0.30 -0.47 -0.13 0.09 .004 -.26
Risk avoidance 0.23 0.05 0.41 0.09 .031 .21
Traditionalism 0.13 -0.06 0.32 0.10 .256 .11
Privacy desire anonymity
Lack of integrity 0.40 0.23 0.57 0.09 <.001 .43
Shyness 0.18 0.01 0.35 0.09 .035 .19
Fearfulness -0.16 -0.35 0.03 0.10 .089 -.17
Risk avoidance 0.09 -0.10 0.28 0.10 .288 .10
Traditionalism <0.01 -0.21 0.21 0.10 .991 <.01
Privacy desire interpersonal
Lack of integrity 0.10 -0.07 0.27 0.09 .085 .16
Shyness 0.21 0.03 0.39 0.09 .002 .33
Fearfulness 0.02 -0.17 0.21 0.10 .686 .04
Risk avoidance 0.20 -0.01 0.41 0.11 .003 .34
Traditionalism 0.10 -0.12 0.32 0.11 .177 .16
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The data confirmed H3a: People who are generally more anxious desired
less privacy from government surveillance (b = 0.30, β= -.26, p = .035; small
effect). Regarding H3b, results showed a statistical trend that fearfulness
was associated with reduced desire for anonymity (b = 0.16, β= -.17, p = .089;
small effect). As expected, we found no significant relation with desire for
interpersonal privacy (b = 0.03, β= .04, p = .686).
Results supported hypothesis H4a and H4b: Respondents who were more
likely to report avoiding risks also reported desiring more privacy from gov-
ernment surveillance (b = 0.23, β= .21, p = .031; small effect) and from other
persons (b = 0.20, β= .34, p = .003; medium effect). Risk avoidance was not
related to desire for anonymity (H4c; b = 0.09, β= .10, p = .288).
Results did not confirm H5: Respondents who reported being more tra-
ditional did not desire more privacy from government surveillance (H5a;
b = 0.13, β= .11, p = .256), did not desire more anonymity (H5b; b < .01, β< .01,
p = .991), and also did not desire more privacy from other persons (H5c;
b = 0.10, β= .16, p = .177).
For an overview of all results, see Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1.
5.3.4 Discussion
The results of Study 1 showed that integrity relates to several dimensions
of desire for privacy: People who reported being of lower integrity desired
more privacy from government and more anonymity. In other words, people
who agreed that there would be nothing wrong with cheating a little or lying
occasionally were also more likely to agree that the government should not
invade peoples’ privacy, even if that could help to prevent terrorist attacks.
Likewise, people who said, for example, that they would feel tempted to take
things that do not belong to them were also more likely to avoid situations
in which they were identifiable.
In addition, desire for privacy was predicted also by other (neutral) person-
ality facets: People who were more shy, more risk averse, and less anxious
also desired more privacy. This implies that next to lack of integrity there are
various other personality-related aspects that predict desire for privacy.
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Figure 5.1: Study 1. Model shows relations between personality facets and
desire for privacy. + p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05.
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5.4 Study 2
Using an experimental design, Study 2 aimed to replicate and expand the
findings of Study 1. First, we tested the robustness of our finding that in-
tegrity relates to privacy by again analyzing self-reported integrity as a
predictor of desire for privacy. Second, we analyzed the relations’ gener-
alizability by using a different way to measure self-perceived integrity. Next
to an indirect self-report of integrity, we now included an implicit association
test (IAT; Fischer & Bates, 2008, April) as an additional objective measure
of integrity. The integrity IAT shares comparatively little statistical variance
with other self-reported measures of integrity (Fischer & Bates, 2008, April),
implying that the IAT measures a different latent construct. At the same time,
when being used together with self-reports the integrity IAT was shown to
significantly increase explained variance of actual cheating behaviors (Fis-
cher, Thompson, & Turner, 2012, April). This suggests that although the IAT
and the self-reports measure different facets of integrity, taken together they
can help predicting integrity related outcomes, such as desire for privacy.
Third, we conducted an experiment in order to analyze whether people’s
desired level of privacy can be influenced by concrete integrity-related behav-
iors. If so, this would corroborate Study 1’s hypothesized causality, which
is that aspects of integrity influence desired levels of privacy (and not vice
versa). In theory, one might use an experimental design in which one group
of participants engage in negative or deceitful behaviors and another group
in positive or benevolent behaviors to see whether this would affect subse-
quent levels of desire for privacy. In practice, however, several ethical reasons
argue against this procedure, which is why we focused on a more implicit
integrity-related task. In our manipulation, we asked participants to write
an essay about past events in which they behaved either (a) positively or (b)
negatively. We reasoned that if people write about negative behaviors they
might believe they have something to hide and hence feel an increased desire
for privacy, whereas if people believe that they have nothing to hide they
might feel a lower desire for privacy. This led to the following new set of
hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1: Compared to a control group, participants who write
an essay about past negative behaviors desire more privacy from
government (H1a), more anonymity (H1b), and more interper-
sonal privacy (H1c).
Hypothesis 2: Compared to a control group, participants who write
an essay about past positive behaviors desire less privacy from
government (H2a), less anonymity (H2b), and less privacy from
other people (H2c).
Hypothesis 3: People who feel lower in self-perceived integrity
(as evidenced with a self-report) desire more privacy from gov-
ernment surveillance (H3a), more anonymity (H3b), and more
interpersonal privacy (H3c).
Hypothesis 4: People who feel lower in self-perceived integrity (as
evidenced with an IAT) desire more privacy from government
surveillance (H4a), more anonymity (H4b), and more interper-
sonal privacy (H4c).
H1 and H2 argue that the essay tasks have a direct influence on the de-
sire for privacy. However, it also seems possible that this effect is mediated
through self-perceived integrity. That is, because of having written an essay
about negative past behavior people first think that they have less integrity,
which then increases their desired level of privacy. On the other hand, one
can also argue that self-perceived integrity is a stable trait-like concept that
cannot be changed by means of a short essay task, which would argue against
mediation. Hence, given that both options seem possible, we will analyze
this notion in a first research question.
In Study 1, we did not analyze other negative personality factors next to
lack of integrity, factors that could also explain why people desire privacy.
For example, referring to the dark triad (Paulhus & Williams, 2002), it could
be that people desire privacy (a) to be capable of manipulating others, (b)
because they are excessively egocentric and want more room for themselves,
or (c) because they lack empathy and do not want to connect with others.
Hence, in research question two we analyze if the dark triad are further
predictors of the desire for privacy.
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5.4.1 Method
Procedure and participants
The data were collected between May and August 2015 with a laboratory
experiment. The experimental manipulation was modeled after Reed and
Aspinwall (1998).2 In the positive essay group, we asked participants to write
about some past behavior that they felt demonstrated high integrity (e.g.,
“Please describe a situation in which you demonstrated high integrity, for
example, you donated something for reasons of charity”). In the negative
essay group, we asked participants to write about some past behavior that
they felt reflected low integrity (e.g., “Please describe a situation in which you
demonstrated low integrity, for example, you lied because doing so benefitted
you”). In the control group, we asked participants to write about something
that was irrelevant to integrity (“Please describe the room you are currently
sitting in”). Participants had 15 minutes to complete their essay. Afterwards,
we measured self-perceived integrity by means of an IAT of integrity (Fischer
& Bates, 2008, April). Participants then filled out a questionnaire regarding
their self-reported integrity, their personality, and their desire for privacy.
Finally, we allowed participants to destroy their own essay if they wanted to,
and debriefed them regarding the research questions and the manipulation
procedure. We asked if participants had guessed the purpose of the study
and assured them that assignment to one of the groups did not reflect their
integrity or personality. IRB approval was obtained for this study before any
data were collected.
Participants were students from a university in the western U.S. Partic-
ipants received course credit for taking part in the study. With regard to
sample size, again no information on effect size was available beforehand,
which is why we referred to a conventional group size of n = 30. The final
sample consisted of N = 87 participants, randomly assigned to three experi-
mental groups (negative: n = 30; neutral: n = 27; positive: n = 30). Participants’
age ranged from 18 to 34 (M = 20), 51% of the participants were female, and
the median for participation time was 44 minutes. Regarding ethnicity, 40%
2Reed and Aspinwall (1998) tested whether a positive experience (the endorsement and
recall of one’s past acts of kindness) would decrease biased processing of self-relevant
health-risk information.
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of the respondents were Non-Hispanic White / Caucasian, 2% Black / African
American, 22% Hispanic / Latino, 23% Asian / Pacific Islander, and 13% re-
ported “other” as their ethnicity.
Material
We developed new items alongside those of Study 1 in order to be able to ex-
change potentially malfunctioning items. The final scales showed acceptable
fit, good composite reliability, and adequate convergent factorial validity (see
Table 5.3).
Lack of integrity self-report We used the same 4 items as in Study 1 to
measure self-reported lack of integrity. Again, the scale showed good factorial
validity.
Lack of integrity IAT The integrity IAT is an indirect and implicit way
to measure self-perceived integrity (Fischer & Bates, 2008, April). The IAT
consists of two categories: the target category “self” (me, my, mine, self, and
I) and the control category “other” (them, their, theirs, other, and they). In
addition, the IAT features two attributes: the positive attribute “honest” (fair,
integrity, sincere, trustworthy, truthful, and moral) and the negative attribute
“dishonest” (unfair, steal, deceive, cheat, lie, and corrupt). Based on response
time differentials, the IAT measures associations between categories and
attributes: Participants who perceive themselves to have higher integrity
associate the category “self” more readily with “honest” than they do “self”
and “dishonest”. We computed the IAT results based on the p1311-procedure
as recommended by Richetin, Costantini, Perugini, and Schönbrodt (2015).
We inverted the final scale in order to measure lack of integrity.
The dark triad In order to measure Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and
narcissism, we used the Dirty Dozen scale by Jonason and Webster (2010).
Machiavellianism measures how strongly people try to manipulate others
toward their own ends. One example item is “I tend to manipulate others
to get my way.” Psychopathy captures whether people tend to lack empathy
and do not reflect on their own behavior (“I tend to be unconcerned with
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Table 5.3: Study 2: Psychometric Properties and Factorial Validity of Variables
M sd skew curt α ω ave p(χ2) cfi rmsea
Privacy desire .76 .82 .49 <.04 0.92 .08
Government 4.44 1.30 -0.04 -0.35
Anonymity 2.36 0.90 0.30 -0.80
Interpersonal 4.15 1.26 -0.23 0.23
Lack of integrity
Self-report 2.53 1.15 0.57 -0.30 .68 .70 .39 .90 1.12 <.01
IAT -0.29 0.26 0.57 -0.03
Dark triad .70 .81 .53 .29 0.98 .05
Machiavellianism 3.43 1.62 0.20 -0.90
Psychopathy 2.96 1.38 0.52 -0.27
Narcisissim 4.72 1.30 -0.56 -0.57
the morality of my actions”). Narcissism measures whether people are ex-
cessively self-centered and expect to receive special attention from others (“I
tend to want others to admire me”). Despite being a well-established scale,
we could only represent the dark triad’s three dimensional factorial structure
in a well-fitting way when using 2 items for each factor (instead of 4; see
online material). Hence, overall we used 6 items (2 for each dimension).
Privacy desire We used the same items as in Study 1, except that we also
adopted 3 newly developed items to measure desire for anonymity (e.g., “I
want to be able to surf the Internet anonymously”), given that the prior items
did not show optimal fit (see online material).
Data analyses
As in Study 1, we used SEM to analyze the data. Again, the data violated the
assumption of multivariate normality (W = 0.83, p < .001), so we used the more
robust Sartorra-Bentler estimator. We modeled the manipulation as a dummy
variable and computed two contrasts: In contrast one, we compared the
positive essay group to the control group, and in contrast two, we compared
the negative essay group to the control group.3
3There is no statistical difference between analyzing experiments with ANOVAs and GLMs
(Cohen, 1968). We decided to use SEMs (which are GLMs), because they provide several
advantages (e.g., they allow measurement of latent constructs in complex models). When
analyzing experiments within GLMs, the different conditions are included as dummy
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Figure 5.2: Study 2. Model 1 shows the results of Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c and
2a, 2b, 2c. Model 2 shows the results of Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 3c. In
the positive group, participants wrote an essay about positive past
behaviors, in the negative group about negative behaviors. In the
control group, participants wrote a neutral essay that described
the room they were sitting in. + p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05.
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5.4.2 Results
Model fit and factorial validity
The SEM showed acceptable fit (χ2 (167) = 198.65, p = .048, CFI = 0.92,
TLI = 0.89, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.07), adequate total convergent factorial
validity (AVE = .49), and good total internal consistency (ω= .83).
In our experimental design, we followed the recommendation of O’Keefe
(2003) and did not define our manipulation in terms of its effects on a psycho-
logical state (here, self-perceived integrity). Instead, we used a manipulation
with intrinsic features and external validity (essay task). As a result, there
was no need include a manipulation check (O’Keefe, 2003).
Hypotheses
The data did not confirm Hypothesis 1a and 1b, which predicted that partici-
pants who were in the negative essay group would desire more privacy from
government (Mneg = 0.06; Mcon = -0.07; b = -0.18, β= -.07, p = .633) and more
anonymity (Mneg = 0.01; Mcon = -0.15; b = 0.46, β= .16, p = .219). However, re-
garding H1c, which predicted that participants who were in the negative
essay group would desire more interpersonal privacy, the data showed a sta-
tistical trend (Mneg = 0.46; Mcon = -0.39; b = 0.70, β= .24, p = .052). This implies
that participants who reflected about past behavior showing low integrity
indicated they would generally want more privacy from other people.
The data did not confirm Hypothesis 2a, 2b, and 2c. H2a predicted that par-
ticipants who wrote an essay about positive past behaviors would desire less
privacy from government, which was not confirmed by the data (Mpos = 0.01;
Mcon = -0.07; b = 0.22, β= .08, p = .618). Regarding H2b and H2c, results ac-
tually showed the opposite: Participants who reflected upon past positive
behaviors actually desired more anonymity afterwards (H2b; Mpos = 0.49;
Mcon = -0.56; b = 1.33, β= .47, p = .003). There was also a statistical trend that
variables / contrasts (here: pos. vs. con; neg. vs. con). In the results section, we reported
the latent factor means. For using contrasts to model experimental designs in GLMs, see
Field, Miles, and Field (2012).
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Table 5.4: Study 2: Predictors of (1) Privacy Desire Government, (2) Privacy
Desire Anonymity, (3) Privacy Desire Interpersonal, Lack of In-
tegrity (self-report and IAT), and the Dark Triad
b (LL) (UL) se p β
Privacy desire government
Lack of integrity (self-report) 0.52 0.22 0.82 0.15 .008 .45
Lack of integrity (IAT) 1.11 0.89 1.33 0.11 .043 .22
Positive essay 0.22 -0.09 0.53 0.16 .618 .08
Negative essay -0.18 -0.45 0.09 0.14 .633 -.07
Machiavellianism -0.63 -1.15 -0.11 0.27 .039 -.58
Psychopathy 0.79 0.33 1.25 0.24 .023 .57
Narcissism -0.12 -0.49 0.25 0.19 .659 -.09
Privacy desire anonymity
Lack of integrity (self-report) 0.56 0.20 0.92 0.18 .013 .47
Lack of integrity (IAT) 0.57 0.36 0.78 0.11 .321 .11
Positive essay 1.33 1.03 1.63 0.15 .003 .47
Negative essay 0.45 0.20 0.70 0.13 .219 .16
Machiavellianism -0.90 -1.53 -0.27 0.32 .014 -.81
Psychopathy 0.74 0.28 1.20 0.23 .023 .52
Narcissism 0.38 -0.02 0.78 0.21 .171 .27
Privacy desire interpersonal
Lack of integrity (self-report) 0.53 0.22 0.84 0.16 .011 .43
Lack of integrity (IAT) 0.63 0.42 0.84 0.11 .257 .12
Positive essay 0.61 0.37 0.85 0.12 .068 .21
Negative essay 0.70 0.46 0.94 0.12 .052 .24
Machiavellianism -0.17 -0.63 0.29 0.23 .531 -.15
Psychopathy 0.64 0.22 1.06 0.21 .054 .43
Narcisissim 0.20 -0.01 0.41 0.11 .060 .34
Lack of integrity (self-report)
Positive essay 0.23 -0.47 0.92 0.35 .522 .10
Negative essay 0.22 -0.45 0.88 0.34 .523 .09
Lack of integrity (IAT)
Positive essay -0.08 -0.21 0.04 0.07 .202 -.15
Negative essay 0.05 -0.09 0.19 0.07 .453 .10
Machiavellianism
Positive essay 0.17 -0.57 0.92 0.38 .649 .07
Negative essay 0.06 -0.61 0.73 0.34 .867 .02
Psychopathy
Positive essay -0.11 -0.70 0.48 0.30 .708 -.06
Negative essay 0.18 -0.47 0.82 0.33 .594 .09
Narcissism
Positive essay -0.32 -0.92 0.29 0.31 .309 -.15
Negative essay -0.31 -0.85 0.22 0.27 .253 -.15
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after having written an essay about positive past behaviors, participants de-
sired more privacy from other people (H2c; Mpos = 0.09; Mcon = -0.61; b = 0.61,
β= .21, p = .068).
The data confirmed Hypothesis 3a, 3b, and 3c: Participants with higher
self-reported lack of integrity desired more privacy from government (H3a;
b = 0.52, β= .45, p = .008), more anonymity (H3b; b = 0.56, β= .47, p = .013), and
more interpersonal privacy (H3c; b = 0.54, β= .43, p = .011). All three effects
were medium to large-sized.
Concerning H4a, results confirmed that participants whose IAT showed
higher lack of integrity desired more privacy from government (b = 1.11,
β= .22, p = .043). The effect was small. Hypotheses 4b and 4c, which predicted
that participants with lower integrity IATs would desire more anonymity and
more interpersonal privacy, were not supported (H4b; b = 0.57, β= .11, p = .321;
H4c; b = 0.63, β= .12, p = .257).
In research question one, we analyzed if the essay tasks changed levels
of self-perceived lack of integrity. Results showed that essay tasks did not
affect participants’ self-perceived lack of integrity (both self-report and IAT;
see Table 5.4).
The results of research question two showed several significant relation-
ships of the dark triad with desire for privacy: Contrary to expectation, par-
ticipants who had higher results in Machiavellianism desired less privacy
from government (b = -0.63, β= -0.58, p = .039) and less anonymity (b = -0.90,
β= .81, p = .014). As expected, higher levels of psychopathy were related to an
increased desire for privacy from the government (b = 0.79, β= .35, p = .023)
and for anonymity (b = 0.74, β= .52, p = .023). Narcissism was not related to
the desire for privacy.
For an overview of the results, see Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2.
5.4.3 Discussion
The analyses of Study 2 replicated several findings of Study 1. Results again
showed that people who self-reported lacking integrity indeed desired more
privacy. Study 2 evidenced this relation not only regarding desire for privacy
from government and regarding desire for anonymity (as was shown in
Study 1), but also for the desire for privacy from other people. In addition,
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an IAT of integrity also confirmed that lack of integrity corresponds with
a higher desire for privacy from government: People who were quicker to
associate words such as unfair, steal, deceive, cheat, lie, and corrupt with
themselves reported an increased desire to protect their privacy from the
government. In addition, results of research question two showed that the
desire for privacy can also be affected by other negative personality traits.
For example, people who have higher levels of psychopathy also desire more
privacy from government surveillance.
Next, the experimental setting revealed a statistical trend that people who
reflected upon past behavior that showed low integrity reported desiring
more privacy from other people. This implies that people seem to withdraw
from others when they are reminded of their own negative behaviors of the
past. Interestingly, we also found that when people reflect upon past behav-
iors that are positive they desire more anonymity and (potentially) more
privacy from other persons. On the one hand, this seems counterintuitive as
one might believe that people would rather want to tell others about their
good deeds, which is something they can only do when they forfeit their
privacy by self-disclosing. On the other hand, there are also reasons why
desiring more privacy after having reflected upon positive aspects is plausi-
ble. For example, we find a similar pattern when we look at personal diaries:
Here, the author keeps note of moments he or she treasures and which the
author does not want to forget. Beside the fact that these moments are often
positive, they also have another feature: They are personal, even intimate.
In our positive essay task, respondents might have realized just that, which
could be an explanation why they afterwards desired more privacy. So far,
we know at least that the effect was not mediated through lower levels of self-
perceived integrity (see research question one). Hence, it is still worthwhile to
keep on looking for other potential mediators. Taken together, results imply
that reflecting about both positive and negative past behavior can increase
the desire for privacy.
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5.5 General discussion
5.5.1 Implications
This paper analyzed why people desire privacy and whether there is some
truth to the nothing-to-hide argument, which argues that people desire pri-
vacy because they lack integrity. Indeed, Study 1 supports that people who
report lacking integrity — in other words, people who might have something
to hide — desire more privacy from government and more anonymity. Study
2 replicated this finding, which, taken together, implies that the relation can
be considered robust. Similarly, taking into account that strong effects are
not very common in socio-psychological research, it is notable that 4 out of 6
relations between self-reported integrity and privacy were medium- to large-
sized — which again underscores the relationship’s robustness. Finally, given
that we found several significant relations with the dark triad, the results
also suggest that it would be promising to further elaborate on which nega-
tive aspects of personality exactly make people desire more privacy; results
suggested that people with higher levels in psychopathy desire more privacy.
Interestingly, some negative aspects of personality might also reduce desire
for privacy, given that people who reported higher levels of Machiavellianism
desired less privacy. In conclusion, our studies support that there is some
truth to the implicit premise behind the nothing-to-hide argument: People
who want more privacy also seem to have more things that they might wish
to hide — in this study, this included things such as (minor) theft, tax evasion,
or leaving a restaurant without paying the bill.
Notably however, the results showed that lack of integrity is not the only
aspect of personality why people desire privacy. That is, people who are
more shy, more risk averse, or less anxious also desire more privacy. For
example, people who are less anxious are less likely to accept government
surveillance (arguably because they are less afraid of terrorist attacks). When
looking at the bigger implications of the results, this shows the importance to
make differentiated claims on why people desire privacy: Indeed, the results
suggest that some people desire privacy because they might have something
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to hide. However, putting everyone who desires privacy under a general
suspicion is wrong given that shy, risk averse, and less anxious people are
also more likely to desire privacy.
Next, Study 2 suggests that desire for privacy relates to implicit measures
of integrity, given that participants who had lower integrity as indicated
by an IAT reported desiring more privacy from government surveillance.
This shows that even when we measure integrity with a different, arguably
more objective approach, we can still find a significant relation between self-
perceived lack of integrity and desire for privacy. Moreover, Study 2 offers
another perspective that adds to the generalizability of the relation between
integrity and privacy: That is, when people write an essay about negative
past behavior, it is likely that this increases their desired level of interper-
sonal privacy. Interestingly, the results also suggest that when people reflect
upon positive past behavior, this increases desired levels of anonymity and
interpersonal privacy.
In conclusion, our results follow Altman (1976), who reasoned that if expo-
sure of information is risky it is likely that people will use more mechanisms
to strengthen their social boundaries and increase their desired level of pri-
vacy. This study thus aligns with Altman’s privacy regulation theory by
showing that, in several contexts, people with lower integrity had a higher
level of desired privacy.
5.5.2 Limitations and future perspective
In our analysis of predictors of privacy, we followed the recommendation
by Paunonen and Ashton (2001) and did not analyze broad factors of per-
sonality (e.g., neuroticism); instead, we focused on more specific personality
facets (e.g., fearfulness). For future research, we suggest going one step fur-
ther by analyzing predictors that are even more specified. For example, it
seems possible that people who hold dissenting political beliefs could also
have a higher desire for privacy from the government. Similarly, it would be
interesting to focus on different minority groups. For example, it seems plau-
sible that people from a LGBT background might desire more privacy from
government (because it is potentially repressive or unfriendly toward LGBTs).
Finally, in this study we focused mostly on escapist motives for why people
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desire privacy (e.g., shyness, risk aversion). Interestingly, Leary, Herbst, and
McCrary (2003) were able to show that when predicting engagement in soli-
tary activities, it is less preferable to measure how strongly people want to
escape society (avoidance oriented), but rather how much they seek solitude
(approach oriented). Hence, future studies might want to include predictors
that are more approach oriented (e.g., peoples’ desire for contemplation).
To our knowledge, this is the first study that used essay tasks to change
peoples’ desire for privacy. On the whole, the approach proved valuable.
We now suggest further optimizing the experimental manipulation in order
make the manipulation stronger; for example, by using additional ease-of-
retrieval tasks (e.g., Tormala, Petty, & Brinol, 2002). Similarly, we recommend
making the essay task more specified: We suggest that participants elaborate
on past behaviors that focus on either legal aspects (e.g., “When was the last
time you did something that was probably against the law?”) or on social
aspects (e.g., “When was the last time that you lied to one of your friends?”).
From a methodological perspective, future research should continue to
improve the instruments we used, given that factorial validity of some scales
was only moderate. Similarly, we recommend elaborating on the general
understanding of integrity as a theoretical concept. To date, there is not one
overarching concept of integrity that incorporates all the different aspects of
integrity, yet it would be valuable to examine how other aspects of integrity
(e.g., authenticity, trustworthiness, or consistency) relate to privacy desires.
The manipulation produced small to medium-sized effects (β≈ .20). Power
analyses showed that future research should use samples above N≈ 260 in
order to test hypotheses with the recommended power of at least .80 (Cohen,
1992). In Study 2, we tested some hypotheses with a power of approximately
.60, which is relatively low and might explain why some effects were not
significant. Besides, SEM stability would benefit from using larger samples.
In general, the question arises whether it is possible, or even socially de-
sirable, to measure a person’s integrity. On the one hand, integrity implies
absolute criteria: Stealing is bad and forbidden, whereas helping is good and
encouraged. On the other hand, integrity implies relative criteria: Whereas
some cultures disapprove of lying whatever the context, others consider ly-
ing okay — for example “white lies” in order to save face or to avoid hurting
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someone’s feelings (Altman, 1977). Thus, ranking behaviors, opinions, and
character traits with regard to integrity is a moral dilemma. As a result,
throughout the entire study we have understood integrity as a transgression
of social norms that is strong and that most societies would agree upon (for
example, most societies would consider stealing as a sign of low integrity).
As a final note, we measured integrity based on self-ratings. One can criti-
cize this approach by saying it is not possible to measure integrity based on
self-reports because of social desirability influences. However, self-reports of
integrity can indeed predict malevolent behavior: In a meta-analysis with 665
correlation coefficients, integrity tests related to counterproductive behaviors
with a coefficient of r = .47 (Ones et al., 1993). Also, the implicit measure we
used is much less vulnerable to social desirability (A. G. Greenwald, Nosek,
& Banaji, 2003). Nonetheless, future research would benefit from including
behavioral manifestations of integrity, such as concrete cheating behaviors.
If concrete cheating behaviors also increase desires for privacy, this would
strengthen the underlying premise of the nothing-to-hide argument.
5.5.3 Conclusion
In his paraphrase of the nothing-to-hide argument, Daniel Solove ends as
follows: “Although there may be some cases in which the information might
be sensitive or embarrassing to law-abiding citizens, the limited disclosure
lessens the threat to privacy. Moreover, the security interest in detecting,
investigating, and preventing terrorist attacks is very high and outweighs
whatever minimal or moderate privacy interests law-abiding citizens may
have in these particular pieces of information.” (Solove, 2007, p. 753). It seems
plausible that at some point, society has a justified interest in limiting privacy
in order to prevent crime and to improve public safety (e.g., by wiretapping
concrete suspects or by having trials that are public), given that privacy,
obviously, offers opportunities for immoral, malevolent, and illegal behavior.
And the results of this study offer further support for this hypothesis because,
in both studies, people’s desire for privacy could indeed by predicted by
peoples’ lack of integrity.
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At the same time, it would be wrong to monolithically claim that all peo-
ple who desire privacy always have something to hide. By contrast, results
showed that people who desire more privacy can also be more shy, more
risk averse, and less anxious. Or, it could also be that they have just been
reflecting upon some specific past negative of good behaviors. Hence, results
do not imply that privacy is bad per se or that it is always alright to limit
privacy. On the contrary, we stress that everyone needs privacy in order to be
able to think freely, to act autonomously, to be authentic, to relax, to become
intimate, and to foster social support (Westin, 1967).
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6.1 Summary
The introduction ended with the following question: “What happens in each
one of us when we provide information about ourselves, for example on
SNSs, and what could this process reveal about our personality? What is the
psychology of privacy?” Taken together, this dissertation offers the following
answer:
Our context determines the degree of privacy we are currently perceiving.
The more privacy we are perceiving, the more information we are likely to
disclose (Study 1; Dienlin, 2014). In addition to context, also our psycho-
logical expectations affect our behavior. For example, if we are concerned
about our privacy on SNSs we are less likely to disclose personal things on
Facebook (Study 2; Dienlin & Trepte, 2015). Vice versa, if we think that we
will benefit from self-disclosing we are more likely to communicate infor-
mation about ourselves (Study 3; Dienlin & Metzger, 2016a). However, our
psychological expectations do not only affect self-disclosure, they also influ-
ence self-withdrawal (i.e., using privacy settings such as friends lists). When
comparing online self-disclosure with online self-withdrawal, we found that
privacy concerns are more powerful to predict self-withdrawal, whereas ex-
pected benefits are more effective to predict self-disclosure. Finally, our desire
for privacy resonates profoundly with several aspects of our personality. For
example, people who are more likely to report lacking integrity, people who
are more shy, less anxious, and more risk averse are also more likely to desire
privacy (Study 4; Dienlin & Metzger, 2016b).
In short, this dissertation can be summarized as follows: Privacy consists
of three major elements, the objective privacy context, the subjective privacy
perception, and the consecutive self-disclosure or self-withdrawal. The behav-
ioral manifestations of privacy (disclosure or withdrawal) can be predicted
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accurately if we know a person’s privacy concerns and expected benefits,
and the desire for privacy is itself a powerful predictor for a person’s overall
personality.
6.2 Implications
6.2.1 Privacy is contingent, tripartite, and multidimensional
In what follows, I present and elaborate on four overarching findings of this
dissertation. They stem from a joint analysis of all studies and aim to provide
a broader perspective. The first finding that I want to focus on is that privacy
is contingent, tripartite, and multi-dimensional.
One major aim of this dissertation was to advance our theoretical un-
derstanding of privacy. What is privacy, what are important psychological
mechanisms? Is it possible to measure it, to feel it, or to conceptualize it? Of
course, these questions are not new and have been asked many times before.
According to Kammerer (2014), academic research on privacy began already
in the late 19th century when Warren and Brandeis (1890) published their
seminal article “The right to privacy” in the Harvard Law Review, featuring
the famous claim that privacy is the “‘right to be let alone’” (p.195). Since
then, several theories and studies followed that all contribute significantly to
a better understanding of privacy. However, these theories and studies also
contradict each other regarding various aspects, which became especially
apparent when the digital revolution of recent years challenged our entire
academic understanding of privacy.
With the aim of answering the aforementioned questions, I combined sev-
eral well-tried theories into one encompassing theory of privacy, the privacy
process model (PPM). As a result, the PPM is not so much a new theory of
privacy, but rather an integration of already existing theories. It is the theo-
retical corner stone of this dissertation, and each of the following empirical
studies build upon it. In short, the PPM advances that privacy is a contingent,
tripartite, and multi-dimensional construct. It consists of the privacy context,
the privacy perception, and the consecutive self-disclosure or self-withdrawal.
The distinction between the objective context and the subjective perception of
privacy offers a potentially better understanding of self-disclosure, given that
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people often overestimate their true level of privacy (e.g., on SNSs; Trepte
& Reinecke, 2011). From a larger perspective, one could thus say that the
PPM introduced the well-known differentiation between constructivism and
objectivism (see, e.g., Jonassen, 1991) to privacy theory, since constructivism
predicates that there is no independent objective reality but only a personal
and subjective construction of it. Next, referring to interpersonal boundary
regulation as suggested by Altman (1975), another central aspect of the PPM
is the claim that users constantly engage in a privacy regulation. That is, if the
desired level of privacy differs from the achieved level of privacy, users either
change their context or their self-disclosure. In conclusion, the PPM combines
the notion of interpersonal boundary regulation through self-disclosure (Alt-
man, 1975) with the well-known privacy related aspects of self-withdrawal
(Westin, 1967), whilst employing a multi-dimensional perspective (i.e., infor-
mational, social, psychological, and physiological privacy; Burgoon, 1982).
Thus, most claims of the PPM are not new, given that the PPM substantially
builds upon a large body of studies on privacy literacy. Conversely, what’s
new is the combination, the synthesis of all the aforementioned specific no-
tions into one encompassing psychological theory of privacy. In other words,
one might describe the PPM as a kit that encompasses the most important
tools in order to arrive at a fundamental understanding of privacy as a psy-
chological concept.
The PPM potentially helps to advance privacy research in various contexts.
For example, one major aim of current literature is to explain and predict
specific online privacy behaviors as best as possible, and the so-called pri-
vacy calculus emerged as one of the most prolific theories to achieve just
that (e.g., Krasnova, Veltri, & Günther, 2012). However to date, when mea-
suring online privacy behaviors, privacy calculus theory only referred to
self-disclosure. The PPM, by contrast, emphasized that in order to regulate
privacy people do not only self-disclose but also self-withdraw — a notion
that goes all the way back to Altman (1975). As a result, in the extended
privacy calculus model for SNSs (Study 3; Dienlin & Metzger, 2016a) we
introduced this bivariate perspective to privacy calculus theory and added
self-withdrawal as a second dependent variable. It seems important to stress
that, so far, empirical research focused mostly on one behavior at a time.
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That is, whereas several studies analyzed which factors can explain online
self-disclosure (e.g., Krasnova, Spiekermann, Koroleva, & Hildebrand, 2010),
other studies investigated which factors can explain online self-withdrawal
(e.g., Lang & Barton, 2015). Some did, in fact, analyze both behaviors in one
study — however, they either used separate statistical models (e.g., Yong Jin
Park, 2015; Walrave, Vanwesenbeeck, & Heirman, 2012) or analyzed them
as independent variables instead of as dependent variables (e.g., Masur &
Scharkow, 2016). As a result, the PPM inspired the extended privacy calculus
model for SNSs, which integrated a bivariate understanding of privacy by in-
cluding both self-disclosure and self-withdrawal as dependent variables. This
had several positive outcomes: For example, it showed that privacy concerns
are more important for self-withdrawal than for self-disclosure. Altogether,
the extended privacy calculus model might thus help to update our general
theoretical understanding of privacy.
Next, it becomes increasingly apparent that privacy is not a uni-dimensional
variable. Instead, privacy consists of several interrelated sub-dimensions that
all display individual characteristics. On a theoretical basis, the PPM inte-
grated Burgoon’s (1982) notion that privacy consists of four dimensions: in-
formational, social, psychological, and physiological privacy. On an empirical
basis, we found support for this multi-dimensional nature of privacy as well.
For example, in a theory of planned behavior approach, we designed three
models of privacy behaviors: One focused on informational privacy, one on
social privacy, and one on psychological privacy (Dienlin & Trepte, 2015).
Results showed that the three dimensions differed substantially from one an-
other. For example, privacy intentions and behaviors were most identical for
psychological privacy behaviors (the empirical regression coefficient β= .79
showed that people were capable of disclosing almost exactly as much per-
sonal information as they wanted to reveal). However, the relation between
privacy intentions and behaviors was weaker for the dimension of social pri-
vacy behaviors (the coefficient β= .47 implied that even when people wanted
to restrict access to their SNS profile they were less likely to put that be-
havior into practice). At the same time, one can even argue that additional
privacy dimensions exist, as was evidenced when analyzing the relationship
between privacy and integrity (Study 4; Dienlin & Metzger, 2016b). Here, it
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was shown that aspects relating to anonymity, which partly resonate with
the dimension of informational privacy, can offer incremental benefit when
they are included in a specific research design.
Finally, the study showed that in addition to privacy dimensionality, it is
equally important to differentiate privacy directionality. In other words, one
has to consider from whom people desire privacy. In our last study, we
showed that it can make a large difference whether people desire privacy
from their peers or from the government (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016b). When
people reflect upon negative past behavior, they do not desire more privacy
from institutions but, instead, desire more privacy from their peers. As Laufer
and Wolfe (1977) already suggested: Sometimes it is not important to have
more privacy per se, but rather to have privacy from specific people.1
6.2.2 Privacy behaviors are not paradoxical
The second overarching finding of this dissertation is that privacy behav-
iors are not paradoxical. So far, several studies argued that online privacy
behaviors are contrary to expectation, that they cannot be predicted suffi-
ciently based on psychological antecedents and are thus paradoxical (Ac-
quisti & Gross, 2006; Barnes, 2006; Norberg, Horne, & Horne, 2007; Taddei
& Contena, 2013; Taddicken, 2014; Tufekci, 2008). However taken together,
the results of the studies arrive at a different estimation of the plausibility of
privacy behaviors.
The PPM already showed that if we distinguish between objective and
subjective privacy we have a better chance to understand users’ privacy be-
haviors (Dienlin, 2014). In addition to this theoretical argument, we adopted
an empirical theory of planned behavior-based approach (TPB; Ajzen, 1985)
and explicitly analyzed the predictability of online self-disclosure. The TPB
approach built upon the PPM by using three of the four privacy dimensions
(i.e., informational, social, and psychological privacy), and showed that online
privacy behaviors are not random or paradoxical but instead are heavily in-
fluenced by psychological antecedents such as privacy intentions, privacy at-
titudes, and privacy concerns. Results showed that the antecedents explained
1For example, in a vivid illustration Laufer and Wolfe (1977) argued that kids, above all,
prefer to have privacy from their parents.
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between 20 percent (social dimension) and 62 percent (psychological dimen-
sion) of online behaviors — effects that are large compared to those usually
found in social research.
By focusing on privacy concerns, the TPB approach analyzed antecedents
of online self-disclosure that are mostly negative. However, if we broaden
the perspective and reconsider the most important tenets of privacy theory
(e.g., Altman, 1975) it becomes apparent that this can only be one side of
the “privacy coin” and that self-disclosure should be determined by positive
aspects as well. And indeed, referring to privacy calculus theory (Culnan &
Armstrong, 1999), a growing body of research has confirmed by now that
online self-disclosure is influenced significantly by both costs and benefits
(Cheung, Lee, & Chan, 2015; Krasnova et al., 2012; Krasnova et al., 2010;
Min & Kim, 2015; Shibchurn & Yan, 2015; Sun, Wang, Shen, & Zhang, 2015).
As a result, in the so-called extended privacy calculus model for SNSs we
hence broadened the TPB approach and included expected benefits as further
antecedents of online self-disclosure.
The extended privacy calculus model replicated the results of the TPB
approach and showed that privacy concerns explained self-disclosure signifi-
cantly. In addition, results confirmed that benefits predicted self-disclosure
and that privacy self-efficacy in turn determined self-withdrawal. More pre-
cisely, perceived benefits and privacy concerns explained 30 percent of online
self-disclosures, whilst privacy concerns and privacy self-efficacy explained
14 percent of online self-withdrawal. For the context of social sciences, these
numbers again represent medium to large effect sizes (Cohen, 1988) — which
seems somewhat remarkable, and again shows that privacy behavior can
be predicted to a large extend based on psychological antecedents, arguing
against the privacy paradox.
How can we explain the diverging results on the privacy paradox? Obvi-
ously, the studies used different methods, samples, and underlying theories.
As a result, one could argue that studies which found significant relations
between concerns and behavior simply used superior methods. However, this
might be only one part of the truth, because at the same time these studies
also took completely different perspectives. Whereas those studies that sup-
ported the privacy paradox explicitly looked for discrepancies (e.g., Norberg
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et al., 2007), newer ones rather tried to bridge the attitude behavior gap and
aimed to find similarities (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015). As illustration what
this difference of perspectives can signify, let us briefly consider the following
notions (which are, of course, somewhat polemic and oversimplified):
1. Human behavior can be predicted by three variables: the person, the
situation, and the error (e.g., Lewin, 1935; Novick, 1966).
2. Error represents entropy and is chaotic. The person and the situation
represent structure and are systematic.
3. The privacy paradox focuses on the error, and thus finds entropy. The
PPM, the theory of planned behavior approach, and the extended pri-
vacy calculus model focus on the situation and the person, and hence
find structure.
At this point, Karl Popper might reply: If we look for paradoxes we will
find paradoxes, and we look for structures we will also find structures (Pop-
per, 1959/2005). Even when taking Poppers scientific desiderata of objec-
tivity, falsifiability, parsimony, and falsification into account, the question
still remains: Which aspect do we want to focus on? Finding paradoxes
or finding structures? The dissertation’s combined results hopefully show
that it might be more helpful and sustainable to adopt the second perspec-
tive, because this way we increasingly have the chance to better under-
stand a substantial part of privacy behavior online, the underlying psychol-
ogy of privacy, and to offer concrete individual and societal recommenda-
tions.
Hence, by attaching significance to situation and person the combined re-
sults of this dissertation echo the views of Rogers (1951/2003) and support a
perspective that is profoundly humanistic: Taken together, all studies provide
evidence that online behaviors are substantially based upon psychological
antecedents, and that inner values, attitudes, concerns, joys, and intentions
alike all relate to privacy behaviors. The results show that our online behavior
is not only due to error, chance, or misfortune. In conclusion, this disserta-
tion hence refutes the privacy paradox perspective and, alternatively, offers
both theoretical and empirical support for a more humanistic perspective by
emphasizing the significance of both situation and person.
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6.2.3 Privacy is a powerful predictor
The PPM, the TPB approach to the privacy paradox, and the extended pri-
vacy calculus model all aimed to contribute to a better understanding of
privacy and its underlying psychological mechanisms. However, one might
ask, “What is the big deal? Why do we need a better understanding of pri-
vacy?” By linking privacy with other more distal psychological constructs,
we arrive at the third overarching finding of the dissertation: Because privacy
has strong and paramount predictive power.
In the last study of this dissertation we analyzed the relation between
privacy and personality and, more specifically, the relation between privacy
and a novel variable, one that had not been analyzed alongside privacy so
far, which is lack of integrity. And indeed, results showed that people who
have shown more negative behaviors in the past (which can be interpreted as
a sign of lower integrity) on average desire more privacy (probably because
they face a higher risk when self-disclosing; Altman, 1976). Interestingly,
desired levels of privacy did not only correspond with integrity that was
measured with self-reports but also with integrity that was measured with
an implicit association test (Fischer & Bates, 2008, April). This triangulation
of methods further supports that the relation between integrity and desired
levels of privacy is profound, which is noteworthy given that the relation
was tested for the first time.
From a theoretical perspective, the study argues that if we engage in nega-
tive behaviors this will increase our desire for privacy. From a methodological
perspective, this is a causal and one-way assumption. It does not mean that
if the privacy needs of a person increase he or she will show more negative
behaviors. However, and by definition, this causal one-way relation still al-
lows for the following statistical inference: If we know someone’s desire for
privacy, we have a better chance to infer his or her level of integrity. However,
be that as it may, by no means we can conclude that a person who has a
high desire for privacy must have low integrity — in the end, there is only
a slightly higher chance that this might be true. Because next to significant
relations with integrity, the study also showed that the desire for privacy
relates to other (neutral) facets of personality. That is, people who are more
shy, less anxious, and more risk averse also desire more privacy.
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Taken together, the results suggest that if we know the privacy needs of
a person we can partly predict that person’s self-perceived integrity. Given
that the relation between privacy and freedom, privacy and security, and
security and freedom are all interrelated and complementary, and that one
should not come at the expense of the other, this ultimately shows one thing:
Both scholars and practitioners need to be cautious and use the predictive
statistical power of privacy with sufficient responsibility.
The research question of this final study — does the desire for privacy relate
to peoples’ integrity? — was novel altogether. Hence, the results are especially
important to contextualize. Prior research already showed that people cheat
less when they are being surveilled (e.g., Covey, Saladin, & Killen, 1989),
which supports that people who are of less integrity desire more anonymity
and privacy from the government. Similarly, other studies also found that
aspects of personality relate with the need for privacy: For example, people
who were less authentic in their relationships desired more privacy from
others (Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2013), or people who reported to be less
agreeable also desired more privacy (Erlmoser, 2016). Nonetheless, it remains
to be seen whether the relation between privacy needs and integrity will be
replicated in different contexts and with other samples. Moreover, the results
could also be challenged from a theory-based position, because the relation
might be mediated by other third variables (e.g., the need to hide something).
At any rate, Laufer and Wolfe (1977) argued already in 1977 that “what is
hidden from us either individually or collectively can be potentially harmful”
(p. 23) — a statement that the results of the last study corroborate, and which
eventually shows that it is important to extend our understanding of privacy.
6.2.4 Privacy is profoundly psychological
Finally, the last meta-finding I want to emphasize is that privacy as a concept
is profoundly psychological. What defines a concept that can be considered
psychological? According to Zimbardo, Gerrig, and Graf (2008), psychology
as a scientific discipline describes, explains, predicts, and controls individ-
ual human behavior by analyzing underlying mental processes, which most
prominently consist of cognitions and emotions. Hence, a concept can be
163
6 Overall discussion
labeled psychological when it focuses on human cognitions and emotions —
and it becomes quickly apparent that all four studies either introduced or
emphasized aspects of privacy that refer to cognitions and emotions.
First of all, and as has already been stated throughout the discussion, the
PPM introduced the concept of perception to a model of privacy. At the same
time, the PPM still maintains the concept of the objective privacy context.
Hence, there is first an objective situation, which is then processed in a subjec-
tive perception, and which finally manifests in a behavior (i.e., self-disclosure).
This tripartite and contingent distinction seems familiar in the context of psy-
chology, since it was most prominently established during the period of the
cognitive turn / revolution (e.g., Chomsky & Skinner, 1959; Dember, 1974). The
distinction is well known and reads as follows: First, there is an objective
stimulus, which is subsequently processed by a subjective organism (often
described as the black-box), which eventually leads to a behavioral reaction.2
This new cognitive perspective replaced the simpler stimulus-response or
input-output view of behaviorism, which was established by John Watson or
B. F. Skinner (e.g., Skinner, 1953/2014).
Of course, psychological aspects pertaining to privacy have also been dis-
cussed before this dissertation (maybe most prominently by the work of
Irvin Altman); however, the PPM seems to be the first privacy model that
makes this distinction explicit. And I argue that this explicitness is important
because scholars sometimes still think predominantly in the input / output
perspective. For example, take the studies that support the privacy paradox,
and let us look at their results from a slightly different angle: One could also
argue that they marvel about peoples’ behavior (output) in the context of the
Internet (input), without really focusing on the organism’s mediating cogni-
tions such as expected benefits, subjective norms, or perceived self-efficacy —
which are all of a psychological nature.
Next, both the theory of planned behavior approach toward the privacy
paradox and the extended privacy calculus model include at least some as-
pects of emotions, given that they both focus on privacy concerns. In general,
according to Katz (1960) there are three types of attitudes: affectively based
attitudes, behaviorally based attitudes, and cognitively based attitudes.3 Cog-
2Also known as SOR process
3Also known as ABC model
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nitively based attitudes represent a deliberate appraisal of an object, person,
or behavior (e.g., “I think that SNSs are useful, because they help foster
friendships”). Affectively based attitudes focus on the emotions toward these
entities (e.g., “I think that SNSs are distressing, because people always try
to impress others”). Behaviorally based attitudes are attitudes that people
infer by observing their own behavior (e.g., “I think I like SNSs, because I use
them so much”). Now, let us consider the definition of privacy concerns: “Pri-
vacy concerns capture the negatively valenced emotional attitude that people
feel when personal rights, information, or behaviors are being regressed by
others” (Dienlin, 2014, p. 286). By addressing “negatively valenced emotional
attitudes”, privacy concerns thus differ from the closely related concept of
perceived privacy risks, which measures “the expectation of losses associated
with the release of personal information” (Xu, Luo, Carroll, & Rosson, 2011,
p.46). Hence, the main difference is that privacy concerns emphasize implicit
emotions, whereas privacy risks prioritize explicit cognitions.
Interestingly, it is actually relevant to draw this distinction. Both the the-
ory of planned behavior approach toward the privacy paradox study and
the extended privacy calculus study showed significant relations between
privacy concerns and both self-disclosure and self-withdrawal. However, it
seems that privacy concerns relate more closely to behaviors than expected
privacy risks. In an additional analysis of the extended privacy calculus
(which we could not include into the publication for reasons of length),
we integrated both privacy concerns and expected privacy risks simulta-
neously to predict self-disclosure and self-withdrawal.4 And indeed, results
showed that privacy risks did not influence self-disclosure (b = 0.01, β= .01,
SE = 0.03, p = .739) and self-withdrawal (b = -0.01, β= -.04, SE = 0.01, p = .739),
whereas privacy concerns were shown to be a strong predictor of both self-
disclosure (b = -0.29, β= -.23, SE = 0.05, p < .001) and self-withdrawal (b = 0.19,
β= .45, SE = 0.02, p < .001).
4As a reminder, we measured privacy concerns with items such as “I worry about my privacy
as a result of using Facebook” or “I do not feel especially concerned about my privacy
online”. Expected privacy risks, conversely, were measured with items such as “I might be
embarrassed by information or pictures posted on Facebook” or “I might get unwanted
attention or even harassment, like from a stalker”. The scale showed good factorial validity
(χ2 = 132.50, df = 27, p < .001, CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.03).
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Altogether, the combined results imply that if we want to predict online
behavior most accurately, both internal cognitive and emotional aspects must
be taken into account, as they potentially offer a better way to open the
black-box. Overall, it becomes increasingly apparent that privacy is a concept
which is profoundly psychological.
6.3 Criticism and future perspectives
What are points of criticism and useful directions for future research? In
what follows, I offer thoughts that compared to the points put forward in the
respective studies are of a more general nature.
6.3.1 Stronger emphasis on control
What is the most important theoretical component of privacy? Whereas one
group of scholars emphasizes that privacy is about the extent of personal
withdrawal, a second group suggests that privacy is more about control. The
latter holds that privacy only exists if people can determine when and where
to self-disclose (according to Masur (2016), the first group is most promi-
nently represented by Gavison (1980) and the second group by Miller (1971)).
The PPM argues in favor of the first position, and arguably there are several
good reasons for doing so. For example, the literal meaning of the word
private is deprived, robbed, free, or personal. As the literal meaning emphasizes
withdrawal, it is thus justified to make it the central notion of a conceptual
definition of privacy. Besides, if we define privacy solely as amount of control,
the entire concept would become increasingly redundant with other notions
such as autonomy or freedom.
At the same time, there are also several good reasons to integrate aspects
of control more prominently into a definition of privacy.5 Let us briefly leave
the context of online media and turn to an example of the offline world (for
5Notably, also the PPM does incorporate some aspects of control. That is, the PPM states that
in situation where the desired level of privacy differs from the achieved level of privacy
people either change their privacy context or their self-disclosure depending on their level
of control. For example, the level of control determines whether people are either leaving
a room or switching the subject of a conversation. Nevertheless, it can still be argued that
the PPM somewhat underprioritizes aspects of control.
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which the PPM is also configured to apply). According to the PPM, a pris-
oner has to be considered completely private given that he / she is withdrawn
and all by himself / herself. However, this operationalization disregards the
psychological manifestation of privacy, in other words its cognitive and sub-
jective representation. That is, if we asked the prisoner whether he or she
would feel private or not he / she would most likely reply: “No.” Asked why,
the prisoner would probably go on: “Because I cannot decide when to wake
up, what to do, or with whom to talk. However, I could do that at home, and
only there I would feel truly private.” For the context of online media, one
could think of the following example: If we cut off the Internet connection
of a person, according to the PPM he / she should be more private. How-
ever, that person would probably not agree and rather consider this forced
disconnection as an invasion into his / her privacy. In conclusion, it seems
somewhat coercive trying to establish an academic definition of privacy that
is not shared by the individual. Constructivists such as Kelly (1991) and
also Watzlawick (1984) would probably agree, given that they have often
urged to understand psychological concepts based on peoples’ own personal
understanding, an aspect that is under-prioritized in the PPM.
Similarly, according to Laufer and Wolfe (1977) children often state that
the context in which they feel most private is not at home but outdoors —
simply because their parents cannot supervise and interfere, which provides
children with more control over their own behavior and the chance to act
independently. Children even say that the harshest invasion into their privacy
takes place when others deprive them of this exact control. “Interestingly
the inability to manage interaction stands out as the single most common
experience of invasion among our respondents” (Laufer & Wolfe, 1977, p. 34).
In conclusion, there are several good reasons why an updated version of the
PPM could benefit from incorporating aspects of control more prominently
into its central understanding of privacy.
6.3.2 Reanalysis of privacy dimensions
Another point of criticism regarding theory are the privacy dimensions as
advanced by Burgoon (1982). Burgoon (1982) argued that privacy has four
dimensions: informational, social, psychological, and physiological privacy.
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In this dissertation, I have continually referred to this dimensionality (for
example, in the PPM in Study 1 and in the analysis of the three different
dimensions of informational, social, and psychological privacy behaviors in
Study 2). However, next to several positive outcomes there are also negative
aspects to using Burgoon’s dimensionality. Most notably, the adoption of the
psychological privacy dimension proved to be somewhat difficult. The exact
definition of psychological privacy by Burgoon (1982) is as follows:
Basically, psychological privacy concerns one’s ability to control
affective and cognitive inputs and outputs. On the input side, it
involves the ability to think, to formulate attitudes, beliefs, and
values, to develop an individual identity, to assimilate personal ex-
periences with one’s understanding of the world and its problems,
and to engage in emotional catharsis free from outside impedi-
ments of interferences. On the input side,6 it entails determin-
ing with whom and under what circumstances one will share
thoughts and feelings, reveal intimate information and secrets,
extend emotional support, and seek advice. (p. 224)
As stated before, two prominent perspectives on privacy exist: One that
focuses on privacy as a withdrawal process and one that focuses on privacy as
a control process. So first of all, the statement that psychological privacy is the
“ability to control affective and cognitive inputs and outputs” (p. 224) shows
that Burgoon represents the second party. By contrast, the PPM prioritizes
aspects of withdrawal and thus understands psychological privacy somewhat
differently (Dienlin, 2014, p. 110):
I thus propose that psychological privacy be taken as a measure
of the extent to which people present in a situation engage in in-
timate and personal, or trivial and impersonal conversations. The
more that people disclose intimate information, the higher the
psychological privacy context. If people elaborate on mundane
topics like the weather, psychological privacy is regarded as low.
6Sic; should probably mean output side
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Defining psychological privacy this way offers one benefit: It ac-
counts for all the situations in which people are able to think as
they please, but not speak as they like. (p. 32)
This new definition has some advantages, most prominently because it en-
ables an operationalization of privacy that is more comprehensive. For ex-
ample, by defining it as degree of intimacy of self-disclosure it also allows
for a measurement of psychological privacy behaviors (e.g., “Do you express
personal aspects such as emotions and inner feelings on Facebook?”). Con-
versely, because Burgoon’s definition focuses on controllability it only allows
for the measurement of psychological privacy situations (e.g., “Can you ex-
press yourself freely and independently on Facebook?”).
However, the novel conceptualization of psychological privacy as advanced
by the PPM leads to different problems. First of all, it has one major flaw:
If we consider privacy as degree of withdrawal and describe situations in
which we withdraw as more private, the operationalization’s directionality
is technically wrong: Situations in which we talk about the weather should
not as is currently suggested represent situations of low psychological pri-
vacy but actually situations of high psychological privacy. Why is that, one
might ask? Because when we talk about the weather we have the chance to
withdraw and are not forced to disclose personal information. Remember
that in the extended privacy calculus model, we argued that self-disclosure
always reduces privacy. Hence, when we talk about personal aspects such
as failures or regrets, we always decrease our psychological privacy context,
and when we talk about trivial aspects such as the weather, we increase our
psychological privacy context.
Nevertheless, there are also reasons to maintain the PPM’s original direc-
tionality. The most important one is its inferential logic, given that the PPM
continually states that privacy increases the willingness to self-disclose. This
logic would not work with the new and inverted directionality, as here peo-
ple would self-disclose less when they have more psychological privacy. In
other words, with the new and inverted directionality a low psychological pri-
vacy perception should lead to more self-disclosure, which thus contradicts
the PPM inferential logic that a high privacy perception leads to more self-
disclosure. Moreover, the new and technically correct directionality would
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be counter-intuitive: Because of the fact that people only disclose personal
information in very intimate and private settings (high social and informa-
tional privacy), it intuitively feels wrong to label an intimate and personal
situation a low psychological privacy situation.
Besides these problems of terminology and inferential logic (which are,
admittedly, somewhat cumbersome), the PPM’s conceptualization of psycho-
logical privacy also reduces the capacity to distinguish between informational
and psychological privacy behaviors. This is because one could argue that
informational privacy is actually a sub-dimension of psychological privacy:
If we disclose our name, address, or birth date, situations become more inti-
mate and more personal. People can self-disclose different types of aspects:
identifying information, thoughts, or emotions. For reasons of parsimony, it
does not seem necessary to consider informational privacy as another meta-
dimension of privacy, when it could instead be considered a sub-dimension
of psychological privacy. Moreover, the psychological privacy dimension is
per se conceptually very close to self-disclosure (which is itself one of the
three elements of the PPM): By definition, the more people self-disclose, the
less psychological privacy they have. This is a somewhat circular and another
reason for a different understanding of psychological privacy.
Finally, the empirical foundation of Burgoon’s dimensionality could be fur-
ther substantiated. Since Burgoon’s work in the 1980s, the empirical method-
ology has improved significantly and it seems the time to reanalyze the
dimensionality from an empirical bottom-up perspective. Given that a sub-
stantial part of current work on privacy is build upon her work, it seems
desirable to reestablish the theory’s legitimacy.
6.3.3 Integration of affordances
The PPM differentiates between the objective privacy context and the subjec-
tive privacy perception. As mentioned above, this can be seen as a variation of
the classical antagonism between constructivism and objectivism / empiricism
(Jonassen, 1991). Recently, a novel theoretical focus of communication re-
search developed around the notion of so-called affordances. Introduced by
Gibson (1979/2015), he described the concept of affordances as follows:
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The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal,
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to
afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I
have made it up. (p. 119)
Even though Gibson originally developed the concept for visual perceptions
of animals it was quickly adopted in other contexts as well. First, commu-
nication science applied the concept of affordances in the late 2000’s for
computer mediated communication in general (e.g., Sundar, 2008), later for
social media specifically (Treem & Leonardi, 2013), and currently also for
questions regarding privacy (Trepte, 2015). For example, one affordance of
the SNSs Facebook is its positive communication, as epitomized by the like
button. Facebook designed the structure of its SNS in a way that people are
invited, almost inclined both to communicate and to like — structure and be-
havior blend into one. So, why is the concept of affordances promising? It
seems that, most of all, for reasons of parsimony. That is, affordances offer
the chance to merge objective and subjective viewpoints into one single entity.
Gibson (1979/2015) expressed this advantage very poignantly as follows:
[...] the absolute duality of “objective” and “subjective” is false.
When we consider the affordances of things, we escape this philo-
sophical dichotomy. (p. 35)
Future research could, thus, analyze the option whether including privacy
affordances might make the distinction between context and perception re-
dundant. At any rate, one could argue that the PPM’s contingent relationship
between (1) privacy context, (2) privacy perception, and (3) self-disclosure is
in fact not that strict. Technically speaking, and in the words of Baron and
Kenny (1986), the PPM implies a full mediation of the relationship between
privacy context and self-disclosure through the privacy perception — a no-
tion that one could challenge. For example, several scholars have already
emphasized that the context or situation itself can strongly influence peoples’
self-disclosure (e.g., Masur, 2016), and that this influence takes place subcon-
sciously without a deliberate cognitive representation. As a result, one could
either solve this problem by adding another path to the PPM — a path that
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would model a direct relation between privacy context and self-disclosure.
Or, instead, one could also refer to the affordances approach and treat them
as one single variable altogether.
Next, one can criticize that both the theory of planned behavior approach
toward the privacy paradox and the extended privacy calculus model did not
sufficiently discuss influences on user behavior that are external. Granted,
the two studies deliberately analyzed internal influences on online behavior
(such as personality, attitudes, or intentions). However, if one really aims to
maximize the predictability of behavioral variance one would also need to
implement external influences, factors such as social influences or infrastruc-
tural affordances. In other words, if we want to maximize our chances to find
out whether Person A leaves a post on Person B’s Facebook profile today, it
might be more important to measure whether he or she received a message
from Person B that day (social influence), and whether Person A has acti-
vated the setting to be notified upon arrival of new messages (infrastructural
affordance). However, the need to compare the influence of situational versus
personal factors when analyzing privacy behaviors has already been ascer-
tained elsewhere and will be subject matter of further research (e.g., Masur,
2016).
6.3.4 Increase of explained behavioral variance
The theory of planned behavior approach toward the privacy paradox and
the extended privacy calculus model both show that large parts of online be-
havior can be explained by means of psychological variables such as concerns,
attitudes, or intentions. As mentioned above, prior research often found a gap
between these psychological variables and behavior. The theory of planned
behavior approach was able to bridge this gap by implementing the prin-
ciple of compatibility (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Nevertheless, this approach
also has some critical aspects. Hence, let us briefly recapture the principle of
compatibility by looking at its definition:
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According to the principle of compatibility [...], an intention is com-
patible with a behavior if both are measured at the same level of
generality or specificity — that is, if the measure of intention in-
volves exactly the same action, target, context, and time elements
as the measure of behavior. (p. 44)
This leads to the problem that items measuring attitudes, intentions, and
behaviors are very similar to one another. Let us consider the following
example of informational privacy:
• Informational privacy attitude: “I think that giving information on FB
that identifies me is: not useful vs. useful”
• Informational privacy intention: “How much identifying information
do you currently want to provide on FB?”
• Informational privacy behavior: “How many personal things do you
currently communicate on FB?”
Hence, the principle of compatibility could potentially lead to a shared vari-
ance that is somewhat artificial, due only to similar wording and not mean-
ingful conceptual overlap. As a result, it is possible to conclude that one of
the TPB’s biggest strengths is also one of its most significant weaknesses.
Nevertheless, future research could still ameliorate this aspect by using a
longitudinal design that measures the behavior one or two weeks after the
prior scales were collected. In general, the entire TPB is actually configured to
analyze behavior by means of a longitudinal approach — a notion that most
studies using the TPB, however, often do not put into practice (and the study
presented here is obviously no exception). By using a longitudinal approach
no memory effects would take place, and as a welcome side effect the rela-
tion’s causality could be further substantiated. The primary way, however, of
solving problems that arise with the principle of compatibility is to analyze
concrete behavioral data, which would provide all the incremental benefits
associated with method triangulation.
Be that as it may, we can of course still raise the following (general) ques-
tion: Should we as researchers really be satisfied with explaining 30 percent
of online privacy behaviors? If the aim was to explain as much behavioral
variance as possible, which is legitimate and generally desirable, this might
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not be satisfactory. Other empirical methods such as artificial neural net-
works (ANN) are often capable of explaining more behavioral variance than
traditional statistical procedures (e.g., West, Brockett, & Golden, 1997). In this
dissertation, all empirical analyses were top-down theory-based and did not
use bottom-up automated self-learning algorithms. As a result, bottom-up
techniques such as ANN appear to be a promising path upon which future
research should try to tread — especially in the context of social sciences,
where these techniques are still not well established.
The question is: Do we really and only want to predict privacy behaviors
and privacy needs as accurately as possible? Then, of course, bottom-up
procedures such as ANN are useful. Or, by contrast, do we want to understand
privacy behaviors and needs as best as possible? If so, top-down procedures
such as theory-based structural equation modeling remain the way to go. At
any rate, future research should venture in directions that include bottom-up
methodology as well, because this might help to corroborate already existing
theories and explore new relations that might have not been addressed so
far. In conclusion, the true question does not seem to be either or, but rather
which and when?
6.3.5 Further elaboration of integrity
Of all studies, Study 4 offers the widest range for future research. Three
aspects stand out that have to be addressed. First, given the considerable
potential societal explosiveness the results ask to be replicated in different
contexts with other samples in order to further analyze the findings’ stability,
generalizability, and profoundness. Next, the concept of integrity itself needs
more research. Currently, a multitude of redundant concepts exists that have
yet to be arranged within one large, consistent, and overarching model of
integrity. Finally, future studies should continue to develop experimental
settings that help to effectively manipulate participants’ perceived integrity.
On a more general level, we addressed aspects of integrity that mostly
referred to behaviors that are illegal (or even criminal). However, other as-
pects belonging to the broader concept of integrity are relevant as well — for
example, aspects of authenticity and consistency could be very interesting to
analyze. Whereas criminality, by definition, refers closely to privacy needs
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from authorities, consistency might relate more closely to privacy needs from
other people in general. People who behave differently in distinct social con-
texts might have a stronger need to selectively withhold specific information
about themselves, which might result in a generally higher need for interper-
sonal privacy. Overall, Study 4 should be considered a first step into a novel
research direction — it will be very interesting to see which new arguments,
methods, and results future research will provide.
6.4 Societal and practical implications
What does it mean that our privacy is decreasing, how does it affect the
world that we are living in? Is this “brave new privacy” good or bad, do the
positive or the negative aspects prevail, and what can we do about it? In the
introduction, I proposed the thesis that privacy has decreased significantly
over the course of the past years, and identified the total privacy and the post
privacy reactions as the two most prominent antitheses. Can the thesis and
the two antitheses be reconciled into one synthesis?
When trying to find privacy related answers for these question, two starting
points are often suggested: the individual and the collective (e.g., Trepte, von
Pape, & Dienlin, 2016). In what follows, I adopt this differentiation and offer
some individual- and collective-oriented thoughts in order to extrapolate the
results of this dissertation.7 So, after all, let us now consider the practical and
societal implications that this dissertation can offer.
6.4.1 Increasing privacy literacy
In order to improve the way the individual engages with privacy, several as-
pects will be decisive. To date, one specific aspect seems to be of paramount
importance, which is: increasing privacy literacy. Privacy literacy “encom-
7Granted, the negative perspective of the privacy thesis and the antitheses are, to some
extent, arbitrary as one could also focus on the inherent positive aspects — for example,
that SNSs are a perfect place to leverage informational social support (e.g., Trepte, Dienlin,
& Reinecke, 2014a) or that communication on SNSs can increase life satisfaction (e.g.,
Dienlin, Masur, & Trepte, 2016). However, even though these positive evaluations are
acknowledged throughout the next section, I primarily elaborate on aspects that first and
foremost ask for improvement.
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passes an informed concern for [. . . ] privacy and effective strategies to pro-
tect it” (Debatin, 2011, p. 51). It consists of two major components: declarative
and procedural privacy literacy (Trepte, Teutsch, et al., 2015).
In terms of declarative knowledge, online privacy literacy refers
to the users’ knowledge about technical aspects of online data
protection, and about laws and directives as well as institutional
practices. In terms of procedural knowledge, online privacy liter-
acy refers to the users’ ability to apply strategies for individual
privacy regulation and data protection. (p. 339)
Privacy literacy is important because it increases agency and thus empowers
the user. The theory of planned behavior-based approach toward the privacy
paradox showed that behavioral intentions differed most strongly from ac-
tual behaviors for the dimension of social privacy. In other words, the privacy
behavior people struggle with the most are social privacy behaviors. Social
privacy behaviors represent all those kinds of behaviors that restrict access to
personal content for specific social groups. For example, on SNSs this can be
represented by the use of friends list. The behavioral problems might be due
to the fact that implementing social privacy behaviors on SNSs is difficult
and can necessitate several dozens of clicks (Bilton, 2010.05.12). Given that
users make, on average, one negative privacy experience every two months
(e.g., someone spread a rumor in the online community, or someone posted
embarrassing pictures; Trepte et al., 2014a), this is somewhat worrisome. Sim-
ilarly relevant is that even after users have made negative experiences online
they only increase their informational online privacy behaviors but not their
social or psychological privacy behaviors (Trepte, Dienlin, & Reinecke, 2014b).
Privacy literacy, as it encompasses procedural knowledge (Trepte, Teutsch,
et al., 2015), could thus help empower the user and improve the status quo.
To date, only few studies on online privacy literacy and its cultivation
exist (e.g., Hargittai, 2010; Y. J. Park, 2013). So far, we know that time spent
online and past privacy regulations are positively related with self-perceived
online privacy literacy (Bartsch & Dienlin, 2016). However, it remains unclear
whether concrete educational programs also help to leverage online privacy
literacy. Not only do people who report having more online privacy literacy
also protect their privacy more strongly, online privacy literacy is in addition
176
6 Overall discussion
associated with more perceived safety when using SNSs (Bartsch & Dienlin,
2016). Therefore, leveraging online privacy literacy seems desirable at any
rate.
6.4.2 Encouraging change
The results of the empirical studies showed that a large part of online behav-
ior can be explained based on psychological antecedents such as intentions,
attitudes, or concerns. What does this imply for a privacy synthesis? It shows
that we still have some control over our online behaviors. Our behaviors
largely represent our intentions, and our behaviors can be explained, at least
partially, by a psychological tradeoff between costs and benefits of online ser-
vices. It can therefore be stated that we are living an online life that resonates
significantly with how we want to live.
Because of that, I argue that despite the enormous power of online com-
panies such as Facebook or Google, users are not entirely powerless but still
retain a significant influence over their own virtual representation. Yes, the
status quo represents a loss of control. However, that does not mean that
people have no control whatsoever. By contrast, it seems likely that if users
can be convinced of the advantages of encrypting mails or of using privacy-
enhancing browsers such as TOR they will adapt their behaviors. Of course,
this would not change everything, but according to Dienlin and Trepte (2015)
it has the potential to change up to 30 percent of behavioral variance. There-
fore, based upon the results of Study 2 and Study 3, it is worth trying to
improve peoples’ online behavior by, for example, emphasizing the benefits
of PGP.8
6.4.3 Spreading the knowledge
The PPM aimed to provide a new theoretical framework of the way privacy
unfolds. I argue that spreading this knowledge and thus leveraging our
understanding of privacy theory could help in several ways. Why is that?
Because very similar to Lewin (1935), the PPM states that behavior depends
on the person (subjective perceived privacy) who is, borrowing the words
8Acronym for “pretty good privacy”, which is a method to encrypt e-mail communication.
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of Heidegger (1927/1996, p.127), always “thrown” into a specific situation
(objective privacy context). And by distinguishing privacy situation from
privacy perception, the PPM offers a theoretical explanation as to why so
many privacy mistakes happen on SNSs.
Let us briefly consider a typical example of a privacy mistake that hap-
pens routinely on SNSs: An employee who calls in sick at work. Later, the
employee posts pictures of a concert that he or she attended in the evening.
Unfortunately, however, the employee had forgotten that one of his / her
followers is his / her superior. The PPM advances that even though the em-
ployee was not private while he or she posted the picture from an objective
point of view, he / she nonetheless perceived to be private from his / her own
subjective point of view. If we want people to commit less privacy mistakes,
it is important to propagate this distinction — one needs to understand that
sometimes one’s feeling of privacy can be very misleading, and that the sub-
jective privacy perception can differ substantially from the objective privacy
context.
On an intrapersonal level, understanding privacy correctly could thus be
considered as a modern developmental task: How private we feel does not
necessarily imply how private we are — which is why we have to learn this
distinction. On an interpersonal and societal level, this new perspective seems
equally important to integrate. However, this might take some time: For
example, the Copernican perspective that the earth is round also took several
decades to manifest, only because the ground we are currently standing on
feels so very flat.9 At any rate, I think that by understanding how privacy
works, unfolds, and manifests, online behaviors will mature and our privacy
will be less endangered.
6.4.4 Updating the legislative system
In order to improve the way the collective engages with privacy two aspects
appear to be most decisive. First of all, the legislative system needs to be
updated. From a media psychology perspective, what seems most urgent
regarding legal measures might be that information which was passed on to
one specific company / website should be used only by this company and
9Example taken from: http://www.thebookoflife.org/know-yourself/
178
6 Overall discussion
only for those purposes that were explicitly stated beforehand. The high
number of privacy mistakes people commit show that nobody can perfectly
process who has access to his or her data. However, as privacy perceptions do
not always comply with objective privacy contexts, people cannot be aware of
how their data is being used. Regarding the factual objective privacy context,
let us consider Facebook’s statement of rights and responsibilities that defines
the following so-called IP License (Facebook, 2016):
For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like pho-
tos and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the following
permission, subject to your privacy and application settings: you
grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free,
worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in
connection with Facebook. (para. 2.2.2)
Hence, users are not given access to the information on how their data is
transferred to other companies, which makes it impossible to understand
how one’s information is being used. From a psychological viewpoint, this
is simply not sustainable.
The aspects mentioned above become even more worrisome given that
users of SNSs are willing to transfer content that is very intimate. For exam-
ple, in 2012 40% of students of one specific high school in the United States
used instant messengers or SNSs such as Facebook for sexting. Sexting rep-
resents the “transfer of sexually explicit pictures via cell phone” (Strassberg,
McKinnon, Sustaíta, & Rullo, 2013). Results showed that 20% of the students
had already sent nude pictures of themselves to others (Strassberg et al.,
2013). Therefore, the IP Licence makes it theoretically possible for Facebook
to obtain a considerable number of explicit pictures of their users and sell
them to other companies. Even though this does not seem likely, it is not
as absurd as one might think. Already to date, Facebook was shown to sell
privately shared photos to advertising agencies. Uwe Buermann presented
the case of a Facebook user who shared pictures of his family holiday in
Spain with some of his friends in a restricted photo album (Schlag & Wenz,
2015.12.19). Several months later, when the family was on their way to their
skiing holidays in the Czech Republic, they accidentally encountered one
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of the photos: On a large screen, a Czech travel agency published an adver-
tisement that depicted the family including the two children during their
holidays on the beach in Spain. Given that the user could not know that his
objective privacy context was that low, his perceived privacy when uploading
the pictures was very incorrect and misleading.
Which legal options exist? In Germany, the so-called right of informational
self-determination exists, which interdicts to pass on information to third par-
ties — information is allowed to be used only for the exact reason it was
submitted (see, e.g., Lüpken-Räder, 2012). I argue that this right should be
effective on Facebook as well. In the future, this might be the case. On the
15th December 2015, the European Parliament, the European Commission,
and the European Council agreed on the new data protection rules (Euro-
pean Commission, 2015.12.15), which are part of the general data protection
regulation (European Commission, 2012). Eventually, the following right to
object and profiling of the data protection regulation might better represent the
psychology of privacy online and could contribute significantly to a privacy
synthesis:
Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes,
the data subject shall have the right to object free of charge to the
processing of their personal data for such marketing. This right
shall be explicitly offered to the data subject in an intelligible man-
ner and shall be clearly distinguishable from other information
(European Commission, 2012, p.53).
6.4.5 Establishing a Privacy-Knigge
Regarding collective actions, other options for a privacy synthesis exist. At
its core, privacy is a behavioral concept about the regulation of interpersonal
social relationships (Altman, 1976). In social cybernetic processes, societies of-
tentimes establish norms of conduct that eventually become codified in laws,
rules, or books (e.g., Luhmann, 1984). In Germany, this was very prominently
done by Freiherr Adolph Knigge in 1788, when he published his seminal
book “On human relations” (Knigge, 1788/1853). Hoping to help and guide
people in difficult social situations, Knigge proposed several exemplary role-
model behaviors. For example, his first remark and rule on the conduct with
180
6 Overall discussion
other people is: “Society judges each human based only on the picture that
he or she portrays of himself to the world” (Knigge, 1788/1853, p.8; transla-
tion by author).10 Therefore, according to Knigge, one should always try to
be very careful and candid with others. At this moment, it might be at the
time to establish new social cybernetics by updating privacy-related norms
of conduct, and to write a first “Privacy-Knigge”.11
Which aspects would have to be included that might help to improve so-
cial cybernetics of privacy? First, considering the high number of privacy
mistakes (which mostly happen due to context collapse; boyd, 2008), soci-
ety should be aware of its own responsibility in the appraisal processes that
usually follow after someone has committed a privacy mistake. Not only
the individual but also the collective needs to learn that, today, information
leaks very easily and that it is not difficult to detect others’ idiosyncrasies
or wrongdoings. Study 4 showed that privacy needs are related to integrity,
but as complete withdrawal in order to avoid privacy errors cannot be the
solution it might be preferable for society to account for that technological
change. This means that one should not be surprised to find out inconsisten-
cies in other peoples’ life — on the contrary, one should rather expect to find
these.
Moreover, three conditions have been suggested that necessitate a more
pronounced protection of privacy (Dienlin, 2015): low publication intention,
low status of expertise, and small-scale analyses. Low publication intention
refers to the fact that it is a difference whether someone posts a message on
Twitter, which is mainly used for public communication, or if someone sends
a personal message via instant messengers such as WhatsApp, which are
primarily used for private communication. I hold that information communi-
cated in the latter needs to be protected more. Low status of expertise refers
to the status of the communicator: If someone posts racist comments on SNSs
it is important to consider whether that person is a 14 year old student ex-
pressing his or her still fleeting opinion, or if it is a person that wrote his or
her master thesis about immigration. Finally, small scale analyses represent
10In the German original: “Jeder Mensch gilt in dieser Welt nur so viel, als er sich selbst
gelten macht.”
11In fact, the German Knigge council already published a Privacy-Knigge. However, this is
only a first and preliminary online-version (Wälde, 2012)
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the difference between analyzing the post of a single identifiable person, in
contrast to a compound analysis of several anonymous communicators. The
smaller the scale the more identifiable a person becomes, the more his or her
privacy needs to be protected. If society learns to consider these three aspects
more carefully when evaluating the communications of people, including all
their various forms of privacy mistakes, hopefully a communication that is
more fair and sustainable will result.
6.4.6 Making considerate inferences
What makes the aforementioned even more relevant becomes apparent when
we reflect the results of Study 4. That is, if we analyze the privacy needs
of a person, we have a good chance to get a decent understanding about a
person’s personality. According to Trepte et al. (2013), if we know someone’s
privacy needs we can predict his or her life satisfaction, positive and negative
affect, and authenticity in interpersonal relationships. Study 4 now added
that based on the desire for privacy it is even possible to predict aspects of
integrity, shyness, anxiety, and risk aversions. For example, results showed
that people who feel more inclined to violate social rules also have a slightly
higher desire for privacy from government or from identification.
Hence, it seems that next to the several positive aspects of privacy one
should also account for the notion that privacy offers room for deviant be-
haviors, such as cheating, theft, or exploitation. From a broader perspective,
Study 4 supports that there are situations in which the benefits of surveil-
lance might outweigh the benefits of privacy. For example, surveillance in
public transport does seem justifiable, as people who have the need to avoid
public surveillance also showed having less integrity.
At the same time, we need to be very considerate in order to interpret the
aforementioned results correctly — most prominently, because the study also
evidenced relations of the desire for privacy with other facets of personality.
We have to take into account that, obviously, several other aspects also de-
termine the privacy needs of a person. Next to the aforementioned relations
with shyness, anxiety, and risk aversion, there is, for example, additional evi-
dence that people who desire privacy are, by trend, more introverted (Stone,
1986). At any rate, the results are no basis upon which to infer that a person
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who desires more privacy always has to be of less integrity — yes, there is
a slightly higher chance, but it could also be that he or she is simply more
introverted. In conclusion, privacy can be compared to all the other things
that entail both chances and risks, such as transport, sports, the Internet, or
SNSs. They all have one thing in common: They must be treated with some
consideration.
6.4.7 Having a two-sided privacy discourse
This directly leads to the next practical implication of this dissertation: If we
want to continue toward a privacy synthesis, the combined results showed
that it does not seem justified to uni-dimensionally and always strive for
more privacy. Privacy is not better in each and every situation — a notion
that was already included in Irvin Altman’s understanding of privacy (see,
e.g., Altman, 1975). Obviously, even though privacy is very important for
almost everyone there are still considerable differences in how people enact
their privacy (e.g., Trepte, Masur, Scharkow, & Dienlin, 2015).
In which situations do we need privacy as a protective and replenishing
retreat, and in which situation do we need to limit privacy in order to prevent
crime and exploitation? The answers will not always be easy and have to be
found for specific contexts separately. However, one thing becomes increas-
ingly apparent: In order to find solutions we need to discuss privacy from a
two-sided perspective, which includes both pros and cons of privacy.
6.4.8 Designing new cultural artifacts
Finally, I suggest looking at the potential influences of culture. Culturalism
puts forward that culture is one of the most powerful factors in providing
social values and social actions (Znaniecki, 1919). Books such as 1984 (Orwell,
1950) or The Circle (Eggers, 2013) and films such as Her (Jonze, 2013) or Citi-
zenfour (Poitras, 2014) are vivid examples of a culture’s strong influence on
its people. For example, Orwell’s 1984 paved the way for a healthy societal
concern regarding overtly repressive, exploitative, and omnipresent states.
The term big brother became a commonplace expression and provided a pal-
pable way for everyone to describe the atrocities of too much surveillance.
Cultural artifacts have the power to change perceptions, values, and actions.
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It might be time for a new 1984, a new novel that presents an exem-
plary way to deal with the current challenges. For example, a novel that
describes the story of the birth of an Anti-Facebook, an Anti-Google, or
an Anti-Amazon. A coalition of anti-companies, which could culminate in
a clash between a prior and a future economy. A new Das Kapital (Marx,
1867/1990), but with privacy as a novel currency. The Circle (Eggers, 2013)
ranked 7th place in the New York Times’ bestseller list — hence, given that
the public is currently very interested in the topic, now might be a good time
for another try.
6.5 The privacy synthesis
Both antitheses, the post privacy and the total privacy reaction, encompass
their individual part of the truth. However, a true privacy synthesis cannot
be as extreme as the two antitheses. It is time to talk about privacy from a
two-sided perspective, a perspective that is more mature: So far, the exist-
ing privacy antitheses focused too strongly on one side — I argue that the
conversation about privacy needs to be distinctively more differentiated.
Based on the results of this dissertation, I hence suggest the following pri-
vacy synthesis: Modern societies should try to design new cultural artifacts
about privacy, update old and obsolete social privacy cybernetics, foster a
better understanding of the conceptual nature of privacy, work toward new
and more protective privacy laws, and, above all, aim to leverage overall
privacy literacy.
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